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Under what circumstances are NGOs unable to gain access to vulnerable populations? What are the implications for aid policy?

HiiDunia — Mon, 20 Feb 2012 19:15:28 +0000

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Under what circumstances are NGOs unable to gain access to vulnerable populations? What are the implications for aid policy? (3)

Author: Hannah Taylor

Introduction

Gaining access to vulnerable populations is frequently a difficult task. Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) face many circumstances where they are unable to gain access to vulnerable populations, as well as fierce criticism when they fail in their relief efforts. As with much of aid and development, the story isn’t wholly negative and there have been significant technical innovations recently that have facilitated improved access for NGOs. NGOs continue to operate in remote, unpopular and hostile environments and the challenges they face should not be overlooked. The aim of this paper is not to criticise what is already widely regarded as a flawed sector within the aid industry; rather it is to constructively contribute to the debate on access. I will draw out two main thematic areas under which NGOs are unable to gain access to vulnerable populations, namely: technicalities and hostile conflict zones. Following on from that, I will explore the idea that these circumstances mask deeper factors in providing relief; strategic interest and convenience. These influences are indicative of a shift in aid policy which I will discuss in an analysis on the implications of ‘access’ on aid policy in terms of conceptual, political and practical implications.

At this juncture, it would be wise to clarify some the key terms used here. When referring to NGOs in this paper, I am largely referring to specialist emergency NGOs who relief agencies who provide assistance. Access applies both to NGOs in terms of their access to vulnerable people, as well as to people in terms of their access to assistance. This paper will only look at NGOs’ access to people, but it is still important to recognise the duality of access in understanding it as a concept. Access ‘enables an impartial assessment of, and response to, people’s needs’ (Mancini-Griffoli & Picot 2004:12). I have taken vulnerable populations to mean those that are prone to suffering conflict, sustained poverty or emergencies such as famine. For the purpose of this essay I will be focusing on access issues relating to man-made disasters and humanitarian crises as opposed to environmental disasters.

Under what circumstances are NGOs unable to gain access to vulnerable populations?

NGOs attempt to provide assistance and relief to any person who is in need of assistance and unable to receive it from their own state. The four Humanitarian Principles developed by Henri Dunont of the Red Cross; Impartiality, Neutrality, Humanity and Independence, form the modus operandi from which NGOs operate. In consultation with the literature, I have drawn out two main themes that occur in accounts of when NGOs are unable to gain access. Though there are different circumstances of denied access in the literature, for brevity’s sake, I will illustrate the thematic areas of technicalities, and conflict zones as the main overarching circumstances as to why NGOs are unable to gain access to vulnerable populations.

Circumstances of technicalities

NGOs often find themselves unable to gain access to vulnerable populations because of bureaucratic regulations and a lack of accurate data leading to ‘forgotten populations’. These circumstances represent challenges to NGOs and have important policy implications. The bureaucracy surrounding NGO registration in Bosnia and Iraq serves as a good illustration of where NGOs are unable to gain access to the vulnerable because of technicalities. Bolton and Jeffrey argue that NGO registration was a tactic employed by authorities to control relief efforts and NGO access, adding that ‘the legislation in Bosnia and Iraq acted as a barrier to entry to organisations that were small, underfunded, or had significant political differences with the international authorities’ (Bolton & Jeffrey 2008:604). The implications on aid policy of this was that the NGO registration process became a deeply political matter and NGOs found themselves having to either disregard the law or identify themselves with a ‘side’. Another illustration of bureaucracy came from the Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) where it reported that in January 2000 there were ‘seventeen locations which were made inaccessible by air due to flight restrictions imposed by the government’ (Marriage 2006:481).

Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) conducted a survey in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) which was ‘invaluable for documenting the plight of forgotten populations … in desperate need of assistance’ (Herp 2003:142). Whilst it is true that these surveys are typically only conducted in broadly accessible areas, it is worth noting that there are regions so remote and rural in the world that many NGOs would be unable to gain access to the vulnerable simply because they did not know they existed. These ‘forgotten populations’ are conveniently identified through these surveys and NGOs are able to implement their programmes.

Circumstances of conflict and hostility

Areas consumed by conflict and hostility are, by far, the most commonly cited circumstances of NGOs being unable to gain access to vulnerable populations. Conflict in the DRC, Iraq and Afghanistan are recent examples of countries where NGOs have repeatedly struggled to gain access to vulnerable populations due to hostility and insecurity. In 2003, NGO workers in Iraq were affected by a profound sense of insecurity and experienced numerous assassination attempts against personnel (Bolton and Jeffrey 2008). Rebel held areas in the DRC remained hostile to NGOs, and ‘between December 1999 and July 2000, MSF was forced to suspend activities in Kimpangu due to insecurity’ (Herp 2003:143). Even in areas not directly affected by the conflict, MSF found that in some provinces there were huge numbers of refugees but ‘roads and bridges throughout … have literally disappeared, making many areas practically inaccessible’ (Ibid.:144).

Under the surface of these circumstances lies a stark reality that in some (but not all) circumstances, insecurity can be linked back to the way that NGOs are operating. ‘They should be asking whether aspects of the way they are imposing their own formulae on the local reality could be leading to this kind of misunderstanding’ (Harragin & Chol 1998:37). Whilst this is not particularly constructive in the debate on terms of access for NGOs, it further iterates the point that NGOs consistently give reasons for not being able to access the vulnerable without studying the real causes of hostilities. Almost all circumstances, whilst often legitimate, are masking deeper motivations by NGOs for gaining access to and providing relief for vulnerable populations. Access based on strategic interest and convenience, provides us with two alternative explanations of why NGOs are really unable to gain access to the vulnerable.

Securing Strategic Interests

One of the biggest questions facing aid workers and policy makers alike is why NGOs push for access in some countries despite obvious security restrictions in order to assist vulnerable populations (such as in Iraq and Afghanistan) and why they remain apathetic to crises of monumental proportions (for example the famine experienced by the Dinka in South Sudan in the late 1980s, see Keen 1991). Indeed, during the 1980s there was little regard for the law or ‘hostile environments’ on the moral grounds that people were suffering and had needs that could be met. Despite involving crossing into a sovereign territory illegally, in the 1980s, 200 NGOs were involved in a discrete cross-border relief operation carrying much needed aid into war-torn Afghanistan (Duffield 2007:73). Along with numerous unglamorous tales of taking risks, this is testament to the commitment of aid workers the world over to get access – and ultimately aid provision – to those who need it most. And those who need it most generally tend to be the least accessible (a logical deduction). However there is often more at stake than acting on what is morally ‘right’, and the pressures on donors to act according to their home political environment and ensuing strategic interests are great. One study succinctly illustrates the importance of strategic interest and safeguarding regional security by comparing the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo (which resulted in a large scale humanitarian intervention), next to the relatively unpublicised and unassisted protracted crises in both Angola and Sudan (Olsen 2003:118).

As we can see from the following data, aid recipients are rarely the countries that need aid the most; instead countries of strategic importance to the big donors of the West tend to receive the biggest aid flows. The data was pulled from the OECD database, and to act as a useful comparison I have listed the ten countries with the lowest Human Development Index (HDI) rank. The data is illustrative for this purpose but a much more thorough analysis comparing the use of such different data sets is beyond the scope of this essay.

Figure 1. Top Ten Vs Bottom Ten

Source: OECD www.oecd.org/dac/stats, UNDP http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/

Furthermore, we can understand that ‘assuaging the conscience of the industrialised world’ (Harragin & Chol 1998: 60) is also important to agencies. In this way, NGOs are not targeting the vulnerable based on requests from the vulnerable themselves, rather as a way of proving to the world that they are assisting the needy (Ibid.:60). In this way, we can challenge the framing of the ‘vulnerable’ in the pledge of NGOs to provide humanitarian assistance by realising that the targeting of the vulnerable – though central to the self-image of aid – might not be the best way of reaching those in need, or of providing relief full stop (Ibid.:61).

Whilst this could easily lead us on to a more considered discussion of the motivations behind the giving and receiving of aid and the framing of access, this will not be done here. What we can conclude though is that the moral basis for gaining access to vulnerable populations is not a good enough method by which to understand access; whether or not a donor country has strategic interests in an area is more indicative of whether or not an NGO will then gain access or not (Herp 2003; Whitman 2005; Olsen 2003; Hendrickson 1998). In their paper on the determinants of levels of assistance, Olsen convincingly argues that the degree of political interest can help explain why NGOs gain access to some humanitarian crises and not others (Olsen, Carstensen & Hoyen: 2003).

Implications for aid policy

In order to properly evaluate and assess the implications of the aforementioned issues on aid policy I will look at conceptual, political and then finally, practical implications.

‘Rather than moral terms, the need for post-interventionary development is now based on security grounds’ (Duffield 2007:81). A key impact on aid policy is revealed here; we have entered a new era of conceptualising humanitarianism whereby security factors must be taken into account when considering access and assistance. Though these sorts of shifts are not new (example: the shift in aid policy in the 1980s that saw a diminished role for the state and a new powerful role for NGOs; Duffield 2008), they are dually significant; intra state conflicts have risen in the past 20 years, and, the distance between military and relief responses has shrunk considerably leading to combined efforts in humanitarian crises. This does unfortunately come with its own set of problems, though there is not space to explore these here.

Another conceptual implication which consistently links back to themes discussed here and elsewhere in the literature on access is the framing of access, and the role of denial in sustaining assistance; facilitated by a language of rights and principles (Marriage 2006:479). The ‘responsibility to protect’, for example, and the authority that NGOs have claimed without any real legitimacy is an illustration of this. Unfortunately there lies a large gap between the conceptual universalist claims proclaimed by NGOs and relief agencies, and their practical failure to provide assistance in accordance with their defining principles. Marriage uses the example of OLS to highlight this gap, and the practical challenges that NGOs encounter in trying to relieve humanitarian crises whilst also trying to maintain funding and favour.

In the Save the Children study on vulnerability in South Sudan (i.e. a reputable agency and a widely cited publication), the authors explicitly describe Western agencies presenting themselves as the ‘solution’ in situations requiring humanitarian assistance, framing the situation from a Western perspective. ‘Overseas aid is a western solution, but the problem lies as much in its being seen as a ‘solution’ as in its being ‘western’’ (Harragin & Chol 1998:33). These issues have an impact on aid policy in the sense that NGOs feed on rhetoric and labels, framing humanitarian crises in terms that favour them and their ‘solutions’. These actions go on largely unchallenged by governments or authorities and so continues to shape aid policy as NGOs exert significant influence on future policies on how to manage and respond to humanitarian crises.

The growing body of literature on access and emergency relief is indicative of the influence that academic research has on aid policy. That is to say, as NGOs have historically failed or succeeded to gain access to vulnerable populations, academics have increasingly researched on the whys, hows, and whos, of emergency assistance and access. ‘The study has shown that it is possible to do [anthropological] research in a war zone and that has practical relevance for relief programmes’ (Harragin & Chol 1998:60). The studies and literature inform policy makers directly; when it is funded by official bodies such as the Department for International Development or Save the Children (as with the South Sudan Vulnerability Study), and indirectly; by informing future leaders and policy makers.

In terms of political implications, the sovereignty of states has historically been absolute, but a growing number of armed interventions into sovereign states such as Iraq in 1990 and Kosovo in 1999 are indicative of a shift in sovereignty. The erosion of state sovereignty as a principle that is no longer absolute happens at a time when the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ is becoming a normative feature of aid policy. ‘If a State fails to protect its populations or is in fact the perpetrator of crimes, the world must be prepared to take stronger measures’ (RtoP www.responsibilitytoprotect.org). The idea of ‘contingent sovereignty’, which emerged through the practise of negotiated access in the 1980s, has implicated a shift in aid policy; ‘humanitarian emergency demanded of Western politicians new ways to act directly in support of civilians, irrespective of their location or side in a civil war’ (Duffield 2007:75). The idea of contingent sovereignty therefore is important to understanding the political implications of NGO access to sovereign states, and how these changes have resulted in changes in aid policy. This idea can be developed and further understood in terms of practical implications through the militarisation of humanitarian interventions.

The growing involvement of the military in relief activities has led to a tangled web of government, military and aid agencies, making it unclear whose means and what ends are being pursued; not to mention the moral dilemma imposed from working in collaboration with an agency so close to the armed forces (as with the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq), and the ‘growing tendency of key donor governments to manipulate relief aid in pursuit of narrow military objectives’ (Hendrickson 1998:283). The experience of NGOs in Iraq represents a shift in the way that relief work is carried out and by whom.

Western military operations in the twenty-first century are largely strategic in securing Western interests (Iraq for securing regional security and oil interests, for example) and by looking at the militarisation of humanitarian interventions we can understand why NGOs are sometimes unable to gain access to vulnerable people. We can see that NGOs – when backed by a military mandate – are able to access areas of extreme insecurity . As NGOs were able to gain access to displaced Kurds in Northern Iraq in 1999 with the help of a 20,000 strong US-led coalition force (Bolton & Jeffrey 2008:594), we can also understand the broader context of NGOs failing to gain access to vulnerable populations in Rwanda and in the DRC because there was no military support (and minimal strategic interest) in providing assistance. So not only has increased involvement of the military impacted aid policy, but it has helped NGOs to shape their future responses to humanitarian crises to include an unprecedented role for the military.

The rights and principles that define NGOs (to be universal, to provide assistance to all and to protect the vulnerable) tell us how to interpret what is wrong and right. It follows then that the reasons given by NGOs for not being able to gain access are likely to shape aid policy so that NGOs are enabled to gain access in the future, based on the logic of right and wrong and learning from previous shortcomings. Further to this, Slim describes four areas of moral value for NGOs and relief agencies; the preservation of human life itself, human rights, justice and staff safety. Staff safety, (necessary in the context of NGO operations in hostile environments) obfuscates the first three as it appears to value the particular lives of some above all other lives (Slim 1997:248). The implications on aid policy here are clear: in prioritising the safety of staff to enable access, NGOs face a challenge to their moral values and universality.

Conclusion

Access and assistance to vulnerable populations by NGOs is a contested area for debate, with many interrelated issues which demand closer attention. I have used two thematic areas to illustrate some of the key issues and circumstances that prevent access; firstly, lack of data and bureaucracy from local authorities prevent NGOs from accessing the vulnerable because of technicalities; secondly, operating in areas of conflict and hostile environments prevents access and this is illustrated with the examples of the DRC, South Sudan and Iraq. This paper has analysed the underlying explanations for accessing the vulnerable; assistance according to the strategic interests of donors (and the sources of NGOs’ funding) as well as convenience for the NGOs themselves. We can draw conclusions that NGOs often claim reasons for inaccessibility because it suits them, in addition to the alarming correlation between assistance provided to crises in areas of strategic interest (like Iraq and Kosovo) versus a lack of assistance provided in areas of minimal strategic interest (as in South Sudan and Angola). The implications on aid policy are complex and best understood through conceptual, political and practical terms. Conceptually, we can understand that firstly there has been a move from moral responses to security based responses and secondly, NGOs and the West conveniently frame themselves as providing the ‘solution’ to crises. Politically, implications stem largely from the erosion of territorial sovereignty in favour of contingent sovereignty, and practically the implications of the militarisation of humanitarian interventions on aid policy are substantial.

There is need for further discussion as to how aid policy might shift in the future, and how the global community will continue to respond to humanitarian crises; according to need and/or according to strategic interest. It will take many more years for us to see the true successes and failures of humanitarian interventions in remote, inaccessible areas and for that reason conclusions cannot be drawn definitively.

Under what circumstances are NGOs unable to gain access to vulnerable populations? What are the implications for aid policy? (3)

Inter-Organisational Cooperation of Haitian NGOs in Education – A Haitian Perspective

HiiDunia — Sun, 08 Jan 2012 20:53:42 +0000

This version of the Report does not contain the original Executive Summary, Table of Contents, Acknowledgements, References or Appendices. To view Report in its entirety please download the PDF file.

Inter-Organisational Cooperation of Haitian NGOs in Education – A Haitian Perspective (54)

Report Author: Marike de Kloe

1. Aims and objectives

After the devastating earthquake in Haiti (January 2010), a lot of funding was pledged by different donors to build up the country. This is an enormous task, facing many challenges. Presently thousands of national and international civil society organisations are involved in different activities for humanitarian relief and development (USIP, 2010).

- One of the challenges in this process is the cooperation between all actors involved, such as government and non-governmental organisations, companies, international organisations, religious organisations and movements.

- Another challenge is the ownership of the Haitian community. This is for example addressed by a network organisation that is concerned about how decisions for reconstruction were taken: ‘We believe that the Haitian government and civil society must determine their own future and therefore should have a leading role in establishing the proper structures to make this happen’ (COE-H, February 2011).

In this project I want to address these two challenges, particularly for the development of the Haitian
education sector.

The aim of the project is to provide insight in aspects and factors that promote or hinder interorganisational cooperation for educational development in Haiti. This insight will be given, based on experiences and opinions from Haitian leaders, involved in the education sector.

Expected outcomes are:

- An overview with information about existing trajectories of inter-organisational cooperation for educational development in Haiti, including aspects and factors that strengthen or hinder cooperation between NGOs and NGOs with the government. This information can be used by civil society organisations (e.g. the Haiti Country Alliance) and donor organisations, in order to facilitate inter-organisational cooperation in Haiti and advocacy for relevant policies in education.

- Of particular interest for development management is the Haitian perspective about interorganisational cooperation, as this is scarcely available in present literature.

2. Introduction and background

This chapter provides an introduction and background information about Haiti, its education sector and the problem of inter-organisational cooperation that is addressed in this project.

2.1 Country situation of Haiti

Haiti is located in the Caribbean Sea and occupies the western third of the Island of Hispaniola (see figure 1).

Figure 1 Map Haiti

Source: CIA 2011 The World Factbook https://www.cia.gov/

Haiti was the first state in the world that proclaimed independence by defeating France in a slave rebellion in 1804. But according to Winters (2008), Haiti moved ‘to a society with a rigid class structure’ (p. 285). For decades the country has suffered from extreme poverty and inequality. Competition between elite groups generated social and political instability. Most Haitian political leaders did not serve out their full term (Schuller 2007, p.70), including Jean-Claude Duvalier and Aristide. Since 2004, UN mission MINUSTAH is present in Haiti to work with the national policy for overall security. A number of country key figures are provided in table 1.

Table 1. Key figures Haiti

Haiti was severely hit by an earthquake on January 12, 2010, leaving more than 200,000 people dead and hundreds of thousands homeless (government of Haiti PDNA, 2010). This earthquake has damaged an already extremely weak public system, including education and health sectors. A second disaster at the end of 2010 was a cholera outbreak, which has already affected more than 122,000 people from which at least 2,600 died (Oxfam, 2011). Haitian authorities lack capacity to provide sufficient services to its population.

An example of the resilience of Haitians is that ―despite the rubble and the ruin there was a timid sense of hope in the capacity of Haiti to overcome in the very first weeks after the quake (UNICEF, 2011). The way how Haitians deal with disasters is described by Nicolas, Schwartz & Pierre (2009). They stress that an understanding of the cultural strengths of Haiti (e.g. community connections and religion) is essential for organisations involved in service provision.

One year after the earthquake, Haiti is in a transition phase from relief activities towards structural development of the country. At present, there are critical concerns about the reconstruction process, for instance: ‘Many aid agencies continue to bypass local and national authorities in the delivery of assistance, while donors are not coordinating their actions or adequately consulting the Haitian people and key government ministries when taking decisions‘ (Oxfam 2011, p. 3). Also a perceived lack of consultation with Haitian civil society organisations by the Haitian government fed a sense of marginalization’ (Progression, 2010, p.8). This is a risk, as based on lessons learnt, participation of local civil society is necessary for an effective disaster response (ALNAP, 2009).

2.2 The education sector

Schools in Haiti are mainly operated by non-public organizations (around 90%, see figure in annex 1). Since the 1930s, the relative share of the public schools has declined (The World Bank, 2010). The number of non-public schools has grown and includes for-profit private schools run by entrepreneurs, schools run by churches and community schools. NGOs are involved in supporting different interventions in education at local and national levels (Wolff, 2008).

Data for education in Haiti have to be interpreted with caution, due to lack of reliable monitoring by the Ministry of Education. Table 2 provides a number of key figures in education.

Table 2. Key figures education in Haiti

Table 2 shows an increase of primary education enrolment in previous years. The low completion rates for primary education are partly due to high drop-out rates and the presence of a large number of students who are over the normal age for their grade (The World Bank, 2010).

Present most significant problems in education are related to enrolment (reconstruction of schools after the earthquake), teacher training, salaries and teacher’s status, weak school management, lack of information about quality standards, overall weak governance and low relevance (Woord en Daad, 2010). In a survey of the education sector, Mérisier (2010, p. 8) stresses the importance of improved information sharing and institutional development of organisations active in education.

Many problems in the education sector cannot be solved by individual schools that are dealing with the weak government capacity. But in general there are concerns about the coordination and cooperation between national and international NGOs and the government (e.g. by the prime minister, NPR, 2010). Michaëla Jean, special envoy for UNESCO (2011, p.4) states: At the present moment, there is an incredible number of scattered educational projects, but there is no coordination.‘Notwithstanding, initiatives for coordination and cooperation in education exist. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has set-up a coordination systems with clusters, after the earthquake. The Education Cluster includes about 200 organisations (UNICEF, 2011, p. 11). Also many of the non-public schools are part of one or more networks (Woord en Daad, 2010).

2.3 Problem description

From the description of the general context of Haiti and its education sector, it becomes clear that the situation is complex, with:
- A context of extreme poverty;
- Weak public and democratic structures;
- Many different organisations involved in education;
- A transition-phase from humanitarian relief activities to development programmes;
- Influence of international organisations in national policy decisions and implementation.

Messages about large budgets pledged by the international community for relief and development in Haiti are accompanied by:
- critics about the coordination of to be financed projects;
- concerns about the way of involvement and ownership of the Haitian community.

In this environment the project is addressing the problem of inter-organisational cooperation in the Haitian education sector. There is a need to get more insight in the existing trajectories and structures of cooperation, and in aspects and factors that influence cooperation and coordination, from a Haitian perspective. This could be relevant for policy makers and donors.

The project is in particular addressing a need of the Haiti Country Alliance, including four Haitian NGOs and one Dutch NGO (see also paragraph 4.3). Since November 2010, these organisations have started working as an alliance2 and decided to explore further opportunities for cooperation, internally as an alliance and externally with other actors. More insight in different types of cooperation could help these organisations to take the right steps on the way forward.

3. Nature of the problem

This chapter provides a description of inter-organisational cooperation for educational development from a theoretical perspective. This exploration leads to a number of research questions (paragraph 3.5) for the problem as addressed in this project..

3.1 Inter-organisational cooperation: why?

Why is inter-organisational cooperation in the education sector of Haiti desired? The ‘usual general aspiration’ for inter-organisational cooperation ‘is the achievement of some form of collaborative advantage’ (Vangen & Huxham, 2003, p.6).

A commonly used institutional framework makes a distinction between state, civil society and market (Robinson, Hewitt & Harriss, 2000, p.5). The actors of this framework can also be distinguished in the education sector in Haiti: the Ministry of Education, the civil society organisations in service delivery and advocacy, and the market, which includes the connection of graduates with the labour market and the ‘market for schools‘ (The World Bank, 2010). This institutional framework is often combined with three ways in which organisations relate to each other: the ideal types coordination, cooperation and competition (Robinson, et al., 2000). Nevertheless in reality all sort relationships seem to exist and ‘there are numerous situations in which different types of organizations are working together in various arrangements, to resolve collective problems‘ (ibid., p.5). In this regard it should be noted that division of responsibilities and funding between the government and civil society in Haiti is a sensitive political issue (see also Francois, 2011). A current global trend is that Education sector policies in almost every country now call for some form of partnership between government and these [civil society] organizations’ (UNESCO Global Monitoring Report 2008, p.173).

Hewitt (2000) mentions a non-exhaustive list of ‘reasons for setting up inter-organisational
relationships:
- Gains in scale and scope (in research, products, service delivery, etc.);
- Meeting flexibility of demand;
- Information sharing;
- Building complementary skills and resource synergy;
- Strengthening competitive position;
- Access to new technologies and/or new markets;
- Protecting an existing resource base against competition;
- Strengthening a group of organisations as a political lobby’ (p.53).
The key commodity is knowledge. Depending on the form and context ‘inter-organisational relationships offer advantages that transcend reliance on either the market or the hierarchy, or improve their functioning’ (ibid, p.54).

3.2 Inter-organisational cooperation: how?

How do organizations cooperate and which factors influence inter-organisational cooperation? A number of theories help to explain cooperative relationships. Hewitt (2000, p.60) listed:
a) Transaction cost economics: cooperation is motivated by transaction cost efficiency. Forms of governance are asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency of transactions.
b) Resource dependence view: cooperation is driven by strategic and social factors and focuses on needs and opportunities.
c) Inter-organizational relationships: collaboration has advantages for allocation and strategies to cope with imbalances and dependency in the environment.
d) Network theories: emphasis on access to and use of information, learning and social capital. Smith, Caroll & Ashford (1995) add: ‘Network theory explains cooperation in terms of the position of cooperating partners in a network of relationships’.

From each theoretical perspective, there is another emphasis on how cooperative trajectories are influenced or can be strengthened, such as:
a) Economic factors
b) Available specialised expertise
c) An unsure political environment
d) Obligations based on trust.

Generally, the importance of a shared vision for working in a collaborative partnership is mentioned by Penrose (2000, p. 255), based on lessons learnt.Brett (2000, p.20) explains that ‘peaceful interaction is only possible where each agency respects the right of all of the others and where viable institutions exist which embody and enforce the rules which allow them all to exchange scarce goods, services and payments on a secure and equitable basis’. He also emphasizes the importance of ‘a strong motivation rather than formal systems’ or certain skills or resources for organisational performance. Besides he mentions that effective results for development only can be produced if the theories about inter-organisational cooperation are ‘combined with a detailed knowledge of the local situation’ and ‘cultural expectations’ (ibid. p.48).

In their research programme Vangen & Huxham (2003) use a number of issues ‘that are repeatedly raised by practitioners as causing anxiety or reward in collaboration’:
- Aims and objectives
- Accountability
- Commitment and determination
- Compromise
- Appropriate working processes
- Communication
- Democracy and inclusiveness (membership)
- Trust
- Power

Ranade & Hudson (2003, p. 33) also suggest a list of ‘necessary conditions for success in co-evolving partnerships’ (adapted from Pratt et al., 1999).
- Building relationships : need of time to explore purpose
- Changing mental maps : people see themselves as a whole and stop shifting blame to other parts of the system
- Diversity : mix of people to enable new possibilities to emerge
- Expectations : not just money, but also passion and energy for change
- Iteration : try and try again
- Leadership : facilitate common ownership and responsibility for the whole
- Future: incentives which enlarge future possibilities

From this paragraph it is clear that a lot of different conditions (e.g. respect), means (e.g. communication) and external factors (e.g. institutional environment) play a role in inter-organisational cooperation. Specific research data from practitioners in the Haitian (education) context could not be obtained.

3.3 Interaction patterns in network cooperation

The previous paragraph provided different theoretical explanations for inter-organisational relationships. Within the network theories, Wielinga and Zaalmink (2008), have developed the ‘ecological perspective’ and FAN approach (Free Actors in Networks), with a focus on energy and connections to steer things along. According to the ecological perspective, ‘networks of people behave like ecosystems. They form complex structures which enable a division of tasks and specialisation. This enables benefits of scale, as long as the network participants are interconnected‘ (Wielinga & Zaalmink, 2008, p.9).

One of the tools in the FAN approach (used as inspiration) is the circle of coherence. This instrument focuses on two dimensions of interaction. The content dimension shows what we know and want, from differences to similarities. The relational dimension involves the relationship between me and we, from my interests, ability, influence, etc. to our interests, ability, influence, etc. These two dimensions provide four interaction patterns. Between the extremes is a vital space in which mutual trust develops (ibid., p.20).

Figure 3. Circle of Coherence

Source: MDF Consultancy (2011)

http://www.mdf.nl/page/MDF-SERVICES/Facilitating-Processes/Training-Courses/

Figure 3 shows the dimensions and quadrants:
1. Exchange: Will this network be worthwhile for me personally? Do the returns balance my
investment?
2. Challenge: Which position can I take in the network? Is my effort valued enough? Is it
challenging enough?
3. Structure: How do we organise ourselves? What is the best task division? How do we
maintain the structure?
4. Dialogue: What motivates the others? What lessons can we learn from each other?
Each of the four patterns requires attention for a healthy interaction. Normally the start is in quadrant 1, but after a while patterns alternate. When participants go outside the circle, they come into non-vital patterns, such as escape (quadrant 1), fight (quadrant 2), resignation (quadrant 3) or adaptation (quadrant 4). Interventions can be done to stimulate the vital patterns (ibid.).

This model could be useful when analysing interaction patterns in inter-organisational cooperation of NGOs for educational development in Haiti. It can also provide recommendations for improvement, as a facilitator (free actor) could intervene to break through barriers and recover connections.

3.4 Trust and inter-organisational cooperation

Previous paragraphs already mentioned the development of trust in a cooperation. This section explores two different categorizations from types of trust.

Harriss (2000), who also refers to other authors, states that cooperation and networking depends on the existence of trust. He distinguishes the following types of trust (Zucker 1986, in: Harriss, 2000, p.238):
1. Process based trust – associated with past or expected exchange
2. Characteristic-based (or ascribed) trust – associated with personal characteristics e.g. family
3. Institutional-based trust – associated with formal societal structures
With regard to cultural differences, Harriss (2000) concludes: ‘Trust relations can be built op, or
destroyed. These processes may be influenced by social values and norms which are part of the
culture of a society, but they are not absolutely determined culturally‘ (p.241).

Dietz, Gillespie & Chao (2010) wrote a chapter in a book about a cultural perspective on organizational trust. They work with a definition of trust from Rousseau et al. (1998, p.395): ‘a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behaviour of another’ (ibid. p.10). Moreover:
- Trustworthiness beliefs inform the decision about trust. They are a set of beliefs that the trustor has about the other party.
- Propensity to trust is a person’s predisposition towards trusting other people in general. It is understood to be a facet of personality influenced by early developmental experiences, and by cultural background.
- Trusting behaviour in work contexts has two categories: reliance (relying on another party’s skills, knowledge, judgments or actions, including delegating and giving autonomy), and disclosure (sharing work-related or personal information of a sensitive nature with another party). Trusting behaviour is the likely outcome of trust, but not guaranteed as other contextual factors can influence trust behaviour.

Central for trust development is the quality of evidence gathered about the other party and the quality
of the interpretation of this evidence (ibid.).

In the same book, Bachmann (2010, p. 93) argues that the nature and quality of trust varies over different cultural and institutional environments. He distinguishes:
1. Interaction based trust – assumes frequent face-to-face meetings and developing some
familiarity.
2. Institution based trust – gives more emphasis to institutional regulation and generally
accepted rules and structures of a business community.

Normally both categories of trust play a role, but one is more dominant than the other, depending on the culture and context. For instance interaction based trust is prevalent in many UK business relationships, while institution based trust is stronger developed in German business relationships. Another example about cultural differences is that a formal contract in America tends to precede trust by underwriting it, while in China strong trust seems to be a pre-condition of signing (Dietz et all, 2010, p.21).

These theories and examples show that it is interesting to find out how specific aspects and conditions for cooperation and trust are perceived in the Haitian culture and context.

3.5 Research questions

The exploration in the previous paragraphs has addressed a number of aspects that are relevant for inter-organisational cooperation. These aspects are included in the following research questions that should be answered in the investigation.

1. Why do organisations enter and participate in inter-organisational cooperation trajectories for educational development?
a. What are (written) objectives for cooperative relationships?
b. How are the understanding and perception of objectives and interests and is this different from the written objectives?

2. How do organizations cooperate and which factors influence the inter-organisational cooperation for educational development?
a. What are conditions and criteria for inter-organisational cooperation?
b. What are interaction patterns and means for inter-organisational cooperation?
c. What are factors that promote and/or hinder cooperation?
d. What is the role of trust and trust building in cooperation?

Answers will also provide information for recommendations about how to strengthen effective and efficient inter-organisational cooperation for educational development in Haiti, between NGOs and with the government.

Definition:
Inter-organisational cooperation trajectories refer to the practice of NGOs (and other institutions) to work in common (e.g. in a network, consortium or alliance), with commonly agreed-upon goals and possibly methods, instead of working separately in isolation.

Note: in this project, ‘inter-organisational cooperation’ can include all different types of collaboration
between an NGO and another institution and does not necessarily exclude aspects of the ideal types of ‘coordination’ and ‘competition’.

4. Research methodology and design

This chapter provides a description of how the problem and research questions are investigated in the project. The sections describe the methodology and provide an overview of the participants and their organisations.

4.1 Methodology
The research questions as defined in paragraph 3.5 are about ‘why’ and ‘how’. For answers to these questions, semi-structured interviews can be used as a methodology of investigation (Potter and Subrahmanian, 2007). Collected data will not be used for quantitative generalisations, but gives insight in the variety of aspects and factors that play a role in inter-organisational cooperation for educational
development in Haiti.

For the interviews a semi-structured interview guide is constructed, see annex 2. The guide is based on the research questions, but also very open. For the data collection, a focus on practical knowledge from experiences of the respondents is desired (to avoid unrealistic ideas). Therefore the interview guide starts with an open question to explain about a cooperation trajectory in which the respondent is or was involved in. Based on this practical story, other questions can be added and related to practice. Also the questions about examples from respondents of ‘good’ and ‘weak’ cooperation give room for a lot of practical experiences. The sequence of the questions in the interview guide can be different per interview, depending on what is mentioned by respondents. In all cases, the interviews end with the same last question.

During the interviews, giving suggestions to the respondents about the content is to be avoided. For example, one of the research questions is about the role of trust in cooperation. But respondents are only asked about relevant ‘means and factors’ in cooperation trajectories. In case the word ‘trust’ is mentioned, an additional question can be asked to explain this aspect.

The selection of ‘key informants’ was done with the aim to collect a wide range of different viewpoints (Woodhouse, 2007, p. 164). I restricted my selection to ‘respondents with a Haitian nationality, related to NGOs that are part of an inter-organisational cooperation trajectory in education’. I could not talk to a representative of the government, due to the election period. I also did not select people who are not involved in inter-organisational cooperation trajectories, but probably the hindering factors for interorganisational cooperation were sufficiently known by the involved respondents. I included the rinciple of triangulation by involving more than one person (maximum three) per organisation. I have also chosen to talk to people from different ‘levels’, e.g. the director of the network and a member organisation.

17 interviews with respondents (3 female, 14 male) were organised and planned in a two-week visit to Haiti (February-March, 2011). I started with contacting the partner organisations I already knew from my professional network. They informed me about contact details of other related networks and organisations and were intermediaries in arranging appointments and office space.

The interview lengths vary from 30-40 minutes and they are audio recorded and transcribed. After the first interview I made some minor changes in the questions, mainly ‘wording’. In total 6,5 hours of interview data are collected. 12 interviews were in French and 5 in English, depending on the preferred language of the respondent.

Additionally from the organisations or networks involved in the interviews, documents (grey material) are collected about their objectives and activities.

By arranging and having the 17 interviews, similar challenges were experienced that are evident for cooperation trajectories, in the area of communication and logistics. Only 5 out of 17 interviews were exactly on the initially planned time and place. Other interviews were postponed, varying from an hour till some days. Transportation was not easy, due to situation of the roads and the traffic in Port au Prince.

I has been tried to contact three extra respondents per email, but there was no response, so their input
could not be included.

4.2 Respondents
The selected respondents were connected to 6 cases of inter-organisational cooperation trajectories that I knew from my professional experience. Details of the trajectories and numbers of respondents are provided in table 3.

Table 3. Inter-organisational cooperation trajectories and respondents

The respondents from the 6 different cooperation trajectories were also involved in other trajectories and these experiences were discussed in the interviews as well:
1. COSPE is member of the education cluster (strategic group) and related to FONHEP and FEPH.
2. CRECH is partner of the Haiti Country Alliance and related to COSPE and FEPH
3. The Education Cluster has COSPE en FONHEP and FEPH as members
4. FEPH is involved in FONHEP, COSPE, CRECH and the Education Cluster
5. FONHEP is related to COSPE, the Education Cluster, FEPH and satellite partner of the Haiti Country Alliance
6. One member of the Haiti Country Alliance is member of FEPH.

Table 6 in Annex 3 provides an overview of the number of interview fragments related to each cooperation trajectory.

Draft findings and conclusions (answers to the research questions, based on the data analysis) are
communicated per email with the respondents, to ensure that the information is correctly understood.

5. Analysis and findings

This chapter provides an overview of the findings from the data collection in Haiti.

5.1 Data features and analysis

Firstly information from the 17 transcribed interviews that was not relevant for responding the interview
questions was marked (estimation: less than 5%). The remaining text was divided into small fragments that could be categorized. After a try-out with 4 interviews, the labelling was reviewed and done for all interviews (with Microsoft Office Excel). In this process, some additional labels were added and at the end some categories could be combined and subsets made. The final categories with numbers of fragments (total 463) are included in Annex 3.

All interview fragments received 1-4 labels from the categories ‘goals and understanding’ (paragraph 5.2 and 5.3), ‘conditions and criteria’ (paragraph 5.4), ‘interaction patterns and means’ (paragraph 5.5) and ‘factors that hinder and promote’ (paragraph 5.6). Fragments have numbers (number respondent from table 4 + extra number), which are used for referencing in the respective paragraphs of findings. For the interpretation also subsets of information were made, about ‘good or weak cooperation’ and ‘hindering or promoting’, as mentioned by the respondents. Paragraph 5.7 and 5.8 describe other subsets about ‘trust’ en ‘international organisations’.

As response to the final interview question about an enabling environment for inter-organisational cooperation, people elaborated about positive conditions, means and factors that are included in the respective descriptions of findings.

The French interviews were analysed in French, but citations in this text are translated to English.

The collected data provides a wealth of information about perceptions and experiences with six
existing inter-organisational cooperation trajectories in the education sector in Haiti, from national level to school level. 76% of the respondents worked for the protestant sector (average 30-43% est., based on Salmi, 2000), the remaining 24% were Catholic or non-religious. Therefore the situation of the protestant sector is possibly somewhat more highlighted, but this is not very different from the other private schools.

5.2 Objectives
The inter-organisational cooperation trajectories COSPE, CRECH, Education Cluster, FEPH and FONHEP have written objectives:. The Haiti Country Alliance is working on this aspect (present objective is only general). Written objectives are an important step in the cooperation, according to respondents. Specific contents of objectives are already included in table 2 of paragraph 4.3

5.3 Perceptions and interests
Respondents shared perceptions about the six cooperation trajectories from their own perspectives. The described objectives are mostly known and clearly explained. Table 4 provides specific strengths and weaknesses as perceived by respondents.

Table 4. Perceptions per trajectory

A number of member organisations in the different cooperation trajectories have a strong focus on financial interests of the cooperation, while this is not the main objective of the networks (5.23). Perceptions are mainly linked to concrete results of a cooperation trajectory in practice and not to a certain structure or process. For partners with a strong financial interest, the perception is less positive if income from the cooperation trajectory is relatively low.

Working complementary to each other is a strongly desired goal and simultaneously a challenge of each cooperation trajectory. The added value of cooperation is clearer if partners are specialised in a certain domain (12.7).Only financial interest is not sufficient.

In the coordination objectives, the attention for community schools is lacking.

5.4 Conditions and criteria
Most prominent condition is a shared vision or initiative. This vision can be developed, but there needs to be a shared idea: ‘We basically agree that we want to work towards the quality of education‘ (11.6). The ‘vision’ can include a problem description (1.12), common goals (16.2) and shared (Christian) values (6.21).

There is a wish to have a strong vision for the development of Haiti (17.18). Then organizations could
work together within the framework of one vision.

Only with participation, forms of inter-organisational cooperation can continue. Organisations should be willing to participate in meetings (see also under time). Member organisations participate ‘by paying the annual fees, by giving suggestions, by praying for the organisation, by buying the products that are developed for your organisation‘ (6.10).

Transparency is another strongly emphasized condition. The Education Cluster is dealing with the challenge of increased transparency: ‘In [my organization] we do that, if we have been at a school, we say we have collected and we have spent X amount of money. We are accountable for the money we receive. (..) But not all the institutions, I don‘t know if there is a problem of security, sometimes they are reluctant‘(8.11).

Even though transparency is a essential, people always need to be respectful: ‗You cannot force him. If he has valued reasons not to share this information, you need to approach and they may tell you‘ (8.12).

Mutual respect for the own strategy of organisations, for religious differences and freedom to express your ideas (15.4) are important for respondents. In a respectful environment, people can talk easily with each other (17.22).

Ultimately cooperation is an issue of attitude and mindset. Egoism and ‘a spirit of division‘ (10.13) lead to concurrence and hinder cooperation. It is in our flag: Unity makes Strength [L'Union Fait la Force] (..) but it seems that everybody works for his personal benefit‘ (2.21). We should ‘be a least curious to trust each other so that we can try and see what we can make out of it‘ (11.17). A feeling of solidarity is positive for cooperation. Also the attitude of ‘don‘t care who gets the credit‘ (12.17) is beneficial.

Saying is doing is a condition for fruitful cooperation. A consequence is that goals should be realistic, otherwise expectations cannot be fulfilled (2.13). Four respondents explicitly mention the Ministry of Education as an obvious example from ‘saying is no doing‘. The Education Cluster has been criticized from outsiders for ‘more talking than doing‘ (9.24).

Availability of time and investments of human resources are necessary in an inter-organisational cooperation trajectory. ‘We sacrifice our time for going to invitations from other schools and other organizations.‘ (2.30) Moreover people need to create a momentum, to get better results (1.23). If you cooperate with other professional institutions, this can lead to a project. ‘Then money follows‘ (11.14).

Organisations and people need to have no fear and feel safe, to be able to share and exchange. This is the case if you can talk as freely in an office of a partner organization as you can do in your own office (17.21). The negative effect of fear is also addressed: ‘This issue, I could count at almost every meeting it would somehow come in. It‘s more like a sense of protection, an instinct‘ (12.15).

To cooperate without fear, the independency (or autonomy) of organizations needs to be accepted. Especially when there are big and small organizations in a partnership: ‗it could happen that the small organization disappears, loses its visibility and identity. It must be able to (..) have a good definition of the domain of cooperation‘ (13.21).

Legal requirements are also to be taken into consideration in certain circumstances. This can include recognition by the Ministry of Education (8.16).

One person mentioned language as reason for non-participation, as English was spoken in some (Education) Cluster meetings (instead of French or Creole), just after the earthquake (3.38).

5.5 Interaction patterns and means
Respondents indicated different types of communication and interaction as means for cooperation. It was possible to categorize these in the four patterns as distinguished by Wielinga & Zaalmink (2008): 1) exchange, 2) challenge, 3) structure, 4) dialogue (see paragraph 3.3).

Many respondents (82%) mention exchange as a first step in a cooperation: Sit down and share our ideas and share what we are doing now in our organization. This is number one‘ (15.16). Another respondent mentions the identification of shared problems (1.14). ‘One of the first factors that could hinder a good cooperation is the lack of understanding’ (2.22).

The importance of challenge was explained in an interview: ‗Your interests are not mine, even if we think we speak about the same thing. We all work for quality education. And then when we sit down to spell out what qualitative education is, we could end up fighting and screaming (…) We have to hush it out and then find a common ground (11.6). Good cooperation is a bumpy road‘ (11.10). This open way of discussing is addressed by 59% of the respondents. One person refers to the way people buy things in Haiti: they do not automatically accept things. ‘You must argue, explain and convince. And you will see soon in the dialogue what the real price is. It is 5 dollar, but they say 10 dollar. (…) Also our meetings have rich discussions.‘ (3.17). Ultimately you will come to consensus.

All respondents have mentioned the interaction pattern of structure in their interview. They mainly talked about:
- Meeting schedules and communication procedures;
- Organisational structures (consortium, alliance, network organisation, informal cooperation);
- Criteria for members or partnerships (including financial participation);
- Statutes and operational plans;
- Tasks of the different organisations involved.
If someone does not adapt to established standards for cooperation, this person has to quit (6.20). Three people explicitly point at the importance of signing for commitments: ‘for a good cooperation (…) you need signatures. With a document and signature there is much more chance that they will respect you’ (16.12).

In many cases, a dialogue (mentioned by 71% of the respondents) is understood as a desired phase in a cooperation trajectory, which is not yet realised in practice. Making use of the expertise of others is crucial. People want to motivate each other and to learn from each other. Dialogue needs a safe environment and it can be stimulated via a structured meeting schedule. Respondents regret the lack of vital platforms in Haiti for sharing, learning and coordination on community level, regional, national and international level.

Shared actions or activities for implementation of plans are very relevant in a cooperation trajectory. Actions will bring results, and make visible that saying is doing. They motivate people. Also if an organization has problems, in a cooperation trajectory you could help a bit, just very little, but this shows already that you understand the problem (1.26). For networks (e.g. CRECH or FEPH), the delivered services demonstrate to members if their participation is worthwhile or not (7.21; 10.14). Many people do not believe in institutions because they see it as people who seek personal interest: make collective benefits of actions visible (2.31) and communicate clearly about results.

Capacity building (of members) is also addressed as means for strengthening cooperation. These activities include for example training (6.3) and policy advice (9.12). It is also possible via modelling, e.g. ‘The General Assembly meeting of COSPE is a model for the member organisations‘(1.6). Two people mention the role of a facilitator, who can freely connect, either between people with innovative views or between different religious groups, for example when FONHEP started with a facilitator that brought the Catholics and Protestants together (10.2).

Budget is an important factor for the scale of activities and results in a cooperation trajectory. However, by the majority of the respondents financial means are not emphasized as a condition for cooperation, but as a relevant means when the cooperation is started and actions are planned. ‘The
budget part will come (…) that‘s what‘s going to be another level‘ (11.8). Within a cooperation trajectory, the question how to get funding can be addressed (4.21). In any case it is advisable to have
diversified funding, to spread risks (10.7).Network organizations prefer that donor organizations work through or with them, instead of directly to schools.

Specific attention was given to the importance of good leadership. Without leadership, the cooperation will remain weak (1.14). A number of networks have grown under good leadership. Moral values are very important in this regard.

All respondents talked about communication and interactions, but it was also explicitly emphasized that information via emails or a website is not sufficient. Personal contact, through visits and calls is important. ‘You should communicate a lot.(..) It is not the big, the email with a lot of tabs. (…) I depend a lot on the telephone. I write, and then I call: This is very important‘(1.17).

5.6 Factors that hinder and promote
Respondents mentioned 10 factors which hinder or promote inter-organisational cooperation.

a) Challenging institutional context
The lack of credibility of the government and civil society organisations hinders the interorganisational
cooperation (1.40). One respondent is complaining about the government: they don‘t hear, they don‘t see, they don‘t think’ (17.11). Also ‘communities are not very structured’ (5.17). Advocacy and lobby is difficult in this environment, but still necessary. A well-functioning Ministry of Planning is desired. The Ministry of Education should start-up working via l’Office National du Partenariat en Éducation (ONAPE) to strengthen the cooperation with the private education sector.

Moreover many organisations are weakly organised (1.3) and lack capacity (3.28). A focus on strengthening institutions is needed: national and regional networks, community structures, school associations and parent associations.

Specific in the private education sector it is difficult that there are schools with a ‘profit mentality‘, which cooperate ‘in a non-profit body’ (10.9).

b) Continuity
Cooperation takes time to bring results (1.42). Many projects are just financed for 3 months till 3
years. This period is often too short. Staff change positions, which hinders cooperation if this is mainly based on personal motivation. Policies should not only be linked to people (e.g. government leaders) and when a new person comes a completely new plan is made.

c) Available expertise
It promotes good cooperation if people are qualified and have sufficient knowledge about their profession (the education sector). Unfortunately baseline information from the Ministry of Education is often not available (1.36).

d) Education
The low level of education in the Haitian society could contribute to a weak culture of cooperation. Education can contribute to mindset change (17.12) and provide relevant skills.

e) Donor policies
Donor organisation can stimulate inter-organisational cooperation through funding strategies and guidelines for partners. Moreover they should promote co-funding of programmes. A negative influence from donors is visible when they prefer to implement their programs directly with schools instead of working via networks or associations (2.16).

f) Economy
Organisations have to deal with unexpected economic changes in the context and this influences also their cooperative actions.

g) Religion
Cooperation within groups with a similar religion (e.g. FEPH or CRECH) is mostly strong. It is possible, but more difficult to cooperate between organisations with different religious backgrounds.

h) Image
It is important for an organisation to have a good image. Then others want to cooperate with you and it is easier to obtain funding. Blame letters are a big risk.

i) Logistics
Lack of means for transportation and internet facilities are practical hindrances for communication.

j) History
One respondent was convinced that there are historical reasons for difficulties related to cooperation, coming from father Duvalier: the way he was leading the country, he tried to divide you, so he could rule better’ (15.3).

5.7 Role of trust
Two respondents explicitly elaborated on the role of a trust in cooperation as very important. Mutual trust means that you can ask a question to someone and you can expect that this person is going to help you if he has the capacity to do that – and also vice versa. Both of you do what you say (2.10). This shows that in the condition ‘saying is doing’ (see paragraph 5.4) could be labelled as an aspect of trust. To build trust ‘you have to have a thick skin, because you have to attempt many times‘ (11.29).

5.8 International organisations
There are good and bad experiences with cooperation between national organisations and international NGOs. International organisations do have much more funding available than Haitian organisations. Unfortunately international staffs do not always have sufficient knowledge about the context. Three people criticize the international officers in the (Education) Cluster(s): ‘All of them are suddenly experts on Haiti (…) but they should investigate what is already on the ground’ (10.18). Differences in vision about the role of the Ministry of Education also hinder fruitful coordination and cooperation. For the education sector it is a risk that the available expertise in Haiti is not fully used, when mainly young international staffs with humanitarian backgrounds are involved in the coordination.

6. Conclusions, implications and recommendations

In this chapter, based on the findings, answers are formulated to the research questions. These conclusions are further discussed in the paragraph about implications and lead to recommendations.

6.1 Conclusions
1. Why do organisations enter and participate in inter-organisational cooperation trajectories for educational development?

1 a) What are (written) objectives for cooperative relationships?
All organisations have an overall aim to work on improved quality and access to education. In general the cooperation trajectories as investigated in the interviews have the following specific objectives:
1. Improved coordination and avoiding duplication of activities in the education sector;
2. Increased effectiveness of interventions through experience and knowledge sharing;
3. Development and sharing of technical capacity in education and curricula for schools and training;
4. Strengthened processes of research and informed policy development;
5. Be a strong voice in advocacy towards the government (Ministry of Education);
6. Increased income from fundraising.

1 b) How are the understanding and perception of objectives and interests and is this different
from the written objectives?
Mostly staffs and stakeholders know about the contents of the objectives for cooperation trajectories. Table 5 gives an overview of perceptions per objective as mentioned above.

Table 5. Perceptions per objective

People’s perceptions are mainly based on concrete results. Especially as effects are on long-term, or not directly visible for each member (e.g. on national level), this is a challenge. The factor of religion (shared Christian values) is important for a positive perception.

In summary: it can be stated that there are no main difference between the written objectives and perceptions of people about these objectives. Only big differences in perception about financial gains should be avoided. In practice not all objectives have already led to clear results.

2. How do organizations cooperate and which factors influence the inter-organisational cooperation for educational development?

2 a) What are conditions and criteria for inter-organisational cooperation?
1. It is crucial that partners have a shared vision. In the beginning this is not always completely clear, but there need to be a common initiative from the beginning.
2. It is essential that there is a willingness and ability to participate. Therefore time and human resources need to be available.
3. Inter-organisational cooperation needs a positive attitude and often a change in mindset.
4. Saying is doing for each organisation. Moreover transparency is a condition for fruitful cooperation.
5. Organisations and people need to act in according to the value of respect towards each other, and towards the independency (or autonomy) of different organisations. Cooperation needs openness for sharing without fear.
6. Legal requirements need to be taken into account.
7. Lack of communication in the French or Creole language hinders cooperation.

2 b) What are interaction patterns and means for inter-organisational cooperation?

1. Four interaction patterns as distinguished by Wielinga & Zaalmink (2008) are addressed:
- Exchange is normally a first phase which asks for curiosity.
- Challenge is crucial: ‘cooperation is a bumpy road’. Without challenging each other, a cooperation trajectory will fail.
- Participants mostly mentioned the element of structure. Sometimes they give even more attention to structure and task division than to the other patterns.
- Dialogue is strongly related to learning. People see the advantage, but therefore cooperation needs to be somewhat mature already. Platforms for sharing and exchange do not always exist.
2. Shared actions are mentioned as objectives for the cooperation, but also as means to strengthen inter-organisational cooperation. Finally the results from actions count.
3. As a means in the cooperation trajectory, an organisation can give attention to capacity building of itself or other involved organisations. This is part of the process.
4. Shared implementation of programmes needs a certain budget. On the one hand the budget influences the scale of the cooperation activities; on the other hand the strength of the common vision and planning of the cooperation trajectory influences the possibilities for fundraising.
5. A cooperation trajectory can grow and bear fruits under good leadership.
6. People need personal contact for a smooth communication and cooperation.

2 c) What are factors that promote and/or hinder cooperation?

1. The institutional context in Haiti is challenging due to a lack of credibility for organisations and political instability. Developments in the history of Haiti have influenced this situation. At present institutional capacity strengthening and advocacy are recommended. Improvement of the ministry of Planning and the ONAPE office of the Ministry of Education is desired.
2. To show results from cooperation, a long time is needed. Often continuity is lacking due to financial constraints and personal changes in positions.
3. The available expertise in the country should be fully used and needs to be strengthened to promote cooperation. International organisations should also build on existing experience in Haiti.
4. With more education, people tend to develop a positive attitude and skills for cooperation.
5. Depending on the policies of donors, cooperation can be promoted (e.g. through donor criteria for proposals and donor-coordination) or hindered (e.g. preference for directly supporting schools instead of networks).
6. Economic developments can lead to difficulties in payments (of e.g. fees) or hinder the
implementation of shared projects in a cooperation trajectory.
7. Religion can both strengthen or hinder cooperation (shared religious values within a similar religious group, but there are bigger difference between religions).
8. A good or bad image of an organisation can promote or hinder cooperation.
9. Practical logistical constraints for transportation and communication can hinder interorganisational cooperation.

2 e) What is the role of trust and trust building in cooperation?

Trust and trust building is essential for cooperation, although the name of the concept is not always
mentioned explicitly.

Types of trust as distinguished by Harriss (2000):
- Example of process based trust: you work on a better cooperation if you are involved in shared actions with shared results.
- Example of characteristic based trust: preference for cooperation with people from the same religion
- Example of institution based trust: organisations should fulfil to certain legal requirements.
Respondents emphasize to build process based trust: show your results to the stakeholders and this will develop your cooperation.

The importance of personal contact in cooperation, the problem of continuity when people change positions and remarks about lacking credibility of institutions possibly indicate that interaction-based trust is stronger developed than institution-based trust in Haiti (see also Bachmann, 2010).

6.2 Implications
The aim of this project is to provide insight about aspects and factors that influence interorganisational
cooperation for educational development in Haiti. People and organisations active in Haiti can work on the improvement of inter-organisational cooperation by addressing the conditions, means and factors that influence cooperation as mentioned in the answers of both research questions. Some of these aspects are relatively simple to address, while especially some external factors cannot be changed easily. Aspects are related to each other. Possibly a focus on positive attitude change and shared values (incl. respect and transparency) will make other external factors less hindering.

From the conclusions it is clear that respondents have addressed a lot of relevant aspects from their experiences. An implication is that these Haitian people and organisations should be taken seriously and invited for active participation in the further development of policies for the country. Some recent publications about education in Haiti (e.g. The World Bank, 2010; McNulty 2011, UNESCO 2011) do not mention any inter-organisational cooperation trajectory in the education sector and reports from international NGOs mainly address the efforts of the international community. To overcome the problems in Haiti, more attention for the vision and insights from a Haitian perspective and existing cooperation trajectories in education is needed.

Conclusions are in line with outcomes of the sector analysis of Mérisier (2010) who also mentioned the importance of research, advocacy (and ONAPE) and institutional capacity building. Most elements of the theory in paragraph 3.1 and 3.2 are addressed as well. The elements of ‘power’ and ‘types of structures’ for inter-organisational structures have received less attention in the interview and this project.

In the findings, the categories from the Circle of Coherence (Wielinga & Zaalmink, 2008) were distinguished. It is possible to use this model for further development of healthy cooperation trajectories.

Conclusions about ‘trust’ are still in an initial phase. More analysis and research is needed to explore which and how elements of the conditions, means and factors can be related to the concept of trust and trust building.

The situation of the education sector and inter-organisational cooperation in Haiti is complicated and proposing oversimplified solutions will not work. A well functioning state apparatus is a major bottleneck which cannot be substituted by civil society. But on the contrary this can also not be substituted by the international community. This is to be taken into consideration for the recommendations.

6.3 Recommendations

For COSPE, CRECH, Education Cluster, FEPH, FONHEP, Haiti Country Alliance
1. Continue to build the 6 different inter-organisational cooperation trajectories and the process to (further) develop a shared vision. Moreover make your results from actions visible for the Haitian public, the Haitian government and international donors. This could increase credibility and chances for funding.

2. Focus more on the interaction patterns of ‘exchange’ and ‘challenge’ (Wielinga & Zaalmink, 2008) and avoid spending too much time and energy in ‘structure’.

General – for civil society organisations
3. Explicitly address the issue of mindset change and good leadership in interventions for education.

4. Be transparent and make others aware of the importance and advantages of transparency about activities, budgets and results.

5. Develop specialised expertise and look for cooperation trajectories that are complementary and have a specific added value. Only financial interest in an inter-organisational cooperation trajectory is not sufficient.

6. Make sure how advocacy and participation in policy development for education in Haiti is integrated in your strategies, directly or indirectly (e.g. via networks).

7. Explore how community schools could be integrated in network organisations and related to the Ministry of Education.

For the Haitian government
8. Improve the coordination of the Ministry of Education with the national and international NGOs involved in education and (via ONAPE) the private sector in education.

International donors
9. Strengthen initiatives for coordination and cooperation via donor criteria for proposals and provide
support to schools with involvement of associations and networks.

10. Be a model for inter-organisational cooperation through co-funding and harmonisation of donor efforts.

11. Make sure that ownership of the Haitian community is guaranteed in to be funded programmes.

Suggestions for further research
1. Action research of a specific cooperation trajectory, about the development of the trajectory and the interventions that can be used from the FAN approach of (Wielink & Zaalmink, 2008).

2. A broader quantitative research about the aspects and factors as distinguished in this qualitative
research, to find out specific priorities and be able to generalise findings.

3. In-depth research about the concept of trust in the Haitian culture.

Inter-Organisational Cooperation of Haitian NGOs in Education – A Haitian Perspective (54)

Cash or Food Aid? Assessing the role of resource-based transfers in achieving female empowerment and gender equity in social protection programmes

HiiDunia — Wed, 28 Dec 2011 21:29:44 +0000

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Cash or Food Aid? Assessing the role of resource-based transfers in achieving female empowerment and gender equity in social protection programmes (70)

Author: Shefali Shah

Chapter One

1.1 Introduction

The end of an era of structural adjustment policies by the nineties marked a discursive shift within multilateral institutions that oriented towards a renewed focus on global poverty. The tendency to associate women and female-headed households as the poorest and most vulnerable has had the effect of making women synonymous with poverty alleviation (Razavi, 1999). However in alluding to a “female face of poverty” across developing economies, this has been to the detriment of a contextual understanding of gender roles and relations at a household and community level (Walsh, 1998:na). It is the purpose of this research to assess the relative merits of cash and food aid in mediating intra-household gender relations and power asymmetries, and the wider impact on female empowerment. As social protection programmes gain momentum across the developing world as a means for poverty reduction, the ways in which household dynamics shape poverty is fundamental to understanding how far resource based transfers strengthen the position of one gender over another. It is this authors view that food and cash transfers as complementary aid instruments reduce intra-household gender conflicts over scarce resources whilst augmenting household welfare.

Despite the UN’s international commitment to gender justice from the mid-Seventies, progress for women has been contradicted by a growing ‘feminisation of poverty’ (Jahan, 1995). This research applies the analytical framework devised by Rounaq Jahan to the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper that guided the formation of Nicaragua’s Conditional Cash Transfer in 2000. The purpose of this is to assess how far women have been integrated into or set the agenda of development policies at the international level. The importance of this is to contribute to a better understanding of how gender issues at the macro level have been mirrored within social protection programmes on the ground. The view presented here argues international policy has followed an integrationist approach to gender mainstreaming.

Conditional Cash Transfers have grown in popularity since the success of Mexico’s Oportunidades (formerly Progresa) that became a model for replication across Latin America and developing economies. Whilst gender equality was made a key feature of programme design specifically through targeting women with cash, the wider goals of CCTs have sought to change the behaviour of poor households. Evaluations of Oportunidades have been criticised for the risks to women as a result of their explicit focus on investment in human capital. Yet the continued proliferation of such programmes particularly for low-income economies lacking institutional capacity is a cause for concern where programme design fails to promote gender awareness (Molyneux, 2006; Bradshaw and Viquez, 2008). This research thus draws on Nicaragua’s Red De Protección Social, a conditional cash transfer modelled on Oportunidades in promoting poor families’ investment in human capital. This is related to Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP); a Public Works programme providing cash or food for labour, whilst the humanitarian Food and Cash transfer (FACT) initiated in Malawi assesses resource-based transfers within a development and emergency context.

In contributing to a limited literature this study seeks to demonstrate in what context cash over food aid or indeed food aid over cash can promote female empowerment and gender equity. Empowerment is defined as women’s “choice, agency and power” to challenger their subordination (Kabeer, 1997 in Razavi, 1999: 419). It is the purpose of these case studies to provide an in-depth contextual understanding of how resource transfers can define gender relations across Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America and thus emphasise the study’s reliability. Whilst the case of Malawi reflects a humanitarian emergency initiative, the value of its conclusions has the potential to revolutionise the design of social protection programmes in both development and emergency contexts.

This study is organised as follows. Section two provides a conceptual and empirical analysis of cash and food aid and intra-household dynamics arguments, followed by a background to women in development and the meaning of empowerment. Section 3 adopts a case study analysis of the social protection schemes of Nicaragua and Ethiopia and Malawi’s Food and Cash Transfer in addition to a broader analysis of gender awareness in development policy. Section 4 concludes.

Chapter 2 – Resource Transfers, Household Dynamics, and Gender Equity: A Theoretical Background

2.1 Cash Transfers or In-kind Transfers?

Debates over the relative effectiveness of in-kind food aid as a tool for poverty reduction and food security has led to a decline in its “absolute value and relative importance” since the mid-nineties (OECD, 2006: 11). Critics questioned the cost-effectiveness of food aid and its ability to reach the poorest, whilst empirical support for cash transfers was ascertained by poor families’ tendency to exchange in-kind aid for cash, indicative of households’ preference for non-food items (Barrett and Maxwell, 2005). The fact that foods form a basic human right and cash a means of livelihood security lends support for the implementation of cash and food transfers in both development and emergency situations. Research on the benefits and limitations of cash transfer programmes has grown since the implementation of Latin America’s Oportunidades, though less is documented about the role of food and cash transfers in poverty reduction or mediating gender tensions. Whilst the adoption of cash in development situations has been widespread, there remains little conclusive evidence of the benefits and limitations of cash transfers (Kebede, 2006). Further whether cash or food is responsible for changes in behaviour or this is attributable to conditionality is equally inconclusive. Nonetheless a greater understanding of the benefits of cash and food as complementary aid instruments in promoting female empowerment and gender equity is fundamental to increasing the effectiveness of social protection programmes. To speculate, the limited literature in this area could be attributed to the lack of attention to monitoring intra-household gender dynamics at programme implementation. This was the case in RPS where less evaluative reports discussed progress than that of Oportunidades (Bradshaw and Viquez, 2008). It can be further argued that the explicit attention to human capital and results-based evidence has been to the corollary of gendered analyses.

The economic logic behind food aid purports to its role in protecting families’ investments in the health and education of their children (Barrett, 2002). Critics contend it has a negative impact on local food production, greater potential for misuse by intermediaries, delays in reaching beneficiaries, a cause of heightened aid dependency as well as poor targeting (Gelan, 2006; Barrett, 2002). Food aid was similarly labelled as paternalistic in that it gave less choice to families as consumers whilst cash could be rapidly delivered, involved low administrative costs and offered households greater diversity and choice in terms of expenditure (Standing, 2007). Further it promoted investment and the accumulation of strategic assets at the household level with greater potential for sustainable poverty reduction (Devereux et al., 2006). In Ethiopia, cash transfers generated multiplier effects that benefitted not only recipient households but also market producers and sellers who did not qualify under the social protection scheme (Gelan, 2006). However the potential for cash to be misused based on stereotyped assumptions of men as irresponsible lends support for food aid where evidence points to a higher marginal propensity for poor households to consume food transfers than to spend cash transfers on food (Devereux et al., 2006). Similarly, growing concerns over the efficacy of cash transfers in increasing food price inflation have questioned their ability to mitigate the impact of adverse shocks (Sabates-Wheeler, 2009). The global food price crisis of 2007-08 increased food insecurity in Ethiopia where cash stipends were not increased with rising inflation (Ibid.). The insecurity of cash as a means for survival within unstable developing economies, and particularly within a fragile global economy has important connotations for the effectiveness of CCT schemes.

Though limited, the research on food aid and female empowerment has stressed the benefits accruing to children where mothers are food aid beneficiaries (Khogali and Takhar, 2001). This was further supported by household expenditure surveys that indicated women are more responsible and inclined to spend resources on their children (Walsh, 1998; Bradshaw and Viquez, 2008; Soares and Silva, 2010). However like cash transfers, the effect of this on women’s own welfare and their existing obligations has implications for their power, agency and choice. Walsh argues that allocations of food aid must complement women’s work and their responsibilities as a means for alleviating their burden (1998). Similarly, even where women receive food aid there is inconclusive evidence on the equality of its distribution amongst children (Ibid.). In Mexico’s Oportunidades higher incentives were given to promote girls’ enrolment in school, but girls remained more likely than boys to drop out (Bradshaw and Viquez, 2008). How far food transfers succeed in improving the status and subsequent empowerment of women within the household and community is important for the application of these models to other contexts.

Studies have affirmed women’s preference for food or food-for-work schemes as it supplements their role in producing and preparing food. However these trends have been context specific, in Bangladesh female-headed households (FHHs) favoured cash over food aid as they had freedom of control over it (Walsh, 1998). On the other hand, where women had limited access to employment opportunities there was a greater need for cash over food aid (Ibid.). Sen asserted if the control of and access to resources was linked to the individual who contributed most to the household or held most power, women would accrue greater bargaining power from being food aid beneficiaries (1989 cited in Walsh, 1998). Yet in Indonesia the Program Keluarga Harapan (PKH), a pilot conditional cash transfer initiated in 2007, had no significant impact on altering the gendered division of labour or intra-household gender relations by making women cash beneficiaries (Arif et al., 2010). This challenges the assumption that cash would empower women as recipients (IADB cited in Bradshaw, 2008a). Similarly the priorities of poorer families were less oriented towards the education of children than to immediate household needs (Arif et al., 2010).

Food aid in social protection programmes has had the effect of emphasising traditional gender roles such as women’s role in food production (Soares and Silva, 2010). The fact that social norms inform gender roles suggests the need to challenge social stereotypes. Women in Oportunidades reported greater autonomy, status and self-esteem from cash transfers (Latapi and de la Rocha, 2009), however these analyses point to concerns over the dubious assumptions in which giving cash to women have been made, as well as the context to which they have been applied. Whilst food aid has been found to reinforce stereotypes and cash aid increases women’s voice, applying these models to developing economies requires attention to women’s existing roles within the household and society as well as intra-household gendered power relations. As Luccisiano found the attendance required by women at social talks represent social activities and may affect the way women are perceived in society (2006).

2.2 Intra-Household Gender Relations

Addressing the ways in which resource-based transfers can strengthen or weaken the position of women over men has been paid little attention within CCT literature that can be arguably attributed to the limited monitoring of intra-household dynamics in safety net programmes. However to assert this is an easy task would oversimplify the ‘subtle negotiations’ that occur between men and women at the household level (Razavi, 1999:420). Moreover as Dijkstra contends measuring the attainment of bargaining power within intra-household literature remains a significant methodological and empirical issue (2011). Nonetheless without strong contextual analysis, the gendered relations that shape individual experiences of poverty within countries and societies are susceptible to contentious generalisations that do little to augment female empowerment.

Research stipulates the potentially negative impacts of cash transfers on gender relations being; a reduction in women’s ability to control cash in contrast to in-kind aid, and the increased susceptibility of cash to ‘anti-social’ expenditure (Slater and Mphale, 2008:1). In Slater and Mphale’s gendered assessment of World Vision’s cash transfer programme, initiated in Lesotho in 2007, their findings purported to the role of cash in reducing gender conflict (2008:10). This was attributed to Lesotho’s history of migrant labour that has been responsible for women’s management of cash incomes. In the situation of cash transfers, household’s use of a ‘whole wage system’ has meant that women control income regardless of whose name it is in, and have been accepted by men (Ibid.). However the reliance of households on remittances has contributed to increased gender tensions directly relating to men’s redundancy from mining companies and subsequent disempowerment (Slater and Mphale, 2008). This has been paralleled with an increasing trend for women’s entry into paid factory work that has tilted power back towards women. Whilst this has not created new conflicts, it highlights the significance of a contextual understanding to women’s empowerment.

The difference in coping strategies of men and women particularly at times of crisis further implies the necessity of a gendered analysis. Where men reduced their level of consumption to provide for their children rather than their wives, women tended to consume less for the benefit of both their children and husbands (Slater and Mphale, 2008). Whilst all women agreed gender tensions increased during adverse shocks, evidence showed that cash could significantly reduce gender conflict where it allowed for the purchase of food and other needs. Where men are reported to waste cash on alcohol and cigarettes, this was not supported in Lesotho. Instead the differences in coping strategies were more likely to be a cause of tension as men objected to women’s tendencies to share food with their neighbours (Ibid.). Because women controlled resources this was to men’s dissatisfaction (Ibid.).

Research into intra-household dynamics has important implications for the assumption that making women cash or food beneficiaries will automatically result in the equitable distribution of resources. In Vietnam, giving cash or food to households reduced tensions because it alleviated pressure to obtain food and meet other needs (Holmes and Jones, 2010:22). However in India cash transfers to women had no effect on preventing domestic violence, whilst the conditional entry of women into employment increased household tensions where men resented women’s inability to perform their household duties (Ibid.). In the context of a patriarchal society, this emphasises how women’s empowerment is significantly influenced by the social and cultural norms that may perpetuate female stereotypes. It is interesting no less that in Peru’s Juntos programme, a CCT based on human capital investment, where women and men were incorporated within community meetings to inform both of their rights and reduce domestic violence, women’s enhanced agency, power and reduced dependence on men stemmed directly from their participation in community talks rather than the cash itself (Holmes and Jones, 2010:24). The varied role of resource transfers in heightening women’s autonomy contends to the fact that targeting women in social protection programmes has been based on limited evidence (Dijkstra, 2010). Be it food or cash, each plays a significant role in reducing intra-household tensions were resources are scarce. However where cash is provided to men this can increase conflict particularly where women have greater agency. This would suggest the potentially positive outcomes of conditional employment programmes where men and women both contribute to the household.

2.3 Women and Empowerment

Since the 1960s as women’s movements challenged the social stereotypes that perpetuated their disadvantage in developed economies, economic and efficiency arguments for women’s inclusion across the developing world promoted their productivity as key to their integration (Razavi and Miller, 1995). The United Nations declaration of 1976-85 as the Decade for Women institutionalised the promotion of women’s rights and status within the global community, a turning point in achieving gender equity and female empowerment. However by the early Eighties Ester Boserup, an influential feminist thinker, challenged the welfare approach under development agencies and NGOs that continued to depict women as mothers or wives (1981). Giving rise to the Women in Development (WID) movement, women were promoted as ‘agents and beneficiaries of development,’ such that economic change was central to female empowerment (Jahan, 1995: 12). Proponents argued that the subordination of women in society stemmed from their barriers to the productive sphere (Razavi and Miller, 1995). This was critiqued however for its depiction of women as an already marginalised group that should be added into development policy (Porter and Sweetman, 2005).

Similarly for Goetze, efficiency arguments for women’s integration into development discourse stressed what development required from women, rather than women’s needs within development (1994). Such a view has not been far removed from CCT programmes nor international development policy mandates, whereby women continue to be “working for development,” (Chant, 2008 in Molyneux, 2008:190). Feminists alike concurred that integrating women into exploitative and unequal systems did little to challenge their subordination, emphasising the need to address the social construction of men and women’s roles within development agendas. By the end of the ‘Decade’, gender mainstreaming in development represented a paradigmatic shift from integrating women in development to putting them at the centre of it. Though how far development policy and practice has moved in line with this shift has been central to women’s gains within social protection programmes.

The UN Economic and Social Council define gender mainstreaming in development as a method of making “women and men’s concerns integral…to the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of programmes” (1997 in Porter and Sweetman, 2005:2). This was supported by Gender and Development (GAD) discourse that argued gendered hierarchies restricted women’s opportunities and access to resources (Sharma, 2008). However Elson states the implementation of GAD in development policy has been in addition to existing policies rather than dictating it (2004). Rounaq Jahan conceptualised two distinct approaches to gender mainstreaming to challenge the claim that women’s empowerment and gender equality were at the centre of development policies (1995:12). Her pivotal study offers greater substance to the present analysis of CCT programmes in understanding how far women benefit under social protection programmes in terms of their status, autonomy and decision making power. In her gendered analysis of the macroeconomic policies of the World Bank (WB), United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) she argued that the means for addressing WID and GAD had been incorporated within the project frameworks of both Canada and Norway, yet the WB had not prioritised gender at each level of programme design, monitoring or evaluation (1995:68).

This paper uses Jahan’s work to apply her framework to the context of Nicaragua to assess how far the incorporation of gender issues into development policies and programmes has followed an integrationist approach or an agenda-setting approach (1995: 13). Under gender mainstreaming, an integrationist approach reflects the framing of gender issues within development policy so that women are a feature but not a primary goal. An agenda-setting approach would imply the re-conceptualisation of development policy entirely from a gender perspective, prioritising female empowerment through directly targeting women’s decision-making power (Jahan, 1995). Donors and policy practitioners claim to have adopted both an integrationist and agenda-setting approach to mainstreaming gender, prioritising integration and mainstreaming before gender equality and women’s advancement. This they contend is based on the need to ‘set the agenda’ [through women’s integration] before changing it (Jahan, 1995: 21). To interrogate this view, an integrationist approach implies women have been treated solely as “participants and beneficiaries in development policies,” (Jahan, 1995: 24) rather than decision-makers through their enhanced agency, voice and power.

To strengthen the integrity of such an argument this study incorporates the analytical framework of Molyneux and Thomson (2011) to examine how decisions at the policy level dictate programmes on the ground. They assert that sensitivity to gender in CCTs would imply the allocation of resources “directly seeks to strengthen women’s capabilities; social and economic empowerment is an explicit goal; family-friendly policies that account for women as care givers; promote gender equity by sharing responsibility amongst men; women’s voice in the programme design, implementation and evaluation” (Molyneux and Thomson, 2011: 199; Molyneux, 2008). As the PRSP that guided Red de Protección Social pertained to being “country owned, designed through national participatory processes with the assistance of the WB,” (Bradshaw, 2008a: 196) it would be expected that gender is a higher priority particularly as it is modelled on the gender aware Oportunidades. The inattention to gender no less would give credence to the contention that RPS has been based on an integrationist approach to mainstreaming gender in development. With the replication of CCTs based on existing, successful models such as RPS this analysis at the micro-level permits a greater understanding for the universal applicability of CCT schemes to other developing economies. A limitation to Molyneux and Thomson’s framework arises in the subjective definition of empowerment, thus its meaning here is discussed in 2.2A. The extent to which women’s positions within safety net schemes has been an outcome of a gender blind political economy has important consequences for women’s empowerment.

2.2a Defining Female Empowerment

Empowerment has become a buzzword within development discourse and policy circles, alluding to notions of enhanced self-esteem, self-actualisation and status with participatory governance. However as Jahan argues, self-empowerment or improving women’s access to resources is not a suffice means of challenging the structures that perpetuate gender inequality in the first place (1995). Women must become their own agents of change rather than the “passive recipients of welfare” stereotyped under the Women in Development discourse (Razavi and Miller, 1995: 4). The shift to GAD re-conceptualised the definition of empowerment as a ‘process of awareness raising and struggle’ to challenge gendered hierarchies (Sharma, 2008: 7). For Rowlands the ambiguity in the term power itself has connotations for the way in which empowerment is conceptualised and addressed within development programmes (1999 in Campbell, 1999). Kabeer similarly identifies it under categories of power; disempowerment and empowerment arguing individuals cannot be empowered without having been disempowered (2001). Rowlands adds to this where the definition of power is thus conceptualised as a means of challenging oppression and inequality, only then can empowerment be realised (1999).

Sharma debates the neoliberal conception of empowerment as a de-politicization of poverty versus a means of re-establishing power where it belongs, the former viewing poverty as something to be technically managed (2008: xx; Ferguson, 1994). For her, empowerment represents a governmental strategy to control and direct the behaviour of women towards specific ends (2008). The UNDP specifically works to ensure gender equity and women’s empowerment is met not just as a human right but a means of eradicating poverty as part of the Millennium Development Goals. This is based on the idea that women’s access to education can reduce fertility promote growth and poverty reduction. However this views women as a means to an end within development circles rather than an end in itself, with little concern for women’s welfare (Jahan, 1995). This supports the contention that definitions of empowerment within international development agencies have not sought to give power back to women but instead promoted a ‘feminisation of poverty alleviation’ (Chant, 2003 in Bradshaw and Viqeuz, 2008: 827). The expression of empowerment used within this paper expands on these author’s contributions in affirming the view that empowerment is not something that can be “done ‘to’ people or ‘for’ people…[but must be] undertaken with women,” (Rowlands, 1998 in Sharma, 2008: 7). Empowerment from here on is thus defined as power, agency and choice (Kabeer, 1997 cited in Razavi, 1999); the ability of women to challenge their subordination through self-actualisation, bargaining power and decision making power.

The claim that CCTs empower women in any given context has been a strong mechanism in gaining international support for conditional cash and food transfers. Giving cash directly to women is justified by the rationale that women are more responsible than males and subsequently more inclined to spend the cash subsidy on their children (Bradshaw and Viquez, 2008). Such imperatives have been reinforced without question by programme designers, based on an economic rationale that argues the investment in the human capital of children is key to economic growth (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009). However whilst one cannot dispute promoting the welfare of children across developing economies, there has been a level of criticism directed at the negative impact upon women. Molyneux defines what has emerged as a ‘maternal model of care’ that reinforces the gendered responsibilities of women as caregivers and within the household (2006: 22). Women in Mexico reported greater status and self-esteem as a result of their participation within Oportunidades yet Latapi and de la Rocha’s ethnographic study found women’s attendance required at talks and meetings, their participation in activities in addition to family and work obligations was a burden borne solely by mothers (2009). This suggests women gain from being cash beneficiaries but such benefits are negated by the conditions attached to cash. Importantly can any feelings of empowerment reported by women in CCTs truly equate to those felt given the opportunity to earn such money within the labour market? (Molyneux, 2006).

Critically, the assumption that men are irresponsible in terms of their use of resources has only heightened the burden placed on women to meet the conditions of cash transfer programmes. Evaluations of Oportunidades have examined the objectives of children’s enrolment in education and health programmes, overlooking the effect on women and in transforming intra-household gender relations (Adato et al., 2000). Where the male role of ensuring their household’s survival is threatened, this has contributed to increased tensions (Molyneux, 2006). However whilst the burdens placed on women have forced dropouts, the low rates of attrition in Oportunidades suggests a recognition by women of the value of CCT programmes (Latapi and de la Rocha, 2009). Nevertheless this strand of thought alludes to the reality that CCT schemes are not a one size fits all and fail to account for the complex structures of households that do not conform to stereotyped perceptions.

The intra-household allocation of resources as part of food and cash transfers has its roots in the theory behind household dynamics. The unitary approach argues that households operate as an independent decision-making body such that targeting resources by gender has little impact on programme success (Haddad et al., 1997). The collective approach on the other hand endorses a gender perspective that stipulates cash beneficiaries play a distinct role in how cash is utilised allocated (Khogali and Takhar, 2001). Whilst CCTs pertain to a collective approach in giving cash directly to women this has come only as a result of their stereotyped image as more inclined to their children’s welfare. Furthermore it does little to suggest that women’s individual needs were built into programme design, being seen as instruments in development only. Latapi and de la Rocha argue that households cannot ‘be reduced to [a] nuclear/non-nuclear dichotomy ,’ though they function best under nuclear structures (2009). Similarly the distribution of resources within households has been influenced not only by gendered power relations but social and cultural norms (Barrientos and de Jong, 2004). It follows that where decision-making power is dependent on the income contributed by a member of the household, women have greater potential for empowerment. However in Ecuador’s Bono de Desarollo Humano CCT, women had no opportunity to contribute to the decision-making process in programme implementation or reflect on how they were being affected (Molyneux and Thomson, 2011). Furthermore it is contradictory in itself that CCTs promote women’s needs and choice whilst constricting them with conditionality. Adato argues there is difficulty in ascertaining whether women’s enhanced autonomy can be attributed to the programme itself or rather the absence of males due to out-migration (2006 cited in Molyneux, 2006). A fundamental concern within conditional cash transfers is the extent to which families have been convinced of the need to invest in their children’s education or whether receiving the cash has been a greater incentive (Molyneux, 2006).

Chapter 3 – Social Protection, Gender Equity and Female Empowerment

This chapter is divided according to two main areas of analysis. First is a critical assessment of the country specific case study to determine the relationship between cash and food aid and intra-household dynamics. This is analysed in relation to their capacity to augment women’s power, agency and choice and with it gender equality. Section 3.2 examines Nicaragua’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper as a means of assessing at a broader level, how gender issues have been recognised and addressed within development policies. Significant attention is paid to RPS because as an advance on Mexico’s Oportunidades, it suggests the extent to which these models have acknowledged and redressed gender bias.

Ethiopia’s PSNP draws on the literature of Devereux et al., (2006) and Holmes and Jones (2010) and their analysis of the successes and limitations of the public works programme through a ‘gender lens’. The PSNP has been accorded a highly gender sensitive design, thus it is the intention here to relate this evidence specifically to the role played by cash aid in mediating household tensions and increasing women’s empowerment. As a cash for work scheme it provides a better understanding of the role of employment in increasing women’s status. Malawi’s unique food and cash transfer programme facilitates the assessment of food and cash together as a modality for equalising intra-household gender relations and gendered power asymmetries, particularly where conclusive evidence is lacking.

3.1 Empowering Women: Cash, Food, Food and Cash?

Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP)

The Government of Ethiopia with the support of donor financing, initiated Sub-Saharan Africa’s largest safety net programme in 2005 with the objectives of alleviating food insecurity amongst the ‘predictably food insecure’ and creating assets at the community level (Devereux et al., 2006:1; Gilligan et al., 2008). Diverging in design from traditional CCT programmes, the PSNP centred on the view that ad-hoc appeals for food aid and emergency assistance did little to overcome the asset depletion of households. Similarly it would permit a reduced dependence upon emergency humanitarian aid for those made vulnerable by their poverty (Devereux et al., 2006). Ethiopia’s PSNP functions as a Public Works and Direct Support scheme, tying cash or food to beneficiaries’ supply of labour in labour-intensive infrastructural community projects to increase household purchasing power (Holmes and Jones, 2010). For poor households unable to contribute their labour, their choice in unconditional food or cash forms their direct support (Gilligan et al., 2008).

Women’s occupation in agriculture and food security as well as their low representation in paid labour and gender-wage disparities have been incorporated within the PSNP such that one third of women are required to engage in paid labour opportunities (Holmes and Jones, 2010). This is with the intention of enhancing women’s autonomy, linked to the generalisation that access to an income equates to notions of empowerment (IADB, 2003 in Bradshaw, 2008a). An explicit feature of programme design has been to account for women’s household and child obligations through the provision of crèche services and flexible working hours to overcome their time poverty (Holmes and Jones, 2010). The PSNP is a significant advance on earlier CCTs in its recognition of the barriers to women’s empowerment. However whilst gender sensitivity has been a pervasive feature of the PSNP, there has been inconsistency in the prioritising of these services on the ground (Holmes and Jones, 2010). Furthermore the lack of attention to the role of intra-household gender relations in resource allocation questions the extent to which improving women’s welfare has been addressed.

Three quarters of the programmes 8 million beneficiaries received cash or food aid in exchange for their labour, with one quarter unconditionally (Devereux, 2006). Yet even where female labour was exchanged, stipends were directly distributed to the heads of household regardless of gender differences (Holmes and Jones, 2010). This infers programme practitioners have viewed households as a single unit and as a result overlooked the reality in Ethiopia that men and women make use of assets and resources differently. The fact that the unitary approach to intra-household resource allocation adopted here was challenged for its failure to account for gender asymmetries is evidence of an inconsistent approach to advancing women’s welfare within the PSNP. The provision of cash in this instance has served to strengthen the position of males over women in male-headed households. Women have faced uneven access to finances whilst their opportunity for enhanced voice was limited to a 30 per cent provision in the decision-making of community assets, giving credence to the view that the benefits to women as cash or food beneficiaries is confounded by unequal gender relations as well as social norms. The finding that male unemployment increased household tensions in Lesotho can be applied to Ethiopia. Though women and men entered into employment the fact that women did not necessarily receive the cash income suggests this could fuel tensions where men do not allocate resources in the same way as women. These findings suggest cash can increase gender conflicts where women are not beneficiaries, supporting the role of food aid in reducing conflict over scarce resources.

The limited literature on household preferences for food, cash or food and cash has emphasised the difficulty in knowing in what context providing one or the other is better suited (Kebede, 2006). Fifty-four per cent of households participating in the PSNP reported a preference for food only, compared to 36% for half cash half food, and 9% favouring cash only. However Devereux et al., assert this preference may have stemmed from the fact this is what they had already been provided and thus had nothing to compare it to (2006). The difficulty of implementing a control group within such programmes would explain the limited literature on the gendered allocation of resources within households. Of significance was the preference amongst wealthier households for cash, whilst poorer households favoured food and cash. This would imply that the need for food and cash has strong links to the livelihood strategies adopted by poor and wealthier households, as well as potential inclusion errors. Nonetheless, the majority of food receiving households reported consuming all of the food at home, whilst only 7% sold a proportion of it. From this it can be inferred that food aid is less likely to create household tensions as it meets immediate needs, however the fact that food only recipients were more likely to sell than those receiving both food and cash transfers may suggest otherwise. Where limited by a lack of research, it is difficult to say with certainty the reasons for some household’s sale of food aid, and in particular on what cash was spent. The fact that men and women utilise cash and value assets in distinct ways is fundamental for a better understanding of the value of food and cash transfers.

Households that expressed a preference for cash recorded their greatest spending on staple foods, groceries, clothes, health and education. Here it can be argued families’ lack of investment in education results from their level of poverty rather than the World Bank’s idea of misguided beliefs. Households in receipt of food transfers enjoyed greater income growth than those given cash, whilst transfers of cash plus food were found to offer self-reported food security, income increases as well as the ability to purchase and keep livestock (Sabates-Wheeler, 2009). This lends the support to the value of food aid when supplemented with cash as a means for achieving long-term development. This evidence also shows the value given to food aid providing greater validity for the provision of cash and food to poor families. Where Devereux et al.’s study is limited by a lack of disaggregation of resources by gender; this may be due to the non-differentiation between genders in resource transfers. In spite of this, some gender analysis can be applied to the response of participants who expressed a preference for food, cash or both (See Appendix 1). Women reported fears that cash would be spent irresponsibly thus preferred food transfers only, whilst concerns over high food prices, difficulty getting to market, and the fear that cash aid artificially augmented food prices were similarly reported by food receiving households. A limitation of food aid expressed by those favouring cash was that food aid had to be collected and brought home, suggesting a male tendency to sell food along the way or that poor households lacked sufficient labour. Cash and food together on the other hand met the food and non-food needs of households, allowed for greater food security when food prices were high whilst cash was more useful after harvests and reduced the need to sell food for cash (Devereux et al., 2006). It is clear food aid supplements livelihood strategies whilst cash permits a more effective route to sustaining livelihoods and investing in health and education through increasing purchasing power. Support for cash as a complement to food aid is justified where cash transfers are increased in line with food prices and delivery of food aid is more efficient. Of course the institutional capacity of countries is an important factor in addressing these issues.

Support for sensitivity to intra-household relations and cultural norms in the design of social protection programmes are warranted where polygamy is a norm. Where first wives were recognised as main beneficiaries in the transfer of resources, this was at the expense of second wives regardless of their participation in public works or the depth of their needs (Holmes and Jones, 2010). In terms of overall empowerment, Holmes and Jones argue that the PSNP had positive impacts on women at the individual level in terms of the enhanced opportunities for their participation in economic activities, increased knowledge, skills and self-esteem as well as contributing to male attitudinal changes (2010: 20). Forty per cent of women entered into paid labour works with both sexes having wage equality. Women reported the benefits of such employment as a greater alternative to the domestic and abusive work they often engaged in. However societal attitudes had not changed towards women workers such that male labour was more valued and given greater incentive to work (Holmes and Jones, 2010). It can be argued that women’s participation at this level has not contributed to enhancing their voice, agency or power. Similarly where women reported increased confidence and self-esteem as a result of their paid labour opportunities, this did not alter their gendered roles and responsibilities within the household. This evidence further suggests that where programme officers are not informed of the benefits of enhancing women’s empowerment, there is little hope for advancing women’s welfare. In effect no aspect of the productive safety net programme was effective in making women agents of development. The fact that these programmes seek to promote long term benefits once the programme ends is indication of a need to better assess the gendered allocation of resources within households. Women reported increased feelings of worth and gained more respect as a result of their participation in public works, whilst some noticed men shared the burden of women’s duties. However of the 8 million programme beneficiaries, these changes were witnessed amongst a minority of households. Rather than becoming the agents of change made synonymous by development agencies since the UN ‘Decade’, the advancement of women in development has been hindered by a failure to challenge social stereotypes and men’s attitudes.

Food And Cash Transfer (FACT), Malawi

The implementation of Malawi’s food and cash transfer (FACT) scheme in 2005-06 formed part of an international response to its food crisis. With CARE International, the unique design of FACT represented a humanitarian relief intervention where the provision of cash plus food offered “all the benefits of both while avoiding the limitations of each,” (Devereux et al., 2006a: vii). The innovative programme was designed to meet 50% of rural household’s food needs through a 25% food aid provision of maize, beans and oil, with 25% through a cash amount equivalent to the cost of buying that food (Ibid.). The decision was made to provide both cash and food aid in case of potential market failure to ensure nutritional requirements were met and that food reached those less able to obtain it such as female-headed households and the elderly.

The necessity of providing cash followed previous assumptions that contend it is more empowering for women; it is cost-effective and has positive impacts on local markets. Families reported the benefits of food and cash transfers in ensuring food security and to their children’s education (Devereux et al., 2006a). Under FACT men and women generally behaved in similar ways to households in Lesotho; women were more likely to share food transfers, whilst men were more inclined to lend cash to other men. Where both were received, few reported domestic violence though this is not to say it did not occur (Devereux et al., 2006a). Though women’s gendered roles have traditionally remained in the production and preparation of food, FACT had little effect on changing men’s attitudes towards shared responsibilities within the household. Even where cash and food transfers were given to the women, in many male-headed households they willingly gave the cash to their husbands (Devereux et al., 2006a). It can be argued that where the gender division of labour reinforces women’s household domain and the stereotypical male breadwinner, women have little self-esteem to assert control over cash transfers thus surrendering it to their husbands.

It is important to note that assumptions that men use money selfishly cannot be generalised to all males. In polygamous households cash was spent on their second wife and family, which couldn’t be defined as misuse. As Devereux et al., argue such situations require cultural sensitivity and attention to the complex meaning of ‘household’ (2006a). Nonetheless it was apparent that men asserted full decision making power where they were given the cash by their wives, but in 60% of cases families reported mutual discussion of how best to spend the cash. However the fact that it is difficult to ascertain the level of women’s participation within this process, for example whether they were able to assert a voice or they passively agreed does little to suggest cash transfers offer greater female empowerment when gendered power relations prevail. There is strong support for the gendered targeting of resources based on FACT and Ethiopia’s PSNP particularly in the benefits to children, however greater analysis is required to avoid encouraging a trade-off between women and children. As found in Ethiopia, the value of cash to households was significantly reduced where it was provided to men. So whilst the provision of cash to women has the potential to enhance their power and status, it cannot be asserted that this will challenge gendered power asymmetries.

Based on the studies of Ethiopia and Malawi food aid is less likely to reinforce unequal gender relations as it is entirely consumed, however in terms of empowering women it has only reinforced a traditional division of labour. Food and cash together contribute to alleviating the burdens placed solely on women with the potential for shared decision-making within the household. However where there is a concern over men’s behaviour, it is necessary to incorporate men into social protection programmes to permit a greater level of intra-household cooperation. That employment can be more empowering for women has potential for women in Ethiopia were women receive the cash, and men earn their own income. Devereux et al. suggest achieving female empowerment within cash and food transfers requires direct attention to addressing gender issues, enhancing the knowledge of community actors to support women and promote gender sensitisation training in the wider community (2006a).

Red de Protección Social (RPS), Nicaragua

Nicaragua became one of the first classified low-income countries in Latin America to implement a social protection strategy in 2000 as part of its Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) (Regalia and Castro, 2007; Bradshaw and Viqez, 2008). Implemented across two phases, Red de Protección Social was designed to alleviate short-term poverty within rural Madriz and Matagalpa whilst tackling long-term poverty through human capital formation (Maluccio and Flores, 2004). The success of RPS, determined through its objectives for achieving food security, health and nutrition as well as education dissolved concerns over the applicability of such programmes from middle to low-income countries. As the second poorest country in Latin America, RPS was designed according to Nicaragua’s own poverty and policy context and thus differed from Mexico’s Oportunidades in its economic growth focus, particularly where gender parity in education was not promoted through greater cash incentives to girls (Bradshaw, 2008a; Molyneux, 2006). Instead the Pay For Performance Model (P4P) incorporated private providers, as well as a supply side logistic that incentivised both cash beneficiaries and private services in exchange for performance conditions (Bradshaw and Viqeuz, 2008). This has been an innovation in addressing where the supply and quality of services fail to meet the growing demand for education and health services, but also suggests the promotion of GDP growth through the private sector that will trickle down to the poor.

Targeting conditional cash transfers to one member of a household inevitably risks increasing tensions between generations, gender relations, and relatives (Adato and Roopnaraine, 2004:68). In Nicaragua, the limited analysis of gender relations within the household has meant affirmative conclusions are difficult. Nonetheless, in some cases there were increases in intra-household gender tensions where men perceived women’s new income as cash beneficiaries as replacement for them (Bradshaw, 2008). Forty-three per cent of women beneficiaries reported their husbands withholding earnings for their own use, amounting to as much as 50% of their income in some cases (Ibid.). Moreover, Bradshaw found there was a greater tendency amongst women who earned their own income through paid labour to report their husbands (2008). Whilst this suggests these women may have greater levels of confidence, this can be the cause of increased conflict between men and women, particularly where women depend on their partner’s income.

In Bradshaw’s analysis of poverty in Nicaragua, women reported the causes of intra-familial violence as alcohol, economic problems and the behaviour of men and women within households (2002: 17). Whilst this was not confined to the regions in which RPS has been enacted, it can be inferred that men’s socially constructed behaviour has the potential to negatively impact household welfare whilst the scarcity of resources can create conflicts. The extent to which cash transfers increase tensions over how to spend resources is less documented but no less important. Targeting cash to women has raised women’s social standing at a community and household level, whilst their opportunity for enhanced knowledge and participation has altered intra-household gender relations (Adato and Roopnaraine, 2004). It is interesting that in Adato and Roopnaraine’s analysis of RPS impacts, men vehemently supported the targeting of cash directly to women in that men saw food production as the woman’s domain (2004). Men similarly asserted that male tendencies were for the anti-social expenditure of cash, thus warranting the need to provide cash to women (Ibid.). However men also stated that where food was not a priority then cash should be provided to men (Bradshaw, 2002). This reinforces the social construction of gender that has dictated men and women’s roles. This also suggests if food aid was being provided, men may demand to be cash recipients as this denotes their roles. A majority of respondents reported that cash eased conflicts in relieving the stress of limited resources, which purports to the valuable role of cash transfers supported by such occurences in both Ethiopia and Malawi. In some cases there were reports of men demanding cash from women (Adato and Roopnaraine, 2004). The fact that this has not been well documented is not to suggest domestic violence or gendered conflicts do not occur due to resource transfers, but points to the sensitivity of such an issue and the repercussions for women and children. The fact that other reports claimed money was rarely spent on vegetables (Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2000) suggests the important role of food transfers in such programmes, but also the variation in household priorities relative to how cash is allocated. This is not to advocate conditionality but to recognise that households cope with poverty in varying ways.

3.2 Integrationist or Agenda-Setting? Mainstreaming Gender at the Policy and Programme Level

A gendered analysis of Nicaragua’s PRSP finds support for the contention that international development policy has followed what Jahan (1995) defines as an integrationist approach to mainstreaming gender. Understood as the means by which women have been identified as participants and beneficiaries in development, without the explicit goal of redressing the structures that perpetuate their subordination, the objectives of the PRSP have not paralleled a confident shift towards GAD discourse. The UN Economic and Social Council definition of gender mainstreaming defined making gender issues a feature of the ‘design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of development’ programmes (1997 cited in Porter and Sweetman, 2005: 2). However the PRSP has pushed for labour intensive economic growth as a solution to reducing poverty with little reference to gender goals (Bradshaw, 2008a). This lends support to Elson’s (2004) argument that GAD policies have not re-shaped development agendas. The promotion of labour-intensive growth instead resembles WID arguments for women’s entry into the productive sphere. Poverty alleviation is addressed from a ‘perspective of greater generation of wealth’ through GDP growth and employment (IMF, 2006:19) yet the RPS is not designed as a conditional work programme. Though this could be the result of low investment in infrastructure and limited job creation.

Early literature on the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) process of Nicaragua discussed the integration of civil society to contribute to its design and monitoring (Dijkstra, 2011). With this the participation of women’s organisations would permit greater attention to attaining gender justice within developing economies (Ibid.). Gideon argued poverty reduction strategies needed to ‘promote women’s voice to influence development agenda’s, maintain a level of cooperation between women’s movements and policymakers, ensure transparency and accountability and make explicit the goal of gender justice’ (2006 cited in Dijkstra, 2011: 297), however whilst in theory there has been an opportunity for women’s voice and transparency this has not translated into practice (2011: 297). This supports the notion that poverty has not been viewed in the context of gender roles and relations, supporting the view that human capital and poverty reduction do not go hand in hand.

A significant trend within the PRSP is the discussion of making women beneficiaries in health and education, but this is not synonymous with action on the ground level (Dijkstra, 2011: 293). RPS has promoted two of four pillars of the IMF’s ‘strengthened’ PRSP; the investment in human capital, and social protection for the most vulnerable (IMF, 2006). Under this women have been portrayed as a vulnerable group in need of social welfare alongside that of children and the elderly. This is supported where Dijkstra asserts women have not been identified as ‘economic agents’ at any point within the paper (2011: 293). Whilst the targeting of cash to women within RPS is not confirmation of a gender approach, it purports to failure to embed gender justice within the PRS process. The idea that women have been made decision makers merely by fitting them into CCT programmes is corroborated by the application of Molyneux and Thomson’s 2011 framework to RPS. The criteria laid out by the authors purports to an allocation of resources that directly seeks to strengthen women’s capabilities, the goal of social and economic empowerment, family-friendly policies, shared responsibility amongst men and increasing women’s voice in regards to programme design, implementation and evaluation (2011). The targeting of cash to rural women in RPS has had the effect of increasing the obligations of women with a lack of attention to their existing responsibilities. Meeting the conditions for cash transfers, their attendance in community meetings and talks on how to become better mothers has had the impact of augmenting their time poverty and lowering their self-esteem as mothers (Bradshaw and Viquez, 2008). Cash allows women to meet the additional needs of their family with the benefit of meeting children’s in education, however this has been to reinforce women as what Bradshaw describes as “objects of reproduction” (2008:199). Interestingly, women beneficiaries reported significant improvements in household gender relations as a result of cash transfers, whereby the paucity of resources was a cause of conflict (Adato and Roopnaraine, 2004). This further reinforces the value of resource transfers in meeting the survival needs of poor households, rather than just their socially constructed needs.

Gender equity and female empowerment has been asserted as an indirect effect of making women cash beneficiaries as opposed to an overarching goal of CCTs. This would imply gender was not excluded in the design of RPS. However the fact that the RPS has recognised men’s stereotyped behaviours in terms of wasteful spending (Bradshaw, 2008a), their failure to address it implies an integrationist approach to gender in policy and RPS. As in Malawi and Ethiopia, male attitudes remain a significant barrier to the empowering potential of cash and food transfers. Whilst it is of credit to Ethiopia’s PSNP in recognising the need for crèche facilities the failure to implement these is further symbolic of an integrationist approach in international policy, but even less so where women in Ethiopia have not been made beneficiaries of cash transfers. The fact that RPS does not seek to encourage gender parity in education implies there is little recognition of how gender shapes poverty. Though Bradshaw and Viquez suggest this may be because primary school attendance is not unequally gendered (2008: 833). RPS identifies women according to the social construction of women’s needs in other words dictating what is best for them. The corollary of which has been to reinforce their status as “passive recipients of welfare” (Razavi and Miller, 1995: 4). This supports Goetze’s argument that WID discourse did not promote women’s strategic gender interests such as challenging social stereotypes, but what development required from women. This would support the argument that international policy has not changed with the shift from WID to GAD discourse.

In assessing whether women have the ability to be empowered based on Kabeer’s distinction between power, empowerment and disempowerment, is supported by women’s subordination under gender divisions of labour and social stereotypes. RPS has identified women solely as cash beneficiaries and not with the intention to challenge the gendered asymmetries of power that perpetuate other forms of disadvantage. The demand for public accountability and quantitative measures of progress within today’s aid industry could explain the focus on education and health targets as a definition of programme success. However this would only reinforce the need to address gender inequality from the top down. The need for effective monitoring and further research into gendered power imbalances and women’s social relations is pivotal to addressing gender equity and enhancing women’s status through CCTs. Women represent tools of development under RPS, which gives credence to the argument that policy practitioners have failed to move from an integrationist to an agenda-setting approach in mainstreaming gender. The autonomy exuded to women as cash beneficiaries has been further questioned with conditionality. If women fail to meet the conditions for which they qualify, they risk their entitlement for that period with consequences for the ability of households to meet their immediate needs. As this research has found, this augments gendered conflicts suggesting the greater importance of resource transfers than conditionality in poverty reduction, if not the “morally atrocious” nature of conditionality (Freeland, 2007).

Chapter Four

4.1 Conclusion

This research has discussed and analysed Nicaragua and Ethiopia’s social protection programmes as well as the humanitarian relief intervention that was Malawi’s Food and Cash Transfer. In seeking to assess whether food and cash transfers can better mediate the unequal gender relations and power-asymmetries within poor households, it finds cross-country comparative support for the hypothesis that food and cash transfers together have a greater capacity to reduce household gender tensions. Food and Cash together can mediate gender tensions where intra-household conflicts stem from a scarcity of resources. The case studies used show the value of resource based transfers in promoting food security in both a development and humanitarian context, as well as the ability for households to meet important non-food needs, provided women remain resource beneficiaries. The fact that men and women use resources differently is a significant finding and thus highlights the importance of a contextual understanding to gendered roles and relations at both the community and household level. The significance of this is to appreciate how resource transfers and their allocation can strengthen the position of men over women when women are not beneficiaries. As both the literature and case studies show, where men and women do not have access to their own income, this can be a cause of heightened disagreements. Similarly male disempowerment can also increase tensions in providing cash to women. This identifies the need to readdress men’s exclusion from social protection programmes to promote gender equity and mutual decision-making, otherwise food and cash aid may reinforce traditional divisions of labour where social stereotypes are not challenged.

Critically the provision of cash and food-based resources to women within CCT programmes has done little to increase women’s agency, choice and power in a context of gendered power asymmetries. Whilst women reported enhanced status and self-esteem in Nicaragua, this has been within a context of their own gendered roles. The explicit promotion of investing in the health and education of poor children has been at a corollary to the welfare of women and the recognition that poverty is shaped by gender roles and relations. The extent to which women’s reinforced division of labour and time poverty stems from a failure to address gender equity and female empowerment at a broader level is to challenge the rising profile of women under the UN since the mid-Seventies. Addressing gender justice within development programmes on the ground level has been contingent on the prioritisation of gender equity and female empowerment at the policy level. The impact of this on poverty reduction schemes at a time when the effectiveness of development aid is under intense scrutiny has severe implications for developing economies and the poor reliant on assistance. This research highlights the importance of making gender equality and female empowerment an explicit goal of social protection schemes in order to promote long-term, sustainable poverty reduction.

At a broader level, social protection programmes have displaced the role of the state in the public provision of goods solely onto women in leading to what Chant has identified as the ‘feminisation of responsibility and obligation’ (2006 cited in Bradshaw, 2008a). The long-term consequences of the inattention to gender justice at both levels to paraphrase Jahan will only serve to make women’s progress in development more elusive (1995) and perpetuate existing gender inequalities in the future.

Cash or Food Aid? Assessing the role of resource-based transfers in achieving female empowerment and gender equity in social protection programmes (70)

The Learn Africa Project: Public Health, Applied Learning and Research Internship

HiiDunia — Sun, 18 Dec 2011 17:22:53 +0000

Report Author: Trevor Mattos

In October of 2010, Gordon College student Miranda MacKinnon and I began planning to do a small-scale development project in Togo, West Africa. We sought to connect Gordon College students with a non-profit organization called Clinics of Hope. Since 2004, Clinics of Hope (COH) has established and sustained several medical clinics in Togo. Local clinic staff provides essential medical services to remote communities, who would otherwise not have sufficient access to healthcare. Our vision was The Learn Africa Project, to prevent disease and promote education within a community where COH was working. We planned to supplement the COH model with support for disease prevention and education, and provide an opportunity to get students creatively involved with COH’s work on the ground, in Africa. We hoped to live within a Togolese community, in reciprocity with the people. The project aimed to facilitate discourse about development in West Africa by sharing life and work in community.

We chose a village called Ganavé in southeast Togo, where a COH clinic had been established the same year. The community was in dire need of a primary school, and healthcare initiatives to address intestinal parasites in school-age children. We planned to do three things in Ganavé:

1. Partner with community leaders to construct a three-classroom primary school.

2. Treat all school-age children with Albendazole for intestinal parasites, and effectively prevent infections from reaching the threshold of disease.

3. Concurrently conduct a village-wide research survey on health and education in Ganavé.

Meeting the educational needs of children in the least developed parts of the world is vital to breaking the cycle of poverty (Garcia, p.52). However, infrastructure remains a major barrier to achieving basic education in poor parts of the world. In a 2005 study, UNESCO confirmed “adequate infrastructure” is a major challenge to primary education in Kenya (Omwami & Keller, 2010). As nations in sub-Saharan Africa attempt to universalize primary education, existing pressures on infrastructure and human resources are exacerbated, and quality education is compromised (Omwami & Keller, 2010). “To expand enrollment without investing in infrastructure only causes the quality of education to decline” (Omwami & Keller, 2010). And to begin with, “The quality of the primary school facilities…their durability and functionality, is often abysmal” (Theunynck, p.2). Lacking infrastructure is discouraging children from finishing primary school and teachers from coming to teach (Theunynck, p.2). Therefore, one critical way to promote education is to partner in developing sound educational infrastructure.

This is what we did in Ganavé, where the situation was no different. Before leaving for Africa, we raised $6,000 to contribute to building Ganavé a three-classroom primary school. We worked closely with the village community to manage and participate in the school construction process. It was extremely difficult, frustrating, and challenging. As it stands now, the Ganavé School is without a roof. We are currently seeking funding to complete this project. Through the process we learned hard lessons about development, dependency, conflict, and resources in poor communities.

A related public health issue in West Africa, that affects education, is parasitic infection caused by soil-transmitted helminths (STH). There are 400 million school-age children infected by STH, which often leads to anaemia, attention deficits, learning disabilities, school absenteeism and dropout (WHO, 2006). Failure to treat children, who are more susceptible to STH infection (Kirwan et al., 2009), seriously inhibits childhood development (WHO, 2006).

A 2003 study in Cameroon proved that not only are children targets of STH infections, but that STH infections usually compound in children, involving more than one species, thereby increasing morbidity. High prevalence and abundance of parasitic infections raises serious concerns about morbidity in school-age children (Tchenté et al., 2003). As a result of intense STH infections in the Cameroonian community of Loum, “school children in Loum are subject to significant nutrition, education, developmental and productivity constraints” (Tchente´ et al., 2003).

But despite the harsh realities of STH, effective anthelmintic treatments, recommended by The World Health Organization, are available. “Regular treatment with…anthelmintic drugs in school-age children reduces and maintains the worm burden below the threshold associated with disease” (Bethony et al., 2006). More precisely, treatments with Albendazole successfully reduce prevalence and intensity of STH infection in children (Kirwan et al., 2009). And anthelminitic drugs (like Albendazole) can be used not only in cases of diagnostically confirmed STH infection, but also in large-scale treatment of endemic communities – significantly reducing child morbidity in these areas (Bethony et al., 2006). In 2001, “the World Health Assembly passed a resolution urging member states to control the morbidity of STH infections through large-scale use of anthelmintic drugs for school-age children in less developed countries” (Kirwan et al., 2009). The benefits of deworming children include improved iron stores, growth and strength, cognitive performance, and school attendance (Bethony et al., 2006). Moreover, children show signs of improved nutritional status and higher motor and language milestones in early childhood development (Bethony et al., 2006). In Ganavé, we distributed Albendazole to all school-age children (2-18 years) during our public health research survey. It is our hope that this initiative will improve childhood development, keep children healthier, and improve school attendance and student performance. In order to maintain child health and development, COH staff will need to continue distributing Albendazole to all school-age children at regular intervals throughout the year. We soon hope to officially establish this program along with others based on our research in Ganavé.

Prior to traveling to Togo we drafted a research proposal, informed consent document, and preliminary survey. After some revision, The Gordon College Institutional Review Board approved our research proposal, allowing us to conduct a survey in Togo. For our survey, we worked alongside 2 translators, Delali Degbeh and Sunday Olaniyan. We spent many days moving from home to home in Ganavé, and a number of neighboring villages. The experience was deeply educational, something I will never forget. Not only did we collect valuable information that could help COH be more effective in Ganavé (and distribute medicine to keep children healthier), we also greeted each family in the community, we learned their names and faces, and we heard many stories about life in West Africa.

The purpose of the research was to ask people in Ganavé how they understood their health and education needs. We planned to evaluate the relationship between the two, submit our analyses to Clinics of Hope, and help design programs that more effectively address the needs particular to Ganavé. We realized that not every village is the same, and we know very little about the day-to-day lives and decisions that Togolese people have to make. Our 2-month experience in Ganavé helped increase our understanding, as did our research.

A cursory analysis of our data would reveal that rates of malaria and malnutrition are high, in addition to the rate of soil-transmitted helminth infections. Also, social issues that have a bearing on economic (and physical) wellbeing include: polygamy and broken family structures. The role of women in the community, and related investment (or lack there of) in women’s health and education, is very low. Women’s disempowerment, we believe, plays a large role in the underdevelopment of these Togolese communities.

Our experience has taught us that prevention is the central tenant of public health. Programs must be effective and sustainable, and they must seek to eradicate the root causes of disease, not only their symptoms. Also, we must not overlook the relationship between social factors and physical health, as many social structures regulate access to healthcare and social services. More generally, we learned that with community development/health programs like this, you must be able to think on your feet, reassess, readjust, and learn from experience. Compared to the relative success we achieved with our STH treatment program, and our efforts to construct a primary school, our most valued achievement was real cross-cultural interaction and conversation. We made deep friendships and learned through the narrated experiences of our West African family. I remain humbled and grateful to our co-workers in Togo, for they have taught us much.

Links & Resources:

The Learn Africa Project – A collaborative Global Health and Development project carried out between Gordon College, Massachusetts and Clinics of Hope.

Clinics of Hope – Homepage of NPO ‘Clinics of Hope’

Works Cited:

Bethony, Jeffrey, Simon Brooker, Marco Albonico, Stefan M Geiger, Alex Loukas, David Diemert and Peter J Hotez. 2006. Soil-transmitted helminth infections: ascariasis, trichuriasis, and hookworm. The Lancet, 367: 1521-32.

Garcia, Marito, Alan Pence, and Judith L. Evans. 2008. Africa’s Future, Africa’s Challenge: Early Childhood Care and Development in sub-Saharan Africa. The World Bank: Washington, DC. 525 pp.

Kirwan, Patrick, Samuel O Asaolu, Síle F Molloy, Titilayo C Abiona, Andrew L Jackson, and Celia V Holland. 2009. Patterns of soil-transmitted helminth infection and impact of four-monthly albendazole treatments in preschool children from semi-urban communities in Nigeria: a double-blind placebo-controlled randomized trial. BioMed Central, Infectious Diseases, 9:20.

Omwami, Edith Mukudi, and Edmond J. Keller. 2010. Public Funding and Budgetary Challenges to Providing Universal Access to Primary Education in sub-Saharan Africa. International Review of Education, 56:5-31.

Tchuente´, L.-A. Tchuem, J.M. Behnke, F.S. Gilbert, V.R. Southgate, and J. Vercruysse. 2003. Polyparasitism with Schistosoma haematobium and soil-transmitted helminth infections among school children in Loum, Cameroon. Tropical Medicine and International Health, 8:11, 975-986.

Theunynck, Serge. 2009. School Construction Strategies for Universal Primary Education in Africa: Should Communities Be Empowered to Build Their Schools? The World Bank: Washington, DC. 257 pp.

World Health Organization, 2006. Schistosomiasis and soil-transmitted helminth infections – preliminary estimates of the number of children treated with albendazole or mebendazole. Weekly epidemiological record, 81: 145-164.

How can NGOs practice ‘doing good’ and minimise ‘doing harm’? What are the dilemmas and challenges present?

HiiDunia — Sat, 26 Nov 2011 20:07:14 +0000

This version of the paper includes Boxed text sections (shown in italics). Please refer to the PDF Download for the full Paper including Bibliography and all citations.

How can NGOs practice ‘doing good’ and minimise ‘doing harm’? What are the dilemmas and challenges present? (117)

Author: Carly Garonne

Introduction

Promoting human rights, driving the cause against climate change, and at the forefront of disaster relief; non-government organisations (NGOs) have an essential role in addressing the issues of global poverty and injustice. Despite good intentions, harmful conduct can arise at any time without an NGO even being aware. This occurs in many ways, such as by breaking the local economy, providing service delivery that harms health and well-being of the local people and by reinforcing conflict. This essay will contribute to the growing body of research on ‘doing good’ and minimising ‘doing harm’ by arguing that harm can be reduced by deeply understanding the context of each programme, taking a rights-based approach and conducting participatory work. Additionally, one of the most important means, albeit controversial, is to record failure. History will only be repeated if it is not documented. Based on the complexities of this debate, this essay will specifically concentrate on the role of international NGOs (INGOs) in order to channel the research. The content is structured into three parts beginning with an overview of INGOs in a modern context to show that growing pressure is being placed on NGOs to increase effectiveness and be accountable for their actions. The dilemmas facing INGOs will be analysed in part two, through the provision of numerous examples and case studies to highlight existing challenges. To finish, general principles that all INGOs can adopt to increase effectiveness will be presented. A conversation has started on acknowledging NGO failure, only if we continue this discussion can harm be reduced.

Part 1: A Background on NGOs

NGOs in Modern Society

Throughout the world, the nation-state has decreased in its ability to meet the basic needs of citizens and an increasing reliance on the world markets has only led to increased inequalities (Tesoriero 2010: 2). Although these mechanisms are not going anywhere fast, uncertainty in their performance has led citizens to look for other means to ‘fill the gap’ that have been left by the state and the market (Salamon and Anheier 1996: xi). This has predominantly been in the form of NGOs. NGOs are defined as organisations that are institutionally separate from the government, despite potentially receiving support and are ‘non profit’ distributing, meaning they can make profit but it cannot be distributed (Smillie 1995). A dramatic amelioration of NGOs in the past two decades has been observed (Pinkney 2009: 30), with the number of INGOs rising simultaneously.

It is important to recognise that NGOs, as part of the space between state and the market, are integrated within civil society. Tesoriero (2010: 16) describes civil society as the formal or semi-formal structures established voluntarily rather than through a government programme or a directive, comprised of NGOs, service clubs and other institutions that mould a functioning society. The term ‘civil society’ has been rejected throughout the developing world as a northern model being ‘too simplistic’ and ‘irrelevant to societies in the south’ (Clayton 1996: 254). As this essay is focussed on analysing NGOs on an international scale, the term NGO or more specifically, INGO, will remain.

An increase in NGOs has meant enhanced competition for limited donor funding. A form of managerialism has arisen for NGOs, demanding focus on outputs, strategy, competition and entrepreneurship and has characterised them by submissions, service agreements, contracts and tenders (Kenny 2011: 162). With this, pressure has increased to raise the standards of NGOs monitoring and evaluation procedures (Pollard and Court 2008: 146). Increasing accountability has to be constituted towards donors and the public, which means that NGOs should be made more aware of possible harm caused by their actions. Competition for financial resources in the sector, has had a devastating impact on NGOs, in that it has resulted in a ‘worst practice’ – secrecy (Admittingfailure 2011), which will be discussed in depth in part three. Amongst the competition for donor support, NGOs are being rewarded for their successes and therefore forced to lie about their failures.

INGO Motivations

Many types of INGOs exist, each with their own motivation and theory. INGOs are defined as any NGO that is working in a country other than its own (Smith, Stebbins, Dover 2006 : 110). Within this, some authors differentiate between NGOs from the developed world, known as ‘Northern NGOs’ and local NGOs in the developing world as either ‘Southern NGOs’, ‘National NGOs or ‘Indigenous NGOs’. Furthermore, differences exist between the different motivations and theories behind INGOs work. David Korten (1990) explains how each NGO implicitly operates on ‘different assumptions regarding the nature of the development problem’. Korten (1990: 114) outlines four different ‘generations’ that define the theory of a particular NGO. This ranges from ‘relief and welfare’ that focuses on direct delivery to meet immediate needs, to ‘small scale, self reliant local development’ – commonly understood as community development initiatives, ‘sustainable systems development’ that seeks changes in specific policies and institutions, and finally ‘the fourth generation’ that associate with the power of people’s movements in driving social change (Korten 1990: 115 -123). The examples and case studies provided in this essay range across the various generations of which the reader should consider. INGOs should have a clearly defined motivation behind their work as this will affect the reasons for their intervention and the methods they exert. This essay contends that a deeper understanding of the complexities associated with development and a greater concentration on long-term sustainability will lead to increased INGO effectiveness.

Part 2: Dilemmas and Challenges

More harm than good

Insufficient pre-departure research proceeded by minimal follow-through, presents space for INGO intervention to go horribly wrong. The list of such harm is endless, and the negative affects of some work possibly remain unknown. Implicit messages made through advocacy and the significant impacts of aid dependency have not been raised in this essay due to word constraints, however must be acknowledged as causing significant issues for the sector. This section will therefore solely focus on what the author believes are the major mistakes of INGO work. Before continuing, it must be acknowledged that despite many failures occurring, most INGOs succeed in providing immediate assistance (Riddel 2007: However current available statistics struggle to measure long-term affects and do not account for a consistent deficiency in reporting failure (which will be discussed in depth in part three). Moreover, poverty and injustice continue on a phenomenal scale around the world; immediate relief does little to challenge its root-causes. Regardless, within all INGO initiatives, whether it focusses on education, health, or human rights, from relief to advocacy – with all success comes an amount of failure.

The Act of Giving

Food, medical equipment, blankets, school books, toys and more; INGOs continue to import millions of resources into developing countries without assessing the local context. In the name of ‘helping’, non-financial resources manufactured kilometres away are brought in to poorer countries, whereas resources are often available locally. Often ‘in kind’ donations take up valuable space in cargo shipments, waste INGOs time sorting through the myriad of items, and may be unusable or potentially dangerous (Gray 2010). Box 1 highlights some of the dilemmas facing the provision of material items. The key issues raised here are the harm caused to local businesses with the flood of foreign items and that products are often unsustainable in the long-term. Resources may furthermore damage health and well-being. For example, the introduction of water points in many locations, such as Ghana and Tanzania, without technical training of locals has led to stagnant water found around the area, and in at least one case led to a breeding ground for mosquitoes (Adunga 2001: 25). Although these examples are filled with good intentions, the affects on the local community have proven much more harm than good.

Box 1 : Mosquito Nets in Africa

Dambiso Moyo (2009) in her controversial book Dead Aid, highly critical of aid to Africa, provides an example to show how aid can break the local economy. Through explaining a hypothetical scenario she describes a reality that occurs across many INGOs in Africa. Moyo describes a mosquito net maker who manufactures around 500 nets a week; employing ten people who each must support more than fifteen relatives. Despite their strenuous efforts, they struggle to beat the malaria-carrying mosquito. An INGO steps in with 100,000 mosquito nets to ‘help’ the affected region. However, the market is now flooded with foreign nets and the local net maker is out of business. Their 150 dependants can no longer be supported. Additionally, in a maximum of five years, the majority of the imported nets will be torn and damaged, no longer effective in preventing malaria.

Food aid is another potentially detrimental act of providing assistance. A large amount of food aid sourced through INGOs is produced far away, taking lengthy trips to arrive at its destination, as well as going through many bureaucratic channels (Timmer 2005: 1). Box 2 details the detrimental affects that this can have. Similar to the case study in Box 1, the local economy may be harmed in the process and time lost through getting the food to its destination. Timmer (2005:1) adds that the introduction of foreign food aid, although needed at the point of appeal, may be followed by a new local harvest. If a new harvest is to follow after foreign food aid has flooded the markets, local prices may collapse, harming the local rural economy (Timmer 2005: 1). INGOs must deeply consider the affects they will have on the local people and their economies. Accessing supplies from the nearest area, whether its local, regional or in a neighbouring country, will usually be the fastest and cheapest strategy (Timmer 2005: 2).

Box 2: Food Aid to Ethiopia

In 2009, the Ethiopian Government appealed to USAID for emergency assistance in an on coming famine (USAID 2009). USAID responded with 65,410 metric tons of cereals, pulses, vegetable oil and blended food to the World Food Programme (WFP) managed by Catholic Relief Services, CARE, Save the Children US and UK, World Vision and more (USAID 2009). Owen Barder (2009), Senior Fellow and Director for Europe at the Center for Global Development (CGD) with extensive experience in Ethiopia, explains how this aid proceeds to occur. The food is bought from American farmers and shipped by road to Djibouti where it is then brought by road to the needed location in Ethiopia. Transport costs add up to $568 metric tonne (approx. AU$588)whereas local prices of wheat at the time were $489 metric tonne (approx. AU$506). Furthermore, the time taken to get the resources there, amounts to the nearly a week that local, regional or national farmers could feed the population. This food that is available locally would increase the incomes of Ethiopian farmers or alternatively those in neighbouring African countries. These local farmers livelihoods and well-being are being undermined by imported foreign food aid. (Barder 2009).

The Effects of Microfinance

Microfinance initiatives (MFIs) can play a significant role in providing people with an opportunity to escape poverty. Extensive amounts of aid money has been donated to INGOs to provide small loans to millions of people around the developing world (Riddell 2007: 274). The idea of micro-credit schemes arose from the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh who have provided credit to over five million people since the end of 2005, with 95% women, in schemes characterised by low interest payments and very high rates of repayment (Riddell 2007:274). Overwhelmingly high success rates have occurred since the MFIs were first created (Riddel 2007: 275). However, 2009-10 saw a turning point for microfinance, with numerous negative affects arising (Rozas 2011 :7). It has been made evident that often the poor are using the money only for immediate needs (Snodgrass and Sebsted cited in Riddel 2007: 275). This use as a ‘stop-gap measure’ to buy essential goods only descends them into further indebtedness (The Reality of Aid 2008). Furthermore, considering the current global economic system, the success of self-employed businesses on the market is disproportionately low compared to big businesses and transnational corporations operating in developing countries (Singh 2008:50).

When the downfall of MFIs first struck in 2009, no best practices or case studies were available to provide guidance for MFI crises (Rozas 2011 :7). Through this, arose the publication Weathering the Storm: Hazards, Beacons and Life Rafts (Rozas: 2011), which provides MFIs with many case studies of what can go wrong and ways to overcome challenges. This publication is invaluable for MFIs to ensure best practice and not to repeat mistakes of the past.

Arguably, a more beneficial response can be provided through unconditional cash transfers. Cash transfers give people choices on where their money goes and available evidence shows that they are being used widely from meeting health and education costs, purchasing food and clothing, and even to investing in small business (IDS 2006: 1) Givedirectly.com (2011), is a prime example. Through a cash donation to their website, GiveDirectly.com locates poor households in Kenya and the money is transferred electronically to the recipients SIM card where cash is retrieved at participating banks (GiveDirectly 2011). Other than given the choice on how they spend their money, it also empowers them to meet their most immediate needs and to invest in effective opportunities (GiveDirectly 2011). This differs from microfinancing as there are no restrictions on how the money should be spent and no need for repayment (IDS 2006:1). Cash transfers are still in their infancy, however signs of successful application are something for INGOs to consider.

However, neither cash payments nor MFIs are quintessential elements for development. Both strategies must be combined with other anti-poverty programmes, such as health-care and education training to raise the living standards of the poor (Singh 2008: 46). Singh (2008: 47) asks ‘what can women do with credit if they do not have child care, education, training and health services?’. The success of both programmes depends on wider changes in the development agenda, including changes in structures and institutions (The Reality of Aid 2008: 18). INGO professionals should inherently be ‘trying to work themselves out of a job’, therefore integrated sustainable solutions within all initiatives is essential.

Creating a ‘Brain Drain’

INGOs presence in a developing country may weaken well-established local NGOs and remove able workers from more effective local positions. From a southern NGO perspective, INGOs enter a communities where local NGOs were already present and compete unfairly with the local organisations while undermining the independent sector (Menocal and Rogerson, cited in Barber and Bowie 2008:748). INGOs often offer higher international wages, removing a competent workforce lured away from essential local employment. Often local employees recruited into working for the INGO are the most educated and could have taken up employment in government positions or worked successfully in the private sector (Barber and Bowie 2008: 749). This manipulates the private sector and the civil service declines. An example of this is provided from Malawi, where the AIDS epidemic was severe and an INGO lured a local worker from their position in the state health sector with an income increase of three times what they were previously earning (Barber and Bowie 2008: 753). Barber and Bowie (2008:749) argue that a ‘downward spiral’ is perpetuated due to the more able citizens joining international employers and the less able remain, as corruption increases, confidence in the government declines further and young people are less inclined to join government employment.

INGOs have comfortably defined themselves as distinctly separate from the state and the government, which has created the western notion of ‘civil society’ (Clayton 1996: 254). Barber and Bowie (2008:748-9) argue that INGOs should not take the same approach in in developing countries. To fight corruption and establish ‘good governance’, INGOs should be working with state officials to form collaboration with the voluntary sector rather than seeking their own agendas (Barber and Bowie 2008: 749). Recruiting local people for their own benefit is part of this parcel, especially when they may pay international payment standards.

Reinforcing Conflict

International assistance in conflict situations, while sometimes reducing tensions and strengthening the means towards peaceful resolutions, INGOs can also reinforce or prolong conflict. Often INGO programmes are designed to only target specific sections of societies, which may cause for social discontent. Earle and Simonelli (2000: 119) explain how in Rio Chayote, the refugee population that had tirelessly fled there were being helped by an INGO, yet were seen as having acquired ‘special benefits’ by the local population. Power struggles had not been taken into account as the INGO had not researched the full political situation (Earle and Simonelli 2000: 122). Box 3 examines another scenario that shows how structural differences can be reinforced. INGOs must form deep understandings of the social, cultural, economic, ecological and political context (Earle and Simonelli 2000: 122).

Box 3: Misled Efforts to Regain Peace

A dialogue process was organised by an INGO working in a conflict area. Minority and majority representatives were present and the INGO played a neutral role in the diplomatic proceedings. However, due to differing levels of education and work experience, the dialogue ended with the minority group feeling overwhelmed and cornered by the more powerful majority. The agency did not have the power to stop the domination of one side of the discussion from humiliating their counterparts. The asymmetries of power were reinforced and the minority group were further disadvantaged. (Anderson and Olson 2003: 12).

Implicit Ethical Messages

INGOs may force implicit ethical messages onto the local population through their actions and attitudes. INGOs from the developed world enter developing countries as leaders for the local community. Yet their conduct and attitudes may rub off negatively on the local community. For example, an INGO may use armed guards to protect their resources from theft or to protect their staff from harm. An implicit ethical message is broadcast that arms are legitimate and that weapons are necessary for security and safety (CDA 2004: 10). Moreover, when INGO staff appear nervous and worried for their own safety around others, this projects the message that it is normal to approach others with suspicion and belligerence (CDA 2004: 10). Gender roles may also be reinforced through INGO staff taking on more family-based roles and other staff’s inabilities to let go of their own gender conceptions (Bebbington, Hickey and Mitlan 2008: 29). These harmful processes are not as easy to observe and much more difficult to report, while the INGO will often be ignorant of such harmful ways. However, these processes can be the most harmful as they can change the habits of society, which can be passed down generations. An engrained consciousness of their actions will deter this and training INGO staff in ethics would be ideal.

Part 3: Optimising ‘doing good’

Preventing Harm

Part two explored the types of harm that can be done, while providing tools to prevent these specific processes from occurring. Discussion will now turn to the underlying principles that INGOs can adopt to minimise harmful actions. Firstly, the critical need for INGOs to fully understand the context they are entering will be analysed followed by the need to take a rights-based approach. The most fundamental means to avoid harm, however, is to document it. These following principles can be applied by any type of NGO, no matter their motivation or understanding on the nature of development.

Understanding the Context

Successful INGO work initiatives result from understanding the context and assistance program in depth before programme mobilisation. Earle and Simonelli (2000: 122) state that ‘one must know the [target] community in all its facets’ by researching and fully understanding its history, culture, social divides, culture alongside the current economic and political systems. They state further that without knowing the context to such an extent is a ‘widely irresponsible social experiment’ (Earle and Simonelli 2000: 122). INGO assistance programmes must be ‘unpacked’ in order to fully understand the impact that their actions may pose onto the local communities (CDA 2004: 6). Based on the findings from part 2, Box 4 highlights some key questions that INGOs should be asking before mobilising in a foreign country. These questions should also be continually monitored and reassessed throughout the life of the project or programme (CDA 2004: 5).

Box 4: Questions INGOs should be posing.

• What resources will be brought into the country? Are these available locally? What impact will our resources have? What mechanisms can we put in place to ensure their long-term sustainability?
• Are there other local NGOs in the area? In what ways can we collaborate to effectively work together?
• Are we inadvertently undermining or weakening local structures?
• Have we considered power relations between conflicting groups? Will our work reinforce any ongoing conflict?
• What impact will we have through our implicit ethical messages? Are we reinforcing any gender roles?

Rights-Based Approach and Participatory Approaches

The most renowned and most-adopted principles to afford INGO effectiveness are from The Sphere Project, which was established in 1997 with proceeding editions (The Sphere Project 2011: 5). Although the handbook focusses on disaster relief, two main approaches are offered that every INGO can learn from. The handbook recommends a humanitarian approach routed in a rights-based approach and participatory methodology (The Sphere Project 2011: 6). The handbook stresses the importance of including not only local people but also local and national authorities in all stages of intervention (The Sphere Project 2011: 6).

Active participation of the local community is crucial to best meet the needs of the local people (The Sphere Project 2011: 23) It is argued that the more professional INGOs have become, the less inclined they are to consult with the local people, believing that ‘they know best’ (Whiting 2011). If change is to be sustainable it must be location specific, designed based on the knowledge of that particular context and must be owned by the people, based on their experience and understandings (Wallace 2001: 33). Involving the local population in the whole process of the INGO programme will enhance its sustainability, as the local people can take ownership and ensure greater probability for success (Fowler 2000: 21). This will no doubt also be enhanced with cooperation of local NGOs.

Document Failures

An INGO harms a local community in Indonesia. It is not made public as it may upset the donor. A few years later the same mistake takes shape in Botswana. A few months after that it is repeated again in Thailand, then Peru, then East Timor….Unless we document our failures, they are only bound to be repeated. (Admittingfailure 2011).

The INGO sector is built on a system designed to reward success and completely evade failure. Donors need to see that NGO programmes are making progress and meeting objectives in order to provide funding (Fowler 2000: 115). INGOs are then forced to distort their successes, otherwise they risk losing funding and nothing will be achieved. This occurs over and over again. This system is unsustainable. Earle and Simonelli (2000: 123) state that ‘failure documentation is a liability for many organisations, whereas illusions of success sell’. A dramatic overhaul of the INGO to donor relationship needs to change to allow for recognition of mistakes. Only once we admit our mistakes can change to our processes be recognised. Through recognition, necessary steps can be taken to rectify a problem and other INGOs will not repeat the mistake. Admitting and publicising failure will contribute to a body of knowledge addressing why errors should not be repeated and this, perhaps, is INGOs ‘saving grace’ (Earle and Simonelli 2000: 123).

Monitoring and evaluation systems characteristically are designed to address shortfalls in NGO work; these need to be revived to form sites of honesty and integrity. Perhaps donors should not be turning the blind eye, by recognising that every project coming through may not be that well-performing. The risks associated with admitting mistakes to donors should be eliminated. Charles Kenny (2011(b)) suggests that what might work was if donors could allow, or even better encourage, early exits from bad projects, where the project managers were able to use the continued funding for something better in a similar sector. Further research into this option as well as means to turn the system around is crucial.

Additionally, a platform is needed for INGOs to share their experiences together to form a knowledge base. A new website, Admittingfailure.com, is trying to achieve just that. Released in January 2011, this site allows all types of NGOs and people working in development to share their stories of projects or programmes that have gone wrong (Admittingfailure 2011). The site is designed to correct the error of ignoring failures and aims to:

“create a best practice of openness, transparency and honesty. We’re all in this together. We’re on the same side in the fight against poverty, inequality and unnecessary suffering in too many forms. Let’s admit our failures to find greater successes”

As it is the websites is in its early stages, its success is hard to tell. It is hoped, however, that many NGOs and people working in the field will acknowledge its benefits and become more involved – as such an initiative could be the benchmark of change to come.

Conclusion

Although INGOs have a significant role in fighting poverty and injustices throughout the world, this essay has highlighted some of the issues that can arise. Non-financial foreign resources may disrupt the local economy, microfinance initiatives may indebt the poor further and INGOs may reinforce conflict through their actions. Furthermore, it has been made evident that INGOs may cause a ‘brain drain’ by removing workers from the government or the private sector for their own benefits. The challenges faced by INGOs in asserting implicit ethical messages is an issue that often goes unnoticed, of which INGO staff need to be continually aware of in order to reduce devastating long-term affects. Despite good intentions, much harm can be done without conscious recognition of the potential for devastation. INGOs must take greater initiative in researching the context of their work, consider a rights-based approach and involve the local people to the greatest extent to ensure local ownership. However, admitting mistakes is the most important way to ensure more good is done than harm. If space is not created for INGOs to share their lessons learned, harm will only be repeated.

How can NGOs practice ‘doing good’ and minimise ‘doing harm’? What are the dilemmas and challenges present? (117)

Globalization, Regulation and Geography: The Development of the Bahamas and the Cayman Islands Offshore Financial Centres

HiiDunia — Tue, 11 Oct 2011 19:57:49 +0000

This version of the paper includes the Abstract, Preface and First Chapter (without Tables). Please refer to the PDF Download for the full Paper including Tables, Appendix, Bibliography and all citations.

Globalization, Regulation and Geography: The Development of the Bahamas and the Cayman Islands Offshore Financial Centres (71)

Author: Alan Hudson

Abstract

This dissertation explores the development of the Bahamas and Cayman offshore financial centres (OFCs) as places in the regulatory landscape of international finance. It aims to move towards an understanding of processes of financial globalization.

Chapter one asks: what explains the emergence of these new places – offshore financial centres – on the map of international political economy?, and introduces the Bahamas and Cayman. Chapter two critically reviews the literature around the themes of globalization, regulation and geography, arguing that conceptualizations of global financial integration as “the end of geography” (O’Brien, 1992), neglect the role of states in processes of globalization and take too narrow a view of geography, a view which falls into the “territorial trap” (Agnew, 1994). Chapter three is a “methodology” chapter.

Chapter four begins to explore the development of the Bahamas and Cayman OFCs, describing the regulatory construction of place. A series of questions are addressed: why construct a place for offshore finance; who constructs a place for offshore finance?; how is a place constructed for offshore finance; and, what are the local impacts of constructing a place for offshore finance? Chapter five expands the focus to consider how the relationship between the Bahamas and Cayman OFCs has affected their development. Chapter six expands the focus again, looking at the relationship of the Bahamas and Cayman OFCs with the USA and at their place within the regulatory framework for international banking provided by the Basle Committee.

Chapter seven brings together some of the insights gleaned from earlier chapters and seeks to put the “regulatory landscape” metaphor to work, moving towards an explanation for the development of OFCs and processes of financial globalization. It is argued that the development of stateless monies produced an economic space of flows, increasingly divorced from the political space of states and the productive economy. The OFCs, through the practice of unbundling sovereignty, articulate the economic and political spaces of capitalism.

Preface

Whilst in New York City, meeting bankers to talk about international finance and the development of offshore financial centres as part of my fieldwork I took the opportunity of visiting the Guggenheim Museum. The Guggenheim Museum is laid out as a wide spiral ramp with exhibits in alcoves just off the ramp. I strolled up the ramp enjoying the exhibits, a bit confused at times – unsure as to whether an object was an exhibit or simply a chair or a thermometer – but finding much to interest me. Once I reached the top of the ramp I began to wonder whether it would have made any difference if I had started at the top of the ramp; perhaps it would have been an easier, less confusing, more interesting and informative route? Pondering this, at the very top of the ramp, I came across a sign advising visitors that we should begin our tour of the museum by taking a lift to the top of the ramp and then gently stroll down and around the museum’s spiral.

At times during my research this event has popped up in my mind; the process of doing a Ph.D. is interesting but can be confusing and only really begins to make sense once you get to the end. And then you may feel that you ought to have started at the top of the ramp rather than the bottom. But, there is no lift to the top of a Ph.D. However, my research has taken me on a tour of some interesting exhibits and in this dissertation I’ll offer you my preferred route around some of them.

Chapter 1

THE PLACE OF OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTRES IN PROCESSES OF FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION

“if we are to look for anything truly distinctive (as opposed to ‘capitalism as usual’) in the present situation, then it is upon the financial aspects of capitalist organization and on the role of credit that we should concentrate our gaze” (Harvey, 1989, p.196).

1.1. NEW PLACES ON THE MAP: OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTRES AND FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION

Over the last thirty years one of the more interesting developments in the geography of the international political economy has been the appearance of “new places” on the map.1 These places are offshore financial centres (OFCs); places which host banking, insurance, and other financial activities, away from the onshore regulatory authorities. Such centres include the Bahamas and Cayman in the Caribbean, Gibraltar and Jersey in Western Europe, Bahrain in the Middle East, Singapore and Hong Kong in East Asia, and Vanuatu in the South Pacific (see Figure 1.1). The appearance of these new places on the map of international finance poses interesting questions: why did they develop as OFCs?; what role do they play?; are the various OFCs part of a general process of financial globalization or is the development of each centre explicable only in its own terms?; how does the development of OFCs relate to the wider international political economy? Curiosity about the development of OFCs leads to efforts to find an explanation for their development; how are we to explain or interpret the development of OFCs?

A useful starting point in developing an explanation of new phenomena is to consider what other processes were going on at the same time: what might have caused the development of OFCs? Given that OFCs are involved in finance, developments in the financial and monetary spheres seem a good place to start. The development of OFCs has largely taken place since the late 1960s, a period which has seen the collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary system and a re-shaping of the landscape of international finance.

The Bretton Woods system, with the dollar at its centre, was based upon the hegemony of the US economy, and the US promise to exchange dollars for gold at a fixed rate of $35 per ounce (Strange, 1986; Helleiner, 1994; Corbridge, 1994). This hierarchical monetary framework provided stability for the post-war reconstruction of Europe and Japan, the internationalization of production and the growth of world trade, but the dynamics of economic development in turn undermined the rigid monetary framework. The fluidity of capitalism undermined the fixity of the states-based monetary system (Harvey, 1989; Leyshon, 1992).

There were several factors leading to the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. The value of the dollar was guaranteed by the US Government and its promise to redeem dollars for gold; this guarantee was based upon the hegemony of the US economy and the ability of the US Government to exchange dollars for gold; the Bretton Woods system was predicated on the link between a strong US territorial economy and the US dollar. This link was stretched and broken by processes of globalization. As international trade grew, as US multinationals expanded their dollar-denominated operations overseas, as dollars were increasingly held overseas and traded in Eurodollar markets, as dollars were printed to finance the Vietnam war, the credibility of the US promise to redeem dollars for gold – the basis of the Bretton Woods system – was brought into question.

It was in this context that Nixon acted in August 1971 to break the link between the dollar and gold. This move signalled the beginning of the end of the Bretton Woods system and a shift to a new monetary system where the value of the dollar was neither formally guaranteed by the US Government, nor backed by gold. The monetary system based on relationships between territorial states had been shattered by the extension of economic activity beyond states’ borders. Monetary relations were flexible and privatized; but, what was the dollar worth? The space of economic activity increasingly transcended the territorial spaces of political authority; there was no guarantor of the currency in a globalizing economic space.

Might the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the development of offshore financial centres be somehow related? Might both developments be part of a wider dynamic and explicable within a common theoretical framework? Might the development of OFCs be connected with processes of financial globalization, the collapse of Bretton Woods, and the mismatch between economic and political spaces? It is these questions, among others, which I address in this dissertation.

This dissertation is an effort to explain the development of OFCs and to see how their development fits in with wider processes of financial globalization. How, then, are we to explain the processes of financial globalization? For some commentators the development of global financial markets is due to technological developments and the power of market forces. In this interpretation financial activity increasingly transcends political boundaries leading ultimately to the “end of geography”, a scenario in which location and regulation no longer matter, or matter less (O’Brien, 1992). For Harvey and other commentators financial globalization is part of the dynamics of capitalism; the latest effort by capitalism to avoid its contradictions through the creation of credit and expansion into new spaces (Harvey, 1982). Although on the surface these interpretations are similar – they both point to the changing geographies of the international political economy – they are different in important ways. For O’Brien geography – as spatial difference – comes to an end as space is homogenized and equilibrium is reached. For Harvey financial globalization (re)produces uneven development; new geographies – spatial differences and spatialities of power and social relations – are produced to avoid the fixity of existing geographies. The question is, then: “how are geographies implicated in processes of financial globalization?” Is geography annihilated, or are geographies both destroyed and created in an ongoing process of uneven development?

I could select a theoretical framework now and then fit my analysis of the development of OFCs into that framework. However, that would be to prejudge matters; how would I choose the theoretical framework? Rather, I intend to gradually develop an explanation through my exploration of the development of the Bahamas and Cayman OFCs, and return to more abstract theoretical concerns in conclusion. As Harvey has argued “at some point or other tangible connections must be made between the weft of theory and the woof of historical geography” (Harvey, 1982, p.451). Geographies may or may not be important in processes of financial globalization; whether they are, and if so how, is an empirical question. For, as Swyngedouw has suggested: “the difference that place makes lies exactly in the fact that different places are different … But the nature of these differences can in essence only be detailed empirically. Nothing a priori can be said about the difference(s) embodied in and constructed through space” (Swyngedouw, 1991, p.158).

The development of OFCs provides a window through which to consider processes of financial globalization. Dealing in intangible, mobile and freely-convertible assets, OFCs provide a particularly interesting window to look through. The development of OFCs is a hard case through which certain processes of financial globalization, and the importance, or not, of geographies should become clear. In my dissertation I look at and through the development of two particular OFCs, the Bahamas and Cayman, seeking to analyze how and why these places are different, and what difference this makes to the workings of the international political economy.

1.2. THE BAHAMAS AND THE CAYMAN ISLANDS

The Commonwealth of The Bahamas is an archipelago of over 700 islands in the Caribbean basin, of which 29 are inhabited, encompassing a total land area of 9000 square km.3 The island-chain stretches for 1300 km. from 80 km. east of Florida to 80 km. north of Haiti on a north-west to south-east axis. Nassau is the capital city, communications hub, business centre, and main population centre of The Bahamas. Nassau is on the small island of New Providence which is home to approximately 172,000 people from a total population of 255,000 (Bahamas Government, 1994; see Figure 1.2).

The Bahamas were “discovered” by Columbus in 1492, with San Salvador probably being Columbus’ first landfall in the West Indies. Spanish settlers took indigenous Lucayans to work on plantations elsewhere but it was not until the mid-seventeenth century that the first permanent settlers arrived, from Bermuda in search of salt, and from Britain setting up plantations on Eleuthera and New Providence. The Bahamas were made a British Protectorate in 1718 and a representative House of Assembly was established in 1729. The eighteenth century saw the importation of African slaves to work the plantations, a key phase in the development of Bahamian society.

The plantation economy did not take root in the Bahamas and since the nineteenth century the economic fortunes of the Bahamas have been closely tied to events in the nearby USA. The Bahamas prospered from blockade running during the American Civil War and from smuggling during the prohibition years of the 1920s before developing its natural resources as a major tourist centre for wealthy Americans. In 1908 the Royal Bank of Canada established the first foreign bank conducting public business.

This was followed in 1936 by the first trust company, the Canadian-owned Bahamas General Trust Company, and in 1942 by the first private bank. This haphazard development of financial facilities was consolidated from the late 1960s as the Bahamas Government adopted an offshore financial development strategy. The Bahamas gained Independence from Britain in 1973.

The Cayman Islands are a group of three islands in the Caribbean Sea, 180 miles north-west of Jamaica and 750 km. south of Miami.4 The two smaller islands, Little Cayman and Cayman Brac, are sparsely populated: Grand Cayman is the main population centre, focus of tourism, financial activity and employment. Grand Cayman is 35 km. long and 12 km. wide at its widest point. The population of the Cayman Islands in 1991 was 27000 (Cayman Islands Government), having risen from 18000 in 1980, with all but 1500 living on Grand Cayman (see Figure 1.2).

The Cayman Islands were first mapped by Columbus in 1503 and named “Las Tortugas” because of the large numbers of turtles in their vicinity. Sir Francis Drake was the first Englishman to visit Cayman in 1586. The Treaty of Madrid in 1670 shared out the Caribbean possessions of Spain and England with the result that England gained The Cayman Islands; they have remained a British colony ever since. The Cayman Islands, unsuitable for agriculture because of the infertile soils, were unoccupied for many years except for deserters, debtors, buccaneers, and some settlers from Jamaica. The inhabitants of Cayman survived by making rope, catching turtles and working as merchant seamen until local elites began to pursue a development strategy based firstly on tourism, and secondly on finance. Fundamental to this strategy was the opening of Owen Roberts International Airport in 1952 and the increasing availability of electrical power. Barclays opened the first bank in Cayman in 1953, beginning the island’s development as an OFC.

By 1991 the Bahamas hosted $287 billion of offshore financial activity and almost 400, banks whilst Cayman played host to 544 banks and $442 billion of offshore banking activity (Bank for International Settlements, 1993). The volume of offshore banking activity hosted by the two centres had risen since 1974 from $23 billion and $3 billion for the two centres had risen since 1974 from $23 billion and $3 billion for the Bahamas and Cayman respectively (see Figure 1.3). My task in this dissertation is to explain how such apparently marginal places have developed as important OFCs, and as important places in the landscape of international finance.

1.3. A MAP OF THE DISSERTATION

A study of the development of the Bahamas and Cayman OFCs could have been many things. Before explaining what my dissertation is, it is worthwhile mentioning what it is not. In particular, it is not three things
Firstly, it is not a guide for financiers and potential investors looking for a way to use the uneven geographies of regulation and taxation to increase their profits and to hide their money. Such guides are readily available elsewhere (Spitz, 1994; CCH International, 1992). Secondly, it is not a traditional “development” dissertation. My aim in this dissertation is not primarily to document and analyze the impact of offshore financial development on the peoples of the Bahamas and Cayman (see Hampton, 1994). Thirdly, my dissertation is not a traditional “economic geography” dissertation. My aim is not simply to map the changing distributions of banks, clients and monies in the OFCs. Such a dissertation would have been made near-impossible by the confidentiality upon which the centres’ success as places for offshore finance is built.

More positively, my dissertation is an effort to understand both the development of the Bahamas and Cayman OFCs and their position in processes of financial globalization. Rather than providing a simple mapping or description of the development of the Bahamas and Cayman OFCs my aim is to understand their development, to contribute to an explanation of the map of international finance. With my focus on a specific case in its wider context, and my effort to write a theoretically-informed and theoretically-informing dissertation, my study may be seen as a “new regional geography” (see section 3.2). With my attention to the social relations, practices and processes of offshore finance it may also be seen as a “new economic geography” (see section 3.2.2). In essence, my dissertation is an effort to write a geopolitical-economy of offshore financial development which avoids the territorial trap of mainstream international relations theory by historicizing geography and looking in detail at the place of OFCs in processes of financial globalization (Agnew, 1994; see also section 2.4.4).

In chapter 2 I provide a review of the existing literatures around the themes of globalization, regulation and geography, using these literatures to prepare the ground for my thesis. Through this review I consider the meaning of “globalization”, look at financial globalization as a hard case, assess some treatments of money and finance in social science, and offer a brief history of financial globalization. I then address the question of whether financial globalization has led to the “end of geography” and the demise of states as important regulatory authorities in the international political economy. I argue that states retain an important role in processes of financial globalization, and further suggest that there is more to geography than states as fixed territorial containers. In concluding chapter 2 I argue that in order to understand the processes of financial globalization, and the development of the Bahamas and Cayman OFCs, a geopolitical-economy which considers the sites, practices and processes of regulation is needed.

Chapter 3 is a “methodology” chapter in which I explain how I have conducted my geopolitical-economy. I argue that it is important to reveal the ways in which research is produced in order to facilitate its evaluation, and suggest that if we are to understand the processes of financial globalization and offshore financial development we need to adopt a “new regional geography” approach. To understand geographies of flows we require flexible research strategies. I begin with a discussion of the emergence of a new regional geography, before considering the impact of the reflexive turn on economic geography, and the role of case studies in a new regional geography. I then describe the processes of my research, my research strategies, and the ways in which I collected and analyzed data.

In chapter 4 I begin to write a geopolitical-economy of the development of the Bahamas and Cayman OFCs, focusing initially on the regulatory construction of the Bahamas and Cayman as places for offshore finance, and working with ethnographic data collected during fieldwork. I begin with a brief discussion of the apparent placelessness of offshore finance, before addressing a series of questions about the regulatory construction of place: why construct a place for offshore finance?; who constructs a place for offshore finance?; how is a place constructed for offshore finance; and what is the local impact of constructing a place for offshore finance? I argue that the Bahamas and Cayman are constructed as places for offshore financial activity through regulation, sets of social practices. I conclude with the suggestion that the regulatory construction of any one place cannot be understood in isolation from other places, a point I take up in chapter 5.

In chapter 5 I consider the relationship between the Bahamas and Cayman as places in competition to host offshore financial activity in the Caribbean. My purpose is to consider how their relationship affects the construction of the Bahamas and Cayman as places for offshore finance. I begin by discussing the competitive environment in which the two centres are positioned, before considering their competitive strategies. I address the question of whether they are locked into a cycle of competitive deregulation, and look in detail at the Bahamas’ move to Independence in 1973 and the opportunity that this offered Cayman. I then consider the ways in which the Bahamas and Cayman increasingly compete through representing themselves as stable and reputable places for offshore finance, and address the impact that multinational banks have on the centres’ competitive strategies.5 That is, does the presence of multinational banks with a presence in both centres introduce a further element of complexity? I conclude with the suggestion that the development of the Bahamas and Cayman as places for offshore finance, and their relationship, cannot be understood without looking at the wider context for their development, a point I take up in chapter 6.

In chapter 6 I expand my focus to consider the wider regulatory landscape in which the Bahamas and Cayman are placed, particularly the relationships of the OFCs with the USA, and their position within the regulatory framework for international banking provided by the Basle Committee on banking regulations and supervisory practices (Basle Committee). I examine the relationship of the “onshore” with the “offshore”, through an historical analysis. I begin by considering the initial development of the Bahamas and Cayman as, in part, a result of onshore regulatory practices and then consider the efforts of US regulatory authorities to regain control over dollar-denominated banking and to extend their control over the offshore centres, beyond US territorial space. In particular, I look at the development of International Banking Facilities (IBFs), the Castle Bank and Bank of Nova Scotia cases, and the development of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs). Finally I examine the reconstruction of the Bahamas and Cayman as places for offshore finance, and the impact of the Basle Committee’s regulatory framework on their development.

In chapter 7 I bring together some of the insights gleaned from my analysis of the development of the Bahamas and Cayman and put the “regulatory landscape” metaphor, a metaphor developed throughout the dissertation, to work. My aim is to move beyond a redescription of processes of financial globalization and offshore financial development, towards an explanation. I consider a Marxian account of financial globalization (Harvey, 1982), and argue that explaining the development of OFCs in these terms – suggesting that OFCs are “on the margins and at the centre of global capitalism’s displacement of crisis” (Roberts, 1994, p.111) – might be coherent and convincing, but, I argue, it fails to specify the ways in which the development of OFCs is related to processes of financial globalization. After a brief detour to the middle ages to pick up some conceptual tools I offer a fuller explanation of the development of OFCs and their place in processes of financial globalization. I argue that the development of stateless monies and Euromarkets reconfigured power/space, producing an economic space of flows, increasingly divorced from the political space of states and the productive economy. I argue that OFCs, which were developed through the actions of offshore elites and onshore financiers, articulate the economic and political spaces of capitalism, providing a link between the economic space of flows and the political space of states and the territorial productive economy. In this way OFCs partially resolve the paradox of absolute globalization. The OFCs articulate the spaces of capitalism through the practice of “unbundling sovereignty”, the separation of sovereignty into sovereignty over physical space and sovereignty over access to the space of flows. It is through the practice of unbundling sovereignty that the Bahamas and Cayman OFCs are central to processes of financial globalization. Geographies are regulated and regulatory.

Globalization, Regulation and Geography: The Development of the Bahamas and the Cayman Islands Offshore Financial Centres (71)

‘Everyone is doing something and calling it PRA’ – A Critical Reflection on Participatory Methods in Development

HiiDunia — Mon, 10 Oct 2011 09:28:22 +0000

Please refer to the PDF Download for the full Paper including Appendix, Bibliography and all citations.

‘Everyone is doing something and calling it PRA’ A Critical Reflection on Participatory Methods in Development (158)

Author: David Parduhn School of Global Studies, University of Sussex ∙ June 2011

Introduction

Since the 1980s, development interventions have come under increased criticism for the bureaucratic, top-down and centre-outwards approach which have characterised them (Chambers 2008: 49) and the ‘cognitive authority’ that was exercised over other people (Nussbaum 2000). Practitioners and scholars alike called for more responsive, participatory and people-centred approaches and since the late 1990s the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SLA) has become the new, widely-employed paradigm in international development discourse (Mdee 2002: 6). The SLA as a particular ‘way of thinking about the objectives, scope and priorities for development’ (IDS 2011a) is based on a set of principles, namely that any development intervention should be people-centred, responsive and participatory as well as dynamic, multi-level, conducted in partnership and sustainable (IDS 2011b). Emphasis is laid on a bottom-up approach which aims to understand the target group’s perceptions of poverty and well-being, and enables them to identify and formulate their own priorities and desired futures (livelihood outcomes), and to plan and act accordingly (Chambers 1997: 156), recognising and drawing upon already existing resources (Hickey & Mohan 2004b: 3, 18; cf. Chambers 2008: xv). Thus, the framework not only calls for a considerable increase in the involvement of the target group in development projects, but also attempts a reversal of the conventional classification of ‘uppers’ (experts) and ‘lowers’ (recipients).

The realisation of these ideals before and during an intervention requires methods for target group participation which go beyond simple consultation. Therefore, a wide range of participatory methodologies have been developed, many of them summarised under the concept Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA), which are employed from the outset and throughout the entire programme or project cycle. These methods have been designed and are constantly adapted to empower people to present and analyse their livelihoods and to identify and formulate priorities and strategies for action. They are meant to enable people to collect and analyse the information they themselves need to improve their lives in ways they decide (Mayoux 2005; cf. Chambers 1997; Cornwall 2011).

However, it has often been questioned whether the currently employed methodologies do indeed reflect the underlying principles of the approach and further the stated goal of empowerment. Despite increasing criticism, participatory methodologies have moved since the mid-1980s ‘virtually unchecked from the margins to the mainstream of development’ (Hickey & Mohan 2004b: 3).

This paper will examine some of the main difficulties and pitfalls related to participatory methods. It will be pointed out that a truly participatory implementation of these methods demands high levels of reflexivity and awareness of the investigated dynamics on the part of the facilitator in order to minimise their impact. However, the mainstreaming of participation in development which occurred during the last decade has in many instances counteracted this ideal.

Who are the experts?

The fundamental principle of both the SLA and participatory methods is a belief in the value of local knowledge and the aim of empowerment and self-help rather than paternalism. Project workers are supposed to take on the role of facilitator rather than expert or donor, and the stakeholders themselves are supposed to generate knowledge and decide on objectives and strategies. However, whether this process can be realised as envisaged is highly questionable.

First of all, it remains questionable whether ‘development experts’ can easily shake off the professionalism by which they define themselves and the role which they have aqcuired over several years: Will they be able to abandon old roles which were defined by top-down teaching behaviour, speaking from the position of the more powerful donor (Schönhuth 1996: 32; cf. Francis 2001: 81; Cornwall 2004: 84)? Subtle markers such as dominant body language or speech behaviour might reintroduce these hierarchies into nominally equal participatory exercises. Furthermore, ‘facilitators’ are also confronted with expectations which contradict this new role: Krummacher (2004: 67) finds that during PRA in Kenya, facilitators were constantly referred to as ’teachers’. In this context, actions which are intended to reduce the power gap, such as sitting on the ground, can make participants feel very uncomfortable (Grace Carswell, pers. comm.), and using materials such as beans for scoring might be regarded as ‘unmodern’ and inadequate and thus discourage the participation of some stakeholders.

Whether the facilitators want it or not, development projects often create a patron-client relationship between facilitators and participants (Mosse 2001: 26). In this regard, one may wonder whether it is possible not to represent the development agency which is always associated with resources (Francis 2001: 80).

Another problem arises from the participants’ knowledge or assumptions about the donor’s profile or interest, the so called development effect (Stirrat 1996: 81). Mosse pointed out that the aims of a project ‘clearly influence the way in which people construct their “needs”’ (2001: 20-23, cf. 2005; Lavigne-Delville et al. 2001:11). Thus, participants frame their ‘needs’ in terms of what they know or assume the agency will be able to deliver und thus secure ‘known benefits […] that might have been jeopardized by some more complex and differentiated statement of preferences’ (2001: 21). Mosse thus argues that participatory exercises produce ‘knowledge for action and not about livelihoods’ (2005: 95, italics in orig.). According to him, participants are ‘equipped to produce knowledge that the project needed’, while their ‘needs’ are strongly conditioned by project deliverables (2005: 96). Even if facilitators try to exercise little guidance, PRA exercises might thus result in participants simply parroting the discourse and preferred solutions of the ‘experts’ (Cornwall 2004: 84). More generally, Rossi calls participatory development interventions an ‘offer-driven process’ (Neubert 2005: 255, cit. in Rossi 2006: 45), ‘which relies on sensitization to create a demand for the types of goods and services that projects can supply at any one time’ (Rossi 2006: 46).

From taking part to participation
‘Getting a seat at the table’?

Apart from the role of donors and facilitators, participatory processes are also complicated by other issues. One of the accentuated advantages of PRA is that the generated outputs such as maps, piles or diagrams are visual, tangible, can combine quantitative as well as qualitative data, and can give insights into sensitive subjects such as gendered power relations (Chambers 2008: 125-126). Methods such as matrix scoring, organisational/Venn diagramming and wealth-rankings have been adopted and are used almost all over the world (Chambers 2008: 134), as they are viewed as enabling even illiterate and innumerate people to participate (Cooke 2004: 48). It is assumed that vulnerable and subordinate groups are thereby given an equal opportunity to participate and voice their opinions.

However, this supposed inclusiveness is hard to fulfil: Mosse (2005: 75) recounts considerable difficulty in motivating people to participate in PRA workshops, which tended to be dominated by the local elite. Members of the target group were unwittingly absent for reasons such as work, temporary migration, trade, education and others, and if locally present they were occupied or not interested in taking part in workshops.

Even if facilitators are able to generate a non-random sample in order to hear as many voices as possible and not only to represent existing patterns of power, questions of power remain. Participants do not act in a social vacuum, rather, PRA sessions create public and formal social contexts (Krummacher 2004: 39; cf. Mosse 1993), ‘within which freedom of speech is not equally shared but on the contrary reflects inequalities of power’ (Lavigne-Delville et al. 2001: 9). Since the spaces in which sessions take place are infused with existing relations of power, accessing them is more difficult for some than for others (Cornwall 2004: 80): Traditional domesticity for instance tends to inhibit women’s participation in events perceived as public and formal (Mosse 1993: 16, 2005: 85).

Cornwall eloquently observes that ‘having a voice clearly depends on more than getting a seat at the table’ (2004: 84). Thus, even if they are nominally present, marginalised groups are often excluded from articulating their interests and needs (Floquet & Mongbo 2000: 277, cit. in Krummacher 2004: 40), for example if they lack skills such as language fluency or, more importantly, because they feel intimidated or cowed, particularly when in unfamiliar spaces or in the presence of authorities or ‘experts’ (Kapoor 2002: 106; Cornwall 2004: 84; cf. Cornwall 2003).

More fundamentally, Vokral (1994: 42) argues that the idea of democratic decision-making which underlies participatory methodologies is not always compatible with prevailing ways of taking decisions (cf. Henkel & Stirrat 2001: 180), while Schönhuth (1996: 34) points out that one should not assume that all participants will be willing to relinquish their knowledge in the public sphere, rather, they may deliberately provide false or misleading information in order to protect their knowledge for whatever reason.

For instance, disadvantaged groups might prefer not to voice their opinion in public settings because of fear. In some cases, taking part in participatory activities resulted in bodily harm for some participants, for instance when women were later punished by their husbands (Chambers 2008: 164) or PRA exercises resulted in violent confrontations between different castes (Shah & Shah 1995). In addition, PRA can expose people to danger when they describe illegal or non-conformist behaviour (Chambers 2008: 163).

Having a voice and being heard

Even when all participants engage in active participation, pre-existing hierarchies come into play: Arguments are differently respected and weighted by other participants (cf. Kapoor 2002: 105), some speakers are better equipped to make themselves heard and others are labelled right from the start because of their social standing or even the accent or words they use (Cornwall 2004: 84, cf. Kohn 2000). Mosse furthermore argues that ‘dominant groups are able to generalise the particular’ (1993: 16) and make their private concerns public ‘by endorsing and putting on record dominant views’ (1993: 13; cf. Cornwall 1998: 48; Kapoor 2002; Lavigne-Delville et al. 2001: 10).

However, it is not only those with higher social standing who might disregard others’ concerns, but those who have spent most of their lives at the receiving end of prejudices often have internalised discrimination themselves and therefore have difficulties imagining themselves as actors, let alone agents, whose voice is worthy of being heard (Cornwall 2004: 84; cf. Freire 1972).

In the light of these difficulties, several authors have pointed to the danger that ‘PRA can work to hide local relations of power. [In particular, the emphasis] on consensus in data expression and presentation is […] prone to the silencing of marginal or “dissident” views’ (Goebel 1998: 284, cit. in Krummacher 2004: 39). Men in particular are often identified as dominating group proceedings, which is why Chambers (2008: 142; cf. Kapoor 2002: 109) calls for separate mapping to disclose issues and realities which are important to women and children. However, Cornwall (1998: 50) has argued that the grouping of men and women is far from being sufficient as these groups in themselves are highly diverse and structured by unequal power. But while this current practice of separating different groups may ‘help create space foralternative world-views to emerge and to be articulated’ (Cornwall 2004: 86; cf. Chambers 1997) and identify issues critical to women or other subordinate groups, these differences run the risk of ‘disappear[ing] into the melting pot of an “average community plan”’ (Guijt & Shah 1998b: 8). In this case, power relations are not necessarily challenged, but rather intensified (Mayoux 1995: 252; Stirrat 1996: 77; Crawley 1998: 31).

Group dynamics & response effects

More generally and even in relatively egalitarian groups, the output of participatory exercises might not necessarily represent the participants’ diverse opinions. There are several well-known response effects which can severely influence the behaviour of participants and thus the generated data. Furthermore, group dynamics such as peer pressure or group think, for example when all participants try to reach a consensus without conflict, can serve to conceal diversity and generate mean values only (Cooke 2001: 102). Moreover, Cooke (2001: 102) points to the difficulty of interpreting silence correctly.

The interface between thought and action

As has become clear, in contrast to seemingly straight-forward representations, implementing participatory methods involves a wide range of difficulties, and the simple application of PRA alone does not guarantee empowerment, local ownership or equal participation in project decision-making. Even a very careful and differentiated implementation of such methodologies, which demands a range of skills and critical awareness of the aforementioned problems and the development of creative, locally-adapted ways to minimise their impact, can not eliminate all of the issues raised.

However, in practice participation has become ‘the new tyranny’ (Cooke & Kothari 2001; cf. Hickey & Mohan 2004b: 4), a mainstream practice which is implemented in different ways, as indicated by the critical statement of an NGO manager quoted in title of this paper (cited in Cornwall & Pratt 2011: 265). ‘Participation’ is treated by some agencies ‘as a technical method of project work rather than as a political methodology of empowerment’ (Hickey & Mohan 2004b: 11). Thus, Cornwall and Gaventa (2001; cf. Mosse 2005) notice large differences between the rhetoric of participation (participants as makers and shapers) and the international mainstream practice of seeking compliance with pre-shaped agendas and pre-determined development ventures (participants as users and choosers). Instead of being internalised and embodied, ‘participatory’ methodologies are integrated into top-down-management and ‘used to legitimate the very approaches and methods PRA practitioners have sought to replace’ (Chambers 1994: 1441; cf. Cornwall 2004: 84).

Due to this mechanisation, the approach itself has lost its value: Instead of being a creative and open process, ‘participation’ becomes an empty ritual (Cornwall & Pratt 2011: 265) and either serves as an alibi, used ‘to legitimize action, to explain, justify, validate higher policy goals’ (Mosse 2001: 27), or is well-meant but flawed in its implementation. The imperfection is among others due to schematic reliance on manuals, lack of time, or limited training, reflexivity and awareness about power dynamics or inter-group relations described above on the part of the facilitator (Stirrat 1996: 86; Kapoor 2002).

Ways forward

However, cases of bad practice should not justify writing off the entire approach (McGee 2002: 107, cit. in Krummacher 2004: 75). Indeed, as most critics of PRA do not provide counter-proposals and in the absence of viable alternatives, it might still be the best way to attempt a more inclusive practice in development interventions in line with the principles of the SLA and to counter top-down approaches (Hickey & Mohan 2004b: 12). In order to improve participatory processes, scholars and practitioners should learn from experience and errors (cf. Chambers 2008: xvi-xviii) and aim to adapt, develop and expand the range of methods further. Anthropological research in particular can provide valuable insights to improve PRA processes. Furthermore, in the context of the SLA participatory methods can be expanded or supplemented by other techniques such as immersion. However, caution should be taken that the focus on the local does not result in the negation of structural forces on the national or global level (Hickey & Mohan 2004b: 12; cf. Mohan & Stokke 2000).

Including the assumed beneficiaries in the whole project cycle from the outset until evaluation can help to identify their realities (cf. Chambers 1997) and preferred futures and thus do more to improve their lives. Therefore, in addition to ensuring the high quality of participatory exercises, it remains crucial to ascertain that findings generated in this way are constantly fed back into the project or policy-making process at all stages in order to avoid the corruption or re-framing of specific and diverse needs by paternalistic behaviour or preconceived ideas (cf. Mosse 2005).

‘Everyone is doing something and calling it PRA’ A Critical Reflection on Participatory Methods in Development (158)

Focus on Corruption: How to secure the aims of decentralization in Peru by improving good governance at the regional level

HiiDunia — Tue, 27 Sep 2011 09:22:37 +0000

While this version of the paper includes some Figures, Tables and a list of appendices, please refer to the PDF Download for the full Paper including Appendix, Bibliography and all citations.

Focus on Corruption: How to secure the aims of decentralization in Peru by improving good governance at the regional level

Authors: Aaron Ausland and Alfonso Tolmos

Executive Summary

Corruption threatens to undermine the whole point of decentralization in Peru, which is to facilitate the political and economic development of the country by improving democratic participation and public service delivery.

Although the global trend is a positive association between decentralization and corruption, the relationship reverses itself within two key subsets. Both poor countries and Latin American countries tend to have worse corruption levels associated with greater degrees of decentralization. This should be doubly worrisome for Peruvian policymakers responsible for designing and leading its new decentralization process.

Why the difference? The key variable for corruption in a decentralized context is effective institutions of good governance. It is likely that it is the improved institutional context that does most of the work of reducing corruption in rich nations. We thus draw policymakers’ attention to the relationship between good governance and corruption in Peru. Specifically, we demonstrate a significant causal relationship between good regional governance, as measured by the Good Governance Index (GGI) of the Office of the Public Defender, and levels of regional corruption, as measured by Proética’s Everyday Corruption Index. Controlling for a number of relevant variables, and with few statistical degrees of freedom, we show that regions that do better on the Good Governance Index have significantly lower levels of corruption.

From these results and the literature we develop four recommendations to push the good governance agenda in order to combat corruption at the lower levels of government. To the National Council of Decentralization we recommend that they 1) strengthen the institutions of good governance proposed by the Office of the Public Defender 2) design a proposal to create a regional tax revenue system to create stronger incentives for good governance. To the Office of the Public Defender we recommend that they 1) improve their measurement of good governance, considering the trade-off between the technical requirements and the political relevance of the index and 2) co-develop with civil society groups an adapted version of the GGI for use at the municipal-level of government.

Our aim is to see decentralized institutions of government strengthened so that the institutional context into which resources, power and responsibility are decentralized is capable of delivering on the promises of decentralization. While our recommendations are directed at two governmental organizations, they also assign a key role to civil society, which participates in and monitors the process of governance and censures corrupt behavior.

Part 1. Focus on Corruption

In the three sections that follow, we build a case for why policymakers charged with guiding the decentralization process in Peru should be worried about corruption. We first identify the worthy aims of decentralization before identifying the destructive dangers of corruption. In section three, we explore the complex relationship between decentralization and corruption, and give reason why Peruvian policymakers should be concerned that decentralization, if not well managed, could result in increased corruption.

1. The Aims of Decentralization

Decentralization has been one of the most striking trends in Latin America over the past two decades. Throughout the region political power and fiscal resources have been devolved from the center to regional and municipal levels of government. Twenty-five years ago only three countries in Latin America had mayors chosen through direct elections; today nearly all do. And of those that don’t, six have mayors appointed by elected municipal councils. Lower levels of government are also managing an increasingly large share of the national budget. Figure 1 shows how Latin American countries have increased the average share of their national budgets spent at the local level.

Why individual countries choose to decentralize is somewhat of a mystery. That a national government would voluntarily embark on a process of devolving political, fiscal and administrative resources and responsibilities to lower levels of government seems to run counter to the traditional political economic theory that politicians attempt to accumulate power. Several explanations have been posited for Latin America’s broad endorsement of decentralization. Some partially credit the consensus of support that developed among the international financial institutions during the 1990s. Others point to the resurgence of electoral democracy in the 1980s in the region and the people’s demand for more responsive government. Others have argued that decentralization is a political maneuver during times of either fiscal or political crisis. A final explanation is that political parties push decentralization as an electoral strategy when they find their support at sub-national levels more secure than their prospects of reelection.

Apart from the underlying political motivations that lead countries to decentralize, there is the question of aims. What does the World Bank and IADB hope decentralization will achieve when they push countries toward this reform? Why do the people of Latin America demand more of it? What does decentralization achieve for them? Our survey of the literature and of government documents indicates that the principal aim is political and economic development through improved democratic participation, more accountable and responsive government, and improved service delivery.

The election of local officials allows citizens to more closely observe the performance of their local authorities and approve or disapprove directly by their vote. Because citizens elect local politicians based on their performance on local rather than national issues, politicians have an incentive to respond to local service demands. Thus services are more closely matched with local voter preferences.

Based on a review of political decentralization in Colombia, Ariel Fiszbein concludes that “competition for political office opened the door for responsible and innovative leadership that in turn became the driving force behind capacity building, improved service delivery and reduced corruption at the local level.”

The aims of decentralization are noble and its potential impact on the quality of service delivery and citizens’ experience with government is great. It is little wonder that people around the world pressure their governments for more of it.

2. The Dangers of Corruption

While many casual observers would agree that corruption sounds like a bad thing, few would expect it to be so strongly associated with stunted economic and political development. In this section we demonstrate just how dangerous corruption is and why it should be on the minds of policymakers.

Corruption & Economic Development

When one looks at Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI), it is immediately apparent that rich countries top the list and poor countries bring up the rear. In fact, the top twenty from the 2004 CPI have a per capita income of over $23,000, whereas the bottom twenty have less than $1700. The question then naturally arises, is this relationship causal, and if so, which direction does it go? Does the wealth of a nation affect the incentives or the perceptions of corruption or do lower levels of corruption aid economic growth? Many researches have used advanced quantitative methods to describe and untangle this relationship.

One of the most influential researchers looking at corruption and economic development is Paolo Mauro, who has shown that if a country could improve its standing on the CPI from a 6 to an 8, then it might expect a half a percentage point increase in its growth rate. Others have shown that had Bangladesh reduced its level of corruption to the level of Poland (2 points on the CPI) in 1990, it would have increased its growth rate such that by 1997 its per capita GNP would have been $413 instead of $350, an 18% increase! Since many economist attribute low national growth rates as the primary factor leading to household poverty, this affect is hugely significant to those with an interest in improving human welfare in the developing world.

Although difficulties remain in isolating corruption from other factors to which it is correlated, researchers have been able to describe and test a number of channels through which corruption affects growth. The most widely cited is reduced investment. According to Mauro, foregone investment alone accounts for 1/3 of corruption’s affect on stunting economic development. Corruption not only acts as a tax on investment but it also increases its riskiness, as there is some uncertainty about whether or not bribe takers will live up to their end of the bargain. He calculates that improving from a 6 to an 8 on the CPI results in a 4 percentage point increase in per capita investment rates.

Another significant channel is the distortion of government spending caused by rent-seeking behavior. Corruption is actually associated with higher public investment, but lower expenditures on operations and maintenance. In other words, corrupt politicians throw money at investment projects that provide kickback opportunities, but don’t invest in their quality or maintenance.

As public spending is distorted toward investment projects, less investment is made in health and education services. Mauro showed, for example, that a country that improves its standing on the CPI from a 6 to an 8 will typically increase its spending on education by ½ of 1 percent of GDP. Many researchers believe that there is a significant relationship between human capital investment – specifically in health and education – and economic development.

Finally, it is worth noting that rent-seeking in the right (meaning corrupt) environment can be an extremely profitable activity. Transparency International estimates the amount lost due to bribery in government procurement alone to be at least $400 billion per year worldwide. It is little wonder then that talented people often turn their creative energy into finding ways to profit from the opportunities of uncontrolled corruption.

Corruption impacts economic development by:

1. Lowering Investment rates
2. Distorting the composition of government expenditure
3. Reducing the quality of public infrastructure and services
4. Suppressing investments in health and education, leading to lower levels of human capital
5. Decreasing tax revenue
6. Providing incentives for talented people to pursue rent-seeking activities instead of producing

Corruption & Political Development

For years, academics viewed corruption as largely benign in terms of its political consequences. Some even argued that it gave the alienated access to government services, helped bind and stabilize the relationship between government and people, and in general “greased” the bureaucratic systems of emerging democracies. This view has been replaced, however, with a more sobering view of corruption as a potentially destabilizing force. Individual acts of corruption have a cumulative effect on the legitimacy of democratic institutions, draining the reservoir of goodwill from political parties, the judiciary, Congress, the police – eventually the ideals democracy themselves loose support. If a threshold of support is crossed, we could expect some new democracies to collapse and revert back to authoritarian regimes. More likely, however, new democracies will simply cease to fully consolidate and will remain week. Already in Latin America there are an alarming number of countries that, while nominally democratic, have lost their promise to deliver on the democratic ideals of openness, equality, transparency, and participation.

Figure 3 illustrates the strong correlation between corruption and political development. We’ve taken the top and bottom quartile of countries from Transparency’s CPI and crossed them with the global survey on political rights and civil liberties from Freedom House. Of the 35 countries in the top quartile, all but five are classified as free, but of the bottom 35, not a single country is classified as free. Granted, there is clearly reverse causality in this relationship. When the institutions of freedom are weak, transparency and accountability break down and corruption goes unchecked. But the path from corruption to decreased political rights and civil liberties is just as strong. Corruption undermines the very institutions that enable economic and political freedoms to flourish. It erodes public support for democratic rule, hampers the consolidation of democracy, and increases the potential for political instability.

Protecting Decentralization

Policymakers responsible for the decentralization process should be concerned about corruption. When power and public resources are captured and misused for private gain, the aims of decentralization are undermined. Decentralization is supposed to bring the government closer to the people, increasing its accountability and responsiveness. The people expect to have greater influence over the decisions that are made and receive services that more closely match their economic and political needs. Corruption frustrates the high expectations of decentralization.

There is little question that perceptions of corruption in Peru have political fallout. In one town, an angry mob lynched its mayor in reaction to questionable charges of corruption. In section 2.2 (fed up with corruption), we show a strong correlation between citizens’ political support for their regional President and the levels of corruption in their region.

Not only is corruption all bad news for Peru’s prospects of economic and political development, it could also threaten to undermine the political support for the decentralization process. If poorly managed, decentralization itself may create new opportunities for corruption in the regions. Instead of bringing the government closer to the people, the devolution of rent seeking behavior would bring corruption closer to the people. It would be hard for any national political figure to continue supporting a policy that decreases investment, slows growth, undermines the democratic institutions of the country, and makes the citizens so angry that they’ll lynch their mayor. Corruption needs to be taken seriously and should be explicitly dealt with in the design and implementation of decentralization, least well-meaning policymakers unwittingly unleash its dangers upon their country.

3. Decentralization and Corruption: A Global Perspective

One might argue that the effects of decentralization – bringing government closer to the people and making it more accountable and responsive – should mean that decentralization itself ought to diminish corruption. We show in this section this is true as a general rule, but that it actually depends a lot on the institutional environment into which power, resources and responsibilities are decentralized. In this regard, both non-rich countries and Latin American countries fare worse than the average and reverse the general rule. This should be doubly worrisome for the advocates and leaders of decentralization in Peru – a non-rich, Latin American country.

Before we examine the data, we should have a look at what academics say about the general relationship between decentralization and corruption. Not surprisingly, there is wide disagreement among them. In this section, the major theoretical arguments on both sides are presented, the data examined, and the relevance of the mixed evidence for Peru described.

More Corruption

Those that argue that decentralization leads to more corruption emphasize three interrelated lines of rationale:
• Increased power and discretion with less accountability
• Overgrazing for bribes
• Local interest group capture

As one researcher points out, local officials tend to have more permanence and discretion than national decision makers. Decentralization empowers them to make more decisions over greater resources in a context where monitoring and auditing are less developed. Additionally the capacity of civil society and the media to provide vigilance and apply pressure is also less than at the national level.

Others show that increasing the levels of government results in competition between them to extract bribes from the same economic actors. This is likely to increase overall corruption and result in “overgrazing”

Finally, since corruption often requires the cooperation of both politicians and bureaucrats, the decreased distinction between them and their increased permanence at the local level make it more likely that unethical relationships will be established between them and with local interest groups, whose money and votes they depend on.

Less Corruption

• Those who argue the other side emphasize:
• Increased accountability
• Increased competition for votes
• Increased inter-jurisdictional competition for investment

Many argue that as a result of local government being located closer to the people it serves, it is more responsive and accountable than the national government and consequently less prone to be corrupted. At the national level, accountability is defused because people vote based on national rather than local performance. But at the local level, accountability is stronger because citizens are better informed about the performance of their local government and can hold officials directly accountable through both vote and protest.

Political decentralization allows local officials to be directly elected, increasing the competition for political office. The result is a political opening for leaders who are more responsive to local needs than to national politics.

Not only do local politicians compete against each other to get into office, once there they compete against other jurisdictions for mobile factors, especially business investment. Evidence exists that firms respond to incentives to relocate to areas with lower corruption.

The Evidence

These competing theories can be tested against the evidence. Using measures of political and fiscal decentralization developed by Schneider, a statistically significant association between both fiscal and political decentralization and corruption was confirmed. But associations don’t clarify the relationship as well as more rigorous econometric analysis. A cross-country model for 48 countries was developed using the CPI once again as the corruption variable and sub-national expenditures as a percentage of total expenditure for the decentralization variable. Controlling for a number of other relevant variables, a significant relationship between greater fiscal decentralization and better perceptions of corruption was found.

But the global relationship becomes ambiguous when you separate countries by levels of economic development, (as shown in Figure 5), or by region. It turns out that in poor countries and among Latin American countries the positive relationship actually reverses itself. Among Latin American countries, those with best CPI scores (Chile, Uruguay and Costa Rica) are among the most fiscally centralized. It should be especially troubling for Peru that both non-rich countries and Latin American countries demonstrate a negative relationship between decentralization and corruption.in Figure 5), or by region. It turns out that in poor countries and among Latin American countries the positive relationship actually reverses itself. Among Latin American countries, those with best CPI scores (Chile, Uruguay and Costa Rica) are among the most fiscally centralized. It should be especially troubling for Peru that both non-rich countries and Latin American countries demonstrate a negative relationship between decentralization and corruption.

One explanation for these results is that decentralization may require well-developed institutions to work well. Where they are weak, decentralization dumps political power, fiscal resources, and administrative responsibilities into an uncertain local environment.

Part 2. Defining the Situation in Peru

In the previous section we defined the aims of decentralization, the dangers of corruption, and the threat that the later poses to the former. In this section we review the current situation in Peru in terms of decentralization, corruption and good governance. Because policy is context-specific, it is important to keep the realities of Peru in the forefront of our minds as we move on to develop a conceptual framework and econometric model from which we draw policy implications.

1. Decentralization in Peru

The history of decentralization in Peru is an irregular one. In 1980, Peru emerged from military rule and wrote a new democratic constitution that enabled local elections for mayors. Between 1985 and 1990, the government attempted to decentralize to the regional level, but design flaws provoked the subsequent administration to reverse the process in 1992. By 2002, pressure had built up among the general population as well as key economic and political actors to push forward once again with decentralization. The new government made it a high-priority policy, and by early 2002, the legislature had developed a strong legal foundation to take the process forward. In January of 2003, elected regional presidents took up their posts.

One of the most salient characteristics of Peru’s current decentralization is how few fiscal resources have been devolved to the administrative authority of the regional governments. There is a distinct mismatch between the levels of political and fiscal administrative decentralization. Officially, 23.5% of total national general expenditure is spent at the sub-national level, 6.5% by local governments and 17% by regional governments. This is low compared to 34% in Latin America as a whole, and 43% in developed countries. But even these low reported figures are somewhat misleading.

Nearly all of the money spent at the regional level has been transferred there by the national government to pay the administrative costs of nationally-managed programs like health and education. Only 13% of the money transferred is actually available for regional governments to manage with discretion, a mere 2% of total national general expenditure.

Currently, there are no regional taxes. 100% of regional revenues are transfers from the national government. According to the Law of Fiscal Decentralization, the regional governments will continue to be funded this way until such a time (currently unspecified) in which macro-regions are formed. These macro-regions will be constituted by the voluntary union of current regions confirmed by a referendum of the affected constituency.

Once these macro-regions are constituted, the law allows for 50% of a specific set of taxes collected by the national government to remain in the macro-regions. Currently, there are no plans to devolve tax-collecting authority to the macro-regions.

Peru has pursued political decentralization without a concomitant level of real fiscal and/or administrative decentralization. According to Carlos Casas, a local expert on decentralization in Peru, there are at least two reasons why this might be. First, there is widespread concern that lower levels of government do not yet possess the capacity to manage additional money and responsibilities. Second, there are concerns at the Ministry of Economy and Finance that more rapid decentralization will lead to macro-economic instability due to fiscal irresponsibility at the regional and local levels. The fiscal crises in Brazil, Argentina, and Colombia, which some attributed in part to decentralization, have increased the caution in Peru.

According to Casas, Macroeconomic instability is one of the principal threats to the decentralization process because if economic health is deteriorated by it, voices may emerge demanding its reversal.
Whatever the reasons, political decentralization without concomitant levels of fiscal and administrative can be dangerous. When people believe that their local government is empowered and resourced, they make demands of it. When local government cannot respond to these demands, unfounded accusations of corruption and mismanagement result, sometimes with tragic consequences. (see story box 1)

Although we believe a better balance between political, fiscal, and administrative decentralization would be healthier for Peru, the central focus of this work is how to diminish corruption in the context of a decentralized Peru. This section briefly described how decentralization policy evolved to its present state in Peru. We turn now to the situation corruption as a potential threat to the benefits promised by decentralization.

2. Corruption in Peru

High Level Corruption

When people think of corruption in Peru, they tend immediately to recall the famous video tapes of the head of the National Intelligence Service, Vladimiro Montesinos, bribing Congressmen, media owners, judges, and other political and business leaders. The first tape, which aired in September of 2000, showed him paying opposition legislator-elect Alberto Kouri US$15,000 per month to switch sides in support of the president. Other vladivideos, as they came to be known, followed, and for a time became popular viewing as “Peru’s own distinctive form of reality television.” In the end, over 1,600 Peruvians were found to have been receiving bribes from Montesinos.

The effect on the political landscape in Peru was spectacular and swift. Prior to the tapes’ broadcast, then president Alberto Fujimori enjoyed a comfortable 50% approval rating, even after the scandalous 2000 elections, which he was accused of rigging. But by October his approval had plummeted to 36% and continued dropping to 24% by the time he fled the country in November.

The magnitude of the bribes and the breadth of complicity will forever mark the Fujimori administration as one of the most corrupt governments the region has ever known. In addition to the US$1.1 million in discretionary funding under his control at the National Intelligence Service provided unsupervised by the Congress, Montesinos also received millions under-the-table from the Ministry of Interior, the military, and by skimming off of state contracts. With these nearly unlimited funds, he paid a dozen opposition politicians between US$10,000 and US$50,000 per month to switch sides. He had another dozen opposition moles and party member politicians on the take, as well as the Prime Ministers. He had dozens of judges, Supreme Court Justices, and the Ministry of Justice on the payroll. The most spectacular bribes, however, were paid to capture television and print media. The bribes paid to buy-off all five privately-owned television broadcasters and much of the print media were counted in millions. In at least two cases, television owners were paid over US$10,000,000 to do Montesino’s bidding.

It is little surprise that Peru’s image in the world was marred by the scandals. Peru’s score on TI’s Corruption Perception Index prior to the scandals hovered around 4.5. The year after, it dropped by nearly 10% and has continued to decline. (see figure 5)

Within Peru, corruption has become an important political theme. According to a survey published by Proética, the Peruvian Chapter of Transparency International, corruption is considered by Peruvians to be the third most important problem affecting Peru. Only unemployment and the economic situation/poverty rank as more important issues. In 2004, 91% of all Peruvians considered their country to be “corrupt” or “very corrupt”. Even though measures of bribery have shown a dramatic decline in actual rates of corruption, the perception within Peru is that it is increasing. This may be due, in part to a declining tolerance for corruption.

Although high-level corruption captures the headlines, the average Peruvian is a mere spectator to the kinds of political favors and financial kickbacks involved at this level. Nevertheless, they too have first-hand experience with the kind of everyday, low-level corruption prevalent in Peru.

Everyday Corruption

According to Proética, about 30% of the national population pays some kind of bribe each year, and 4.5% of all transactions in Peru in 2004 involved bribery. This is down from 5.3% in 2003, and 6.4% in 2002. These are the everyday kinds of transactions that the average person engages in, from paying a parking ticket to getting a copy of their birth certificate; from obtaining a building permit to getting a cable hook-up. They involve a variety of public and private institutions including private business, the judiciary, municipal governments, police, and a number of other social service organizations such as social security, public health, and customs. Appendix III lists the 35 types of transactions measured by Proética and the percentage of each type that involved a bribe in 2003.

These types can be grouped into three broad categories, transactions with the national government, with local governments, and with private business. In both 2003 and 2004, the most corrupt types of transactions were those involving the national government.

The average bribe is approximately US$16, but this figure does not include bribes paid for either winning or collecting a bid (for a government concession or contract), where the sums are much larger and have greater variation. Their inclusion as outliers would pull the average up significantly and mask the true size of the typical bribe paid by the average person engaging in an everyday transaction. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that both of these transactions have some of the highest rates of corruption. (19% and 11% respectively, see Appendix III)

Within the regions, there is substantial variation in the percentage of transactions involving bribes. Table 2 lists the Everyday Corruption Index (ECI) score for each of the 25 regions for the past three years. While most regions have seen a moderate decline in corruption over this period, a few have stood out – Junín and Huánuco for having made outstanding improvements, Cajamarca and Ucayali for having worsened badly.

Fed up with Corruption

Corruption is not an isolated or abstract concept to the average Peruvian. Rather, it is part of his or her daily life. They have seen it seep into the highest levels of public office and rot the very institutions of democracy. They have seen the vladivideos with their own eyes – judges being bought, elected lawmakers selling their loyalties, the free press going to the highest bidder. Corruption spoils nearly every type of interaction with nearly every institution of government. Over 60% of the population believes that the judiciary, national police, Congress and national government are all corrupt. Peruvians are fed up with corruption; their tolerance is on the decline, and their revulsion drives their political support. The approval ratings of the Presidents of the regional governments are strongly correlated with the perceptions of corruption in their respective regions. Figure 6 illustrates this 35% correlation.

Political Commitment

The magnitude of corruption and the heights to which it has reached in Peru have contributed to the creation of a political environment strongly supportive of anti-corruption efforts. One recent demonstration of this is the 2004 Compact to Promote Transparency and Combat Corruption, signed between Peru and the G8 countries. At the Evian 2003 Summit, the G8 countries committed to work together with developing countries to fight corruption and improve transparency. The following year at the Sea Island Summit, Peru was among the first to enter into a compact with the G8, committing itself to taking a number of specific steps to combat corruption. In the compact, Peru affirms the view that “corruption is a threat to democratic institutions, economic development and to the integrity of the international system of trade and investment,” and reaffirms its commitment to “fighting corruption and improving transparency in the conviction that these are key underpinnings of democratic government, development, and poverty reduction.”

Peru has agreed to push for greater transparency in public budgets, including revenues and expenditures, government procurement, the letting of public concessions and granting of licenses. To this end much has already been done. The Superior Council for State Procurement and Contracting is working to harmonize administrative and contracting regulations and creating oversight institutions at the regional and national levels.

Beginning even before the Montesinos scandal broke, Peru began taking a number of important steps, demonstrating its commitment to combating corruption. Today, more than ever, anti-corruption efforts in Peru are undertaken in a political milieu of supportability. A few milestones:

• The Law on Fiscal Responsibility and Transparency was written in 1999 and amended in 2003.
• In 1999, the Ministry of Finance introduced the Integrated System of Financial Management, and made it more user-friendly in 2004 to facilitate public access.
• In November, 2001, the National Anti-Corruption Commission was created.
• In April, 2003, Peru issued the Law for Transparency and Access to Public Information.
• In 2003, the Electronic System of Procurement and Contracting (SEACE) was created.
• In December, 2003, Peru signed the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, ratifying it in late 2004.
• In May, 2004, the Ministry of Justice established a working group to propose ways to strengthen the fight against corruption.
• In June, 2004, Peru signed the Compact to Promote Transparency and Combat Corruption with the G8.

3. Good Regional Governance

According to a recent report published by the Office of the Public Defender (OPD), there is a lot of room for improving the governance at the regional level in Peru. The OPD created a measure for good governance based on more than 70 requisites grouped in 4 main categories: Access to Public Information, Transparency, Accountability and Coordination. The average score indicated that just 59% of the requirements are currently being met (see Table 3). This score means that, on average, the regional governments could improve their level of good governance by at least 70% from their current levels. As we demonstrate in section 3, such an improvement would have a dramatic impact on the levels of corruption in the regional governments.

Access to Public Information

The regions score highest in the Access to Public Information component, with an average of 83%. However, only two sub-components were actually measured in 2004 out of the five that the OPD proposes as theoretically relevant: the formal designation of an official responsible for public information and the cost of information. Consequently, the results did not clearly differentiate the regional governments’ performances in this area. More than half actually received the maximum score available. The only regions to dramatically underperform the rest were Junín and Apurimac, with 37.5% and 20% of the ideal score, respectively.

The OPD hopes to include the other sub-components when the next index is published in January, 2006. One would expect major changes once these are included. Specifically, we expect most of the scores to pull in toward the middle as the component measurements are able to more finely differentiate performance.

Transparency

The regions scored lowest in the category of Transparency, with an average score of 44.3%. Transparency is defined by the quality and timeliness of information related to public finances that the regional governments make available to the public.

However, according to OPD, there were some omitted sub-components in this category as well. While the OPD measured the information available on the web sites (Transparency Portals) of the regional governments, they did not measure the publication and diffusion of such information through other means of communication. Therefore, we also expect some differences in results of this component in the next GGI, but not as drastic as those of the first.

Lambayeque earned the highest transparency score by meeting 83% of the measured requirements. Cajamarca and Ucayali also performed strongly with scores of 72.7% and 64%, respectively. On the other side of the spectrum, there were two regions that scored 0%: Puno and Apurimac, neither of which had an operable web site, nor a formally designated official responsible for public information.

Accountability

The average score for accountability was similar to the overall average GGI score: 58.5%. In measuring accountability, the OPD focused exclusively on the evaluation of public audiences, which are events very similar to the U.S. concept of town hall meetings. The regional governments are expected to hold several public audiences each year, giving the public adequate information through a number of communication mediums about when and where they will be held and what will be on the agenda. They are expected to discuss openly, and with active citizen participation, a number of issues at these meetings, including information about budgeting, planning, the acquisition of goods and services, and other official activities. In this component, Pasco and Tacna earned the highest scores with 89.2% and 86%, respectively, while Junín and La Libertad earned the lowest, with 35.2% and 31.2%, respectively.

Coordination

Finally, the score of Coordination is 58.8% of the ideal. Tacna has not only the highest score with 95.2% in this component, but the highest score in comparison with other components, without considering Access to Public Information because of its measurement problems mentioned. Amazonas also stands out with an 84% score. The lowest scores in this component are 32.4% and 16.8% for Arequipa and Madre de Dios, respectively.

Part 3. Modeling Regional Corruption in Peru

1. Framing the Model

Our goal is to identify effective policy handles to better combat corruption in a decentralized Peru. Although much can be done using theory and the information we have about the situation in Peru, we can also use more rigorous methods. Specifically, we can test our theory that good governance has a significant causal effect on the levels of corruption in Peru’s regions. We use regional-level data, most of which has just recently become available, to build an econometric model of corruption in which good governance is our independent variable of interest and in which we control for a number of other relevant variables.

The biggest potential threat to such a model is the possibility of getting caught in a web of reverse causation. In theory, institutional quality, economic development, and corruption form an interdependent web; improving any one is likely to improve the others. As Mauro points out, “The truth is that probably all of these weaknesses are intrinsically linked, in the sense that they feed upon each other … and that getting rid of corruption helps a country overcome other institutional weaknesses, just as reducing other institutional weaknesses helps it curb corruption.” Treisman also notes, “…even though corruption hinders growth, countries can at times grow their way out of corruption. If other factors lead to vigorous economic development, corruption is likely to decrease.”

Thus corruption, in theory, is both a cause and an effect of weak institutions and poor economic performance, which are themselves interrelated. Just as some symptoms produce negative feedback that reinforces the disease, corruption may be a symptom of both that further erodes institutional quality and hinders economic development.

Our model, however, avoids these problems. First, we use a measure of institutional quality (the Good Governance Index) that affects levels of corruption, but is not itself affected by corruption. It would be a stretch to think that poor performances in the more than 70 sub-components that make up the index are caused by corruption. More likely causes of underperformance are poor planning, mis-prioritization, and a lack of administrative resources, technical knowledge, and awareness of their legal obligations.

Second, although we know that a problem of reverse causation exists between corruption and economic development, we aren’t concerned about this in our model. We are only concerned about getting a correct coefficient on the good governance variable, and to do this, we need to control for levels of economic development, which we do. It is inconsequential to the results of interest that the directional relationship between our dependent variable and a control variable is unclear.

And finally, we avoid the problem of having our independent variables related to each other (multicollinearity) by choosing variables that are uncorrelated. In this case, theory led us to be somewhat concerned about measures of economic development and institutional quality being correlated. However, the correlation between our good governance variable and GNP per capita variable is just 4.2%, which is, for all practical purposes, the same as zero.

So, if we can show the Good Governance Index to be a significant predictor of levels of corruption, then we will be able to draw out specific recommendations to strengthen good governance and be confident that their implementation would effectively combat corruption.

2. Dependent Variable: Corruption

Our econometric model is built to explain corruption in Peru’s regions, for this reason we use a measure of regional corruption as our dependent variable. The measure we use is a corruption index developed by the National Consortium for Public Ethics, otherwise known as Proética, the Peruvian chapter of Transparency International. The Everyday Corruption Index (ECI) measures the percentage of transactions where a bribe was paid for each of the 25 regions in Peru.

To best match the measuring timing of our dependent variable to that of our independent variable, we averaged the first Proética survey, released at the end of 2002, with the second survey, released a year later. This gives us a close temporal match to the field work done by the Office of the Public Defender in constructing the Good Governance Index.

The data for Proética’s ECI comes from samples of 5125 (2002) and 5810 (2003) representative households, systematically selected according to socio-economic ratios from randomly selected blocks within each region of the country. At least 200 households were surveyed in each region each year. The survey population is defined as head’s of household in urban locations of age 18 and over from all 25 regions of Peru. The surveys were conducted by Apoyo Opinion y Mercado.

3. Independent Variable: Good Governance

Our key independent variable is the Good Governance Index (GGI) developed by the Office of the Public Defender (OPD). The GGI was developed within the Decentralization and Good Government Program to periodically measure the fulfillment of the relevant laws on transparency, access to public information, accountability and coordination at the regional government level.

The index covers all 25 regions and measures more than 70 sub-components. The weight of each component and sub-component was determined by a group of experts at the OPD and from the Institute of Economic Studies. Here we have shown just the first level of sub-components to the four main components, noting in parentheses the number of level II and III subcomponents.

Notice that the GGI does not include any measure of corruption as do other well-known measures of good governance such as Kauffman’s Good Governance Index. Our independent variable includes no measure of corruption, and can thus be used as an explanatory variable of the degree of corruption at the regional level as the literature predicts.

4. Control Variables

We have included a number of control variables that theory predicts could be correlated both with our dependent and independent variables. Their inclusion helps us isolate the effects of our independent variable on the dependent so that we can calculate a coefficient that describes their relationship, holding all other relevant factors constant. In various versions of our model we control for the following variables:

• Economic development
• Physical distance from the capital
• Participation in a religious organization
• Levels of primary education
• Size of government
• Ethnic fractionalization

In this section, we describe briefly the measurement we use for each control variable.

Economic development

Although we have already shown the Good Governance Index to be totally independent of levels of regional economic development we still control for it in the model. We do this because there is a strong theoretical basis for believing levels of economic development to be correlated with both the institutional quality that would affect good governance and with levels of corruption. Every model with corruption as the dependent variable that we’ve seen in the relevant literature controls for levels of economic development. The measure we use is the 2001 regional GDP per capita in millions of Nuevos Soles (in constant 1994 prices), estimated by the National Institute of Statistics and Information.

Distance from Lima

Another interesting variable considered in our model measures the distance in kilometers from Lima to the capital city of each region. We developed it using the Map Generator available at www.world-map.perbang.dk. We include this variable because it could be helpful to understand what happens with corruption the more isolated the region is from the seat of the national government.

Religious participation

Religion is considered by many authors as an important explanatory variable for corruption. Our measure is the percentage of people who participate in a religious group. Our data source is NISI’s 2001 National Household Survey. Although most other models use the percentage of Protestantism, we do not specify any particular religion. Our theory is premised on the fact that all major religions in Peru, including traditional indigenous ones, teach systems of ethics that proscribe corrupt behavior.

It may also be useful to think of participation in organized religious as a measure of social capital. In Peru, religious groups are the most common organizations that people participate in, representing 34% of the total participation in social organizations.

Primary Education

According to Ades and Di Tella, education should be included based on the “presumption that in more educated countries with better information flows the costs of corruption will be better understood and will be socially condemned accordingly”. Our measure is the percentage of population enrolled in either pre-school or primary education as of 2003. The data was provided by the Ministry of Education.

Size of Government

We measure size of government as the 2003 expenditures per capita of the regional governments in thousands of Nuevos Soles according to the Ministry of Economy and Finance, including not only their autonomous resources (13% of regional resources) but also the de-concentrated resources (87%). It is important to mention this distinction because despite the de-concentrated resources have not been formally transferred to the regional governments yet, unlike the autonomous resources, they are an important part of the size of the government, national or regional, at the regional level. The theory and evidence of the direction of impact that size of government should have on corruption is mixed.

Ethnic Fractionalization

Finally, we develop two separate measures of ethnic fractionalization, a variable which has significant theoretic support in the literature to be included as explanatory of corruption. Our first measure (ethnic homogeneity) uses the percentage of the regional population belonging to the largest ethnic group. The larger this number, the greater the ethnic homogeneity. The second measure (ethnic fractionalization) uses the percentage of the regional population belonging to the second largest ethnic group. The larger this number, the great the ethnic fractionalization.

5. Results and Analysis

Good Governance

The most important result from the model is the direction and significance of the impact that our measure of good governance has on levels of corruption in the regions. Even with few degrees of freedom and controlling for enough relevant variables to explain 57% of the variance between regions, we find that good governance significantly reduces corruption. Not only is the impact statistically significant, but it is also practically significant, which is to say that our independent variable provides a practical lever for policy makers interested in significantly reducing corruption in the regions.

We illustrate the impact in figure 8, using our results to predict the likely impact on corruption of making realistic improvements in government performance in the region of Junín. According to the GGI, Junín has the worst performing regional government, coming in last place in the index ranking. This region accomplished just 40.5% of the requirements for good governance according to the standards defined by the Office of the Public Defender. As figure 8 illustrates, our model predicts that were Junín to improve its standing to that of the Region of Cusco, which is at the 40th percentile – ranked 10 of 25 with a score of 60.3% – it would see a 2 percentage point drop in the number of transactions marred by corruption. Currently 10.8% of all transactions in Junín require a bribe. If its governance were as good as Cusco’s, our model predicts that just 9.1% would. That is to say, that for every 1000 transactions in Junín, instead of 108 acts of corruption, there would be just 81 – a 16% reduction in the rate of corruption. The improvements needed to make this transition are practical and realizable. The results are powerful and significant. When the Office of the Public Defender created the GGI, they theorized that better performance would lead to lower levels of corruption. Now, with this data, they can definitively say it is so with confidence.

To underscore the relevance and practicality of our findings, we have tracked the efforts of Junín to improve their good governance score since the index was published and the remarkable results they have had on reducing their corruption. In the next section, Tale of Two Regions, we compare their efforts and results of Junín with that of Ucayali.

Our model predicts that accurate compliance with 100% of the requirements measured in the Good Governance Index would reduce the level of corruption in Peru’s regional governments by nearly half. This is a powerful prediction, while at the same time a recognition that the GGI does not explain all of the corruption in the regions. Even with all of our control variables included, our model only explains just 57% of the variation between regional levels of corruption. This means that there are other factors out there that we aren’t measuring that influence the levels of corruption. If we believe that some of these unmeasured factors are related to good governance, than one implication is that we might be able to construct a better measure of good governance and increase its power to explain corruption. In fact, the Office of the Public Defender recognizes this explicitly in their publication of the index. One of our recommendations then is to improve the measure of good governance to capture more of these factors. By doing so, we would expect the improved GGI to show even more powerful results.

Control Variables

When we calculate our model with no control variables, we find that the GGI alone explains 22% of the variation in levels of corruption between the regions. As we add in the control variables, our model’s ability to explain corruption increases to 57% (see table 5). Although most of the controls are not statistically significant at the 90% level, both GDP per capita and religious participation are very close in many of the model’s variations (see Appendix IX for a t-statistics for each specification). As we previously state, in the literature, some measure of economic development is always used as a control variable in models explaining corruption. As expected, our results show that higher levels of economic development are associated with less corruption. If GDP per capita were to increase by 14%, the model predicts a 0.5 percentage point decrease in the corruption rate. Given that the GDP per capita annual growth rate in Peru is 2.2%, it will take 7 years to realize this modest gain in corruption outcomes through the channel of current economic growth rates. This result hovers around statistical significance in each variation of our model. One should take caution, however, when interpreting the coefficient because of the problem of reverse causality.

Interestingly, the variable Distance from Lima has statistical significance across all model specifications. The further the regional government is located from the national government, the lower its level of corruption. Although this is an interesting and statistically significant result, it has no practically significance. For every 100 kilometers of additional distance, the predicted corruption rate decreases by a mere 0.004 percentage points. In other words, the impact is negligible and we find no policy implications in them.

As expected, the greater the percentage of people participating in religious organizations, the lower the corruption. As mentioned, this may be due religious organizations teaching systems of ethics that proscribe corrupt behavior. Alternatively, this may be because the participation rates act as a proxy measure of social capital, which points to a more active and vigilant civil society that demands more responsive government. Although the predicted impact is very strong – a 10 percentage point increase in the participation rate is associated with a 1.4 percentage point decrease in the corruption rate – the statistical significance falls below the 90% level. Nevertheless, we find this result interesting both because of the magnitude of the predicted impact and because the significance level stays between 74% and 86%, depending on the model’s specification. With more degrees of freedom, we might expect to find statistical significance in this variable as do many of the cross-country models that explain corruption using Protestantism as a control.

The Primary Education control variable shows a coefficient with the expected sign – more education associated with less corruption – but again, the result is not statistically significant. The controls for size of government and ethnic fractionalization show neither a strong predicted impact nor statistical significance.

Conclusion

Our model shows that better governance, as measured by the Good Governance Index, leads to lower levels of corruption, as measured by the Everyday Corruption Index. The result is statistically significant, even with few degrees of freedom and controlling for many other relevant variables. It is also practically significant and indicates that the more than 70 sub-components of the GGI, provide a good place to begin looking for policy recommendations to decrease corruption in the regional governments.

6. Tale of Two Regions

When the Good Governance Index was published in July, 2004, it caused quite a stir among the regional governments who found themselves ranked against one another by the Office of the Public Defender (ODP) according to their performance in good governance. Knowing that the OPD is non-partisan, the regional governments could not discount the rankings as driven by partisan politics. When the President of the region of Junín found his administration ranked last, he traveled to Lima to discuss the results with the OPD and to ask for help in improving his position. Clearly, he felt his political future threatened by the results and he wanted to improve his standing in the next ranking due out January, 2006 before the next regional elections in November, 2006.

Following the ODP’s advice, he contracted a consultant from the Institute of Peruvian Studies, to advise him in ways to improve his good governance performance. Although his administration has not been officially remeasured yet, officials from the ODP indicate that his government is making significant progress in improving its good governance performance. Not surprisingly, the annual measures of the corruption rate in Junín have fallen as its government has pushed to improve good governance, as our model predicts. In 2002, Junín was the most corrupt region in Peru according to Proética’s First Everyday Corruption Index, with 12.5% of its transactions corrupted. By the end of 2004, it moved to the middle of the ranking with an index score of just 4.2%

Junín’s success can be set against the relative failure of Ucayali. When the GGI was published, the government of Ucayali was content to find itself ranked 7 of 25. While other governments have made efforts to improve their governance, Ucayali has done less than most. Again, although the next GGI is not due out until January of 2006, officials at the OPD suspect that Ucayali will fall in the rankings. Some initial reports show it already falling behind Junín in several sub-component measures. It is not surprising to see that their ECI score has deteriorated. They started in 2002 with the same score that Junín ends 2004 with, 4.2%. They end 2004 with 9.1%. In other words, the percent of corrupted transactions has more than doubled in Ucayali while in the same period in Junín, they have been cut to a mere third of their previous levels.

Figure 9 illustrates the relative positions of Junín and Ucayali according to the Good Governance Index. Junín, shown in orange, is below average in all four components of the index. Ucayali, on the other hand, shown in blue, is above average in all components except access to public information. Figure 10, shows the evolution of these two region’s Everyday Corruption Index scores. They crossed not long after the publication of the GGI.

Part 4. Recommendations for Combating Corruption

1. Pushing Good Governance

Corruption threatens the success of the decentralization process in Peru. It interferes directly with the aims of decentralization – improved democratic participation, more accountable and responsive government, and better service delivery. Additionally, it impairs economic development and undermines the legitimacy of government institutions. Given the current anti-corruption mood in Peru, the best way to protect the decentralization process from being undermined politically is to take concrete steps to ensure that it does not lead to an increase in corruption.

There is good reason to worry about corruption increasing in a decentralized Peru. Evidence shows that decentralized middle- and low-income countries are perceived as more corrupt than centralized ones. What is more, countries within Latin America that decentralize are perceived as more corrupt than centralized ones. According to both empirical trends, one might expect Peru to experience an increase in corruption as a result of decentralization.

According to the results of our econometric model of corruption in Peru’s regions, the good governance framework described by the Office of the Public Defender offers a powerful policy strategy to buck these trends, combat corruption, and ensure a successful decentralization process in Peru. Good governance should therefore be pushed at the regional level by the institutions responsible for directing the decentralization process. Foremost among these is the NCD, but the Office of the Prime Minister, Ministry of Economy and Finance, Office of the Public Defender, Congress, the Comptroller, the Regional and Local Governments and Civil Society should also be pushing this agenda. According to Proética, Peruvians believe that each of these institutions should play an active role in combating corruption.

Since it is the NCD that is specifically charged with coordinating the process of decentralization, it should lead this effort. It should leverage its Ministry-ranked President and high-level members within the government to prioritize the good governance agenda in Peru and ensure a successful decentralization process.

The Office of the Public Defender also plays a key role. Their strong reputation as a non-partisan office able to work closely with civil society, and their demonstrated expertise in issues of good governance position them to support the NCD, the regional and municipal governments and civil society organizations in this effort.

2. Implementation by the National Council of Decentralization

1) Strengthen institutions of good governance

The NCD should act to strengthen the institutions of good governance identified in the framework developed by the Office of the Public Defender. Specifically, they should strengthen the capacity of the regional governments to a) define administrative rules and manage public information to improve public access to information, b) create and manage web portals to increase transparency, and c) host effective town hall meetings, known as public audiences, to strengthen accountability. Additionally they should d) strengthen the Regional Coordination Councils role to enhance coordination with the different levels of government and with civil society.

Building regional capacity

The Law of Transparency and Access to Information states that any government institution should have an administrative procedure defined in a document called the TUPA (Texto Unico de Procedimientos Administrativos) to facilitate access to public information. According to the OPD, the TUPA should be updated and distributed by the regional governments. According to the OPD, the regional governments should also have a designated official responsible for handling requests for public information, as well as a system for receiving and processing citizens’ complaints and suggestions.

Every government institution is required by law to publish a specific set of grouped information on their web site in a section called the transparency portal. For the regional governments, this includes the TUPA, the budget and financial reports, investment projects, procurement and contracting information, the legal framework, the organization chart and salary information, official activities, and general public announcements.

According to the Law of Regional Governments , there should be at least two public audiences each year to keep the public informed and updated on regional governance matters.

As part of the ongoing public management training at the regional level, the NCD should provide the regional governments with legal information, technical assistence, and training so that officials there have the capacity to define and publish their administrative rules in the TUPA, to administer a system of public feedback, to collect and manage public information, to build and maintain a website that contains adequate, reliable, standardized and accessible public information, and to host effective public audiences.

Strengthening the RCCs

According to the Law of Regional Governments , the Regional Coordination Councils act as consultative entities for the regional governments and play a coordinating role between the regional governments, local governments and civil society. The councils meet at least twice a year in ordinary sessions, primarily to give input on the development of the Annual Participatory Budget and the Concerted Regional Development Plan. The councils are made up of the regional president, local mayors, and key representatives from civil society, including members of the business community.

If the aims of decentralization are to improved democratic participation, make government more accountable and responsive, and improve service delivery, then the input of the RCCs is critical for the making decentralization work. Our findings also suggest that their functioning plays an important role in combating corruption. The greater the breadth and depth of citizen participation in the decision-making, planning and administration of government, the harder it is to hide corruption.

The NCD is charged with the coordination of the national, regional and local development plans. In execution of this charge, they should ensure the full participation of the RCCs in the process of developing the regional plans. They should also help the regional governments to better understand how to work with the RCCs to achieve its governing objectives.

2) Develop a regional tax revenue system proposal

Currently, the operation of regional governments is wholly dependent on financial transfers from the national government. Taxes are collected nationally by SUNAT and then redistributed following a formula that allocates funds according to the needs and poverty level of each region (and sometimes political pressure). There are no fiscal incentives under the current system for the regional governments to improve their performance, and in fact, when higher levels of poverty are rewarded with larger revenue transfers, there may even be some perverse incentives. If, on the other hand, a portion of locally-raised and collected taxes stayed in the regions as a variable revenue stream, then the incentive structure would be changed, both for the regional governments and for the citizenry.

Increasing horizontal competition

If the amount of fiscal resources available to be managed with discretion at the regional level depended in part on regional tax receipts, then regional governments would have an incentive to compete with one another for mobile resources that would grow their tax base. The horizontal competition for business investment would compel regional governments to create more inviting businesses environments, clearing bureaucratic obstacles, investing in infrastructure and human capital, and rooting out sources of corruption (which act like a tax on investment).

The incentives to increase tax collection within their region would compel regional governments to broaden and deepen current tax collection. With greater local knowledge and greater incentives, they would likely do a better job than the national government. The proposal should therefore call for SUNAT to coordinate the creation of regional tax collection agencies for the set of taxes from which a portion is designated to stay.

Finally, the regional governments would also have an incentive to formalize informal productive activities, bringing essentially illegal businesses into the formal sector where they could be both regulated and taxed.

The upshot is that as each region works to increase its tax base, the country as a whole benefits. The cumulative effect would result in an overall increase in both competitiveness and tax collection.

Increase citizen oversight

If a portion of the regionally-collected taxes were destined to fund regional government programs, then tax-paying citizens would have greater incentives to monitor their regional government and to demand better service delivery. Currently, the people rightly view regional revenue levels as the result of a decision made by the national government in Lima. There is no real connection between the money that was collected from them as taxes and the money that is spent by their regional governments. If there was an explicit relationship, then they would have a greater incentive to monitor the management of these resources. They would demand greater accountability and transparency, more access to information and a greater say in the decision-making process of how to spend their own money.

Implementation details

The NCD should create a special taskforce within the NCD to design the regional tax revenue system proposal. It would make both practical and political sense to ask the two representatives from the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) on the council to lead this taskforce. Both representatives are powerful decision-makers at the MEF, whose influence and knowledge of what would and would not be politically supportable would increase the likelihood of the proposal being adopted by the MEF.

The proposal should go beyond what the current Law of Fiscal Decentralization allows for regional taxes. According to Carlos Casas, 50% of the taxes included in the legal framework for the macro-regions, should they ever come to be, is inadequate to cover the programs and responsibilities being devolved to the regional governments. Therefore, the proposal should ensure either a larger percentage of these taxes or a broader set of taxes beyond those specified in the current macro-region framework, to adequately cover the full needs of the regional governments. Additionally, as mentioned, the proposal should seriously evaluate the gradual transfer of tax-collection responsibility to the regional level.

The preparation of this proposal should consider the opinion of relevant academics in Peru as well as the IFIs, especially the Inter-American Development Bank and World Bank. Once approved by the full NCD, the proposal should be presented to the Congressional Commissions of Economics, Public Finance and Decentralization for approval. From there, the proposal would be drafted into law, voted on by the Congress and given to the President to sign into law.

3. Implementation by the Office of the Public Defender

1) Improve good governance measurements

Good governance goes beyond what the OPD currently measures. Their Good Governance Index emphasizes only what is currently included in the legal framework and what the OPD has a direct or indirect interest in. Also, although they are interested in how good governance impacts corruption, they don’t currently measure corruption, nor do they coordinate the timing of the GGI with those that do. They should make a concerted effort with civil society organizations and others to strengthen their measurement of good governance and to time it with the measurement of corruption in the regions to facilitate analytical accuracy.

An accurate measure

Even the OPD recognizes that there are several relevant factors that are not yet being measured in their index, and they have already described two additional components that they intend to measure for the second index due out January, 2006. They intend to develop sub-components that measure the neutrality and impartiality in the activities of public administration as well as the level of inclusion and preferential treatment for special needs citizens such as pregnant women, the handicapped, and children.

Even within the components measured in the current GGI, there were several sub-components not measured. For example, into the component of Access to Public Information, they decided to measure only two out of the five sub-components defined. As a result, over half of the regional governments obtained a perfect score in this component. It is unlikely that the measured homogeneity of performance reflects the reality of the regional governments. More likely, there is variation in the access to public information between the regions.

The exclusion of sub-components in the existing four components and of two whole other components results in an incomplete measure of good governance. These omissions have implications.

First, the ranking of the regions in the forthcoming index is likely to change as much as a result of improving the measurement as actual changes in the regional governments’ performances. New additions will change the weights on the existing components and sub-components. This means that comparisons across the indices in terms of rank and score change will lose some degree of validity.

Second, since at least some of these additional factors are likely to influence levels of corruption, our econometric model has a measurement error. Luckily, correcting the impact on our results would actually work in favor of our analysis, because this measurement error gives our coefficient an attenuation bias. This means that we likely underreport the impact of good governance on corruption. Our analysis therefore is based on conservative results.

A coordinated measure

Additionally, it would improve the analytic usefulness of the GGI if it were coordinated with a measure of corruption. For our analysis we compared the GGI to Proéticas measure of corruption, which is done on a regional-level about once a year. It happened to be that we were able to combine two sets of data from Proética to align nicely with the timing of the GGI fieldwork, but without conscious coordination, such fortuitous alignment is unlikely to ease the work of researchers and analysts interested in these variables. Therefore, in support of future research, some of which they may be interested in conducting themselves to bolster the credibility and power of their GGI, the OPD should either develop its own measure of corruption or coordinate the timing of its work on the GGI with a partner in the private or non-profit sector (like Proética) that works to quantify corruption.

Implementation details

It would be better to radically alter the index one time than to continue making small changes every time it is calculated. Obviously, this implies a concentration of time and resources, but the benefit of having a stable measurement standard is that meaningful comparison across time is made possible. On the other hand, if the OPD thinks that it is too soon in the decentralization process to develop a definitive measurement of good regional governance, then it may make sense to make small improvements over time. As long as the changes are explicit, good analysis is likely to be able to work with them to draw strong inferences regarding comparability in the rankings and score across time.

In any case, the OPD should work hard to improve upon the current measurement. Expanding their coordination with other partners from academia, research centers, non-profits and the private sector would expand their knowledge resources and enhance their work. Specifically, we recommend that the OPD look to forge a relationship with a partner at the regional level, like Participa Peru, and at the local level, like Ciudadanos al Día. There are surely many good options for partnership; we mention these two because they are examples of civil society organizations, with a high degree of credibility, concerned specifically with monitoring the decentralization process in Peru and measuring good governance and/or corruption.

2) Expand measurements to the municipal level

Although our econometric analysis focused exclusively on the regional level, there is reason to believe that our findings are relevant to the local level. The theoretic framework we built in this paper does not distinguish between regional and local levels of government. Consequently, the theory that supports our hypothesis of the relationship between good governance and corruption at the regional level should apply equally well at the local level.

The role of the OPD in defining and pushing the good governance agenda at the regional level is vital in the battle against corruption. It makes sense to leverage the work they have begun at the regional level of government to combat corruption at the local level as well.

Already, civil society organizations (CSOs) have demonstrated an interest in pushing the good governance agenda at the local level. CSOs like Ciudadanos al Dia (CAD) have made important progress in measuring and supporting components similar to those defined by the OPD. For example, among many other activities, CAD has measured transparency at the local level and created a ranking for the capital provincial municipalities in each of Peru’s regions as well as the district municipalities in Metropolitan Lima.

The OPD should take into consideration the progress achieved by CSOs like CAD and create partnerships to support these initiatives with technical assistance and information exchange. The OPD could even develop strategic alliances with CSOs that have the resources and specific expertise to measure and support good governance at the municipal level. OPD could allow them to use its brand and credibility to expand and increase the effectiveness of their work.

We have shown that better governance decreases corruption at the regional level. By pushing the good governance agenda both at the regional and local levels, it should be possible to strengthen the institutional environment into which rascal resources, political power, and administrative responsibilities are being decentralized. With these institutions of good governance functioning and with an active and engaged civil society, it may be possible for Peru to break the trend in Latin American and low-income countries. Instead of decentralization being associated with more corruption, Peru may be able to realize the benefits of decentralization, without paying for them with higher corruption. They may even be able to use the decentralization process, as we suggest, to consciously make a concerted effort to beat back corruption, both at the regional and local levels.

Imagine Peru with improved democratic participation, with a more responsive and accountable government, with better public service delivery, and with less corruption, all thanks to well-designed policies that guide and complement the decentralization process. Imagine Peru with greater economic and political development. Peru needs a breakthrough. The current decentralization process is still in its early stages; its not too late to make a breakthrough happen.

List of Appendices

I. Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index Rankings
II. Office of the Public Defender’s Good Governance Index
III. Good Governance Ranking
IV. Levels of Corruption across Types of Everyday Transactions
V. Legal Framework for Decentralization and Good Governance
VI. Research Interviews conducted in Lima, Peru, January, 2005
VII. Acronyms and Abbreviations
VIII. OLS Regressions

Focus on Corruption: How to secure the aims of decentralization in Peru by improving good governance at the regional level

Change or Continuity? Female Sex Workers’ Lives in the Dominican Republic

HiiDunia — Wed, 15 Jun 2011 21:10:55 +0000

Written by David Parduhn

Introduction

Multi-sectoral Approaches to Migration of Health Professionals

HiiDunia — Mon, 06 Jun 2011 18:22:47 +0000

An Editorial written by Krystle Lai

Background

The World Health Organisation prioritises health care workers as the “cornerstone of health care delivery systems”, and further categorises a well performing health workforce as one of the six building blocks for an effective health system (WHO, 2000).

Whilst migration of health professionals is not a new phenomenon, it has increased significantly, and has continued to do so at an increased rate since the early 1990s. In the 1970s, approximately 6% of the world’s physicians and 4% of the world’s nurses were working outside of their country of origin, with the majority working in the UK, USA, Germany, Canada and Australia (Smith et al, 2009). Current estimates suggest that in the UK, 50% of foreign nurses are from India and the Philippines. In the USA, 80% are from the Philippines, India, Latin America and the Caribbean (Smith et al, 2009).

Migration today has become problematic because the out-migration of health professionals is to such a degree that the source countries are experiencing a significant loss in their national stock of skills, thus impacting on their capability to provide an effective health service. The WHO estimates that there are critical shortages of health professionals in 57 countries (WHO, 2006).

Expectedly, these shortages are distributed inequitably: Africa has 25% of the world’s disease burden, yet it has only 1.3% of health service providers (WHO, 2006). Developing countries in African and Asian countries are suffering the most from such out-migration of health professionals; this has manifested itself in alarmingly low ratios of staff to population (Buchan, 2010).

Push and pull factors influencing migration of health professionals

Whilst deciding to migrate is essentially a personal decision, there are common patterns that enable understanding of the broader issues around the push and pull factors influencing migration. Structural causes at local, nation, regional, and international level also play a role in influencing the migration of health professionals.

Increased globalisation in the form of new and increased access to communication technologies as well as increased access to international travel means that not only are people able to travel more, and more easily but they also have more access to the global labour market.

For health professionals, the lure of higher salaries, perceived increased chances of vertical social mobility, better management and governance structures and better standards of living are all common pull factors in the decision to migrate to a high income country. Additionally, existing networks of migrant communities in the recipient country facilitate not just the migration of an individual to that particular country, but also the integration process upon arrival. Often, these factors are mirrored by push factors in the source country, where health care professionals become frustrated with poor governance and management structures, lack of opportunity, poor salaries etc. Waves of migration are also commonly associated with war and social unrest; significant numbers of health care professionals migrate to developed countries through the asylum process.

Systematic attempts to influence migration from developing countries to developed countries, such as the UK and USA, have played a significant role in increasing migration. Developed countries have used recruitment agencies to actively recruit from developing countries due to their own domestic shortfalls in health care workers. According to the NHS, the cost of training a doctor is between £200,000 to £250,000. Economically, then, it is easy to understand the drive for recruitment of foreign trained professionals.

Impacts of migration

The targeted recruitment of health care professionals by developed countries has amplified the situation in developing countries, whose health systems are experiencing rather more severe human resource shortages. Additionally, developing countries often have weaker health systems, which makes it more difficult for them to overcome losses in human resources.

The impacts of migration are manifesting in diverse forms in different countries. Few countries, such as the Philippines and India, have been able to benefit from this, because their health systems are established enough to absorb the human resource loss. To give an example of this, more than 50% of new nurse registrants in the UK were from India, but this represented just 0.21% of India’s total nursing stock (Hawkes et al, 2009). Other countries have not been able to manage the situation as well, such as Guinea Bissau and Ghana, who each have approximately 30% of their health workforce working overseas (Smith et al 2009)

The deficit of health care professionals is having detrimental effects on health systems of developing countries, where often the workforce is unable to provide an effective service delivery of health care. Major concern has been expressed around the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and the effect migration is having on their attainment, particularly in Sub Saharan Africa.

Current strategies addressing international recruitment of health care professionals

Some countries, such as the Philippines have been able to capitalise on this global trend and are training up to 15000 nurses annually for export (Smith et al, 2009). Remittances from health professionals who have migrated to developed countries is commonly stated as one of the benefits of migration (Smith et al, 2009). In the 1990s, the global monetary input derived from remittances was more than official development aid (Connell, 2008).

There is a significant amount of non binding documentation focussed on out-migration of health professionals from developing to high income countries. The last decade has seen the formulation of various national and regional policies, codes and agreements related to international recruitment of health care professionals. Table 1 below summarises some of the international codes and policies that are currently used in the international recruitment of health care workers.

The codes tabled above have all received significant amounts of criticism. In his analysis of The UK Department of Health’s Code, Buchan(2008) has identified various weaknesses, including the omission of recruitment agencies and private sector employers. Buchan (2008) suggests that strengthening the code will reduce numbers of migrating health professionals from Sub Saharan Africa. However, with the ever growing demand for health professionals in the UK, coupled with the lure of working and living in a developed country, the strengthening of a Code is unlikely to make a significant impact on migratory patterns.

The Commonwealth Code has tried to create a unified international response to the issue, though has not been signed by the UK, Canada or Australia, due to the possibility of having to compensate for source countries’ expenditure on training of health professionals. It is clear that these strategies lack political will for effective implementation.

Multi sectoral approaches to address the problem of out-migration of health care professionals

Whilst the proliferation of national and regional guidelines is a good platform for the management of health worker migration, there is urgent need to address this problem in a more structured and cohesive way.

Considering the multiple levels on which out-migration have effect, and the international spread of stakeholders involved, a comprehensive multi-sectoral approach must be devised and employed. Crucial to the effective management of this problem is a concerted effort, by actors at local, national, regional and international levels. With the negative impacts of migration manifesting in the health systems of source countries most severely, the suggested approach here focuses attention on national health systems of developing countries, using the WHO Framework for Action (2006), with particular reference to the six building blocks, as guidance. The implementation strategies identified have two broad aims: i) to address the most common issues within health systems that push people to emigrate and ii) to increase domestic staff retention rates, thereby reducing emigration rates.

To manage migration effectively, governments need to conduct analysis of their own country context, and proffer feasible and appropriate solutions. As stipulated in Table 2, solutions should be within the WHO framework for health systems strengthening, and address each of the six building blocks.

To maintain and indeed expand health care systems, governments need to increase recruitment and retention, while simultaneously decreasing attrition rates. To do this, Ministries of Health will need to conduct comprehensive research on their workforce, looking particularly at problem areas that could potentially be push factors in out-migration. Stilwell (2003) discusses the importance of information systems, and creating databases of migration as the first step to addressing the issue. Whilst data collection of this sort may not always be feasible in resource poor settings, it is imperative that governments at national and district level have, at the very least, a methodical understanding of push factors causing their staff to emigrate.

Service provision must be targeted, effectively staffed, well equipped and responsive to population’s needs. In effect, this means that international donors, both bilateral and multilateral need to be cognisant of these issues, and must ensure that funding streams are context appropriate and results focussed.

The poor morale of health professionals is often due to an inability to perform tasks effectively due to lack of resources/poor resource allocation. This must be addressed adequately to boost morale, increase retention rates and, ultimately, to improve health status. Another factor which is reiterated in studies on migration is that of inadequate and/or untimely payment (Smith et al, 2009). Health systems need to prioritise financing payment of its workforce, and if appropriate, raise funds specifically for this purpose. There must also be effective governance of finances, at all levels, to reduce corruption within the system and to ensure that the workforce is salaried adequately and on time.

The establishment of accurate health information systems is crucial to good workforce planning. Ministries of Health must have accurate records of the actual number of staff in the health workforce, and must also monitor out migration. Where possible, research should be conducted to identify causes of migration. Donors should also have an understanding that emigration of health professionals is a significant problem, and should support governments in their research, and attempts to increase retention rates.

There are certain measures countries can undertake to help reduce out-migration, and to strengthen the overall health system in order to meet targets such as the MDGs. Governance and leadership at all levels are fundamental to this; health managers at all levels must take responsibility for the effective allocation and monitoring of resources. International bilateral and multilateral agencies and donors must be committed to supporting the health system strengthening of developing countries, and funding should reflect this.

Conclusion

The migration of health workers from developing to developed countries is likely to continue increasing. Although the reasons for migration are essentially personal, we must acknowledge that there are structural causes that are increasing the numbers of health professionals who chose to migrate. The unequal distribution of health care workers globally is intensified by this process, and the impacts are felt most in developing countries with weak health systems, particularly in Sub Saharan Africa. This is effecting countries capacity to meet internationally set targets such as the MDGs.

The solution lies in understanding the issues for migration, managing current migration patterns, and safeguarding against growing attrition rates.

The need for reliable data is central to the management of migration of health professionals, and the effective planning of the health workforce. Policy makers must have a clear idea of the drivers behind migration, and policy must incorporate factors that will work towards higher rates of staff retention on national levels.

The issue of migration of health professionals needs to be made a global priority, with assessable targets for all stakeholders. This will require recognition and understanding of the issue, and political commitment to manage it, on national and international levels. Finally, health professionals must be valued, and recognised as the fundamental building blocks of any health system.

For Bibliography and tables please see PDF download

Multi-sectoral Approaches to Migration of Health Professionals (200)