It seems Somalia once again has the opportunity to gain political legitimacy and security for a devastated people. Last year the UN approved a task force of 8,000 peacekeepers while about 10,000 Somalis’ have been merged to form the Trans-Federal Governments (TFG) security force representing all the major clans of Somalia. However, there are still grave concerns that the hardest part of establishing peace in Somalia still lies ahead. Although the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) were defeated with ease by the TFG and their backers, causing the UIC effectively dissolve itself on 27th December 2006 a power vacuum has been left across much of Somalia that the TFG has been unable to fill. This carries with it the dual threat that the UIC may seek to continue their cause through guerrilla warfare or that southern Somalia will return to clan based politics.
Moreover, much anger has already been directed at the TFG due to perceived clan discrimination as it has pursued policies that have alienated the Hawiye clan through the relocation of government to Jowhan and then to Baidoa from the capital Mogadishu. In many regions this has left the government according to the NGO Crisis Group “weak, unpopular and faction ridden” with fears that the power vacuum is once again to be filled by those warlords and elites that the UIC defeated less than a year ago.
Since 1991 Somalia has been labelled as a collapsed state. Somalia’s collapse since 1991 is the longest period any country has gone in modern history without a functioning government. Indicative of state collapse is not the disappearing but the changing of politics, altering its form, drawing from the traditional to conceive a new socio-political evolution.
With international help from Ethiopia, the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU) and the United States, Somalia is currently struggling to form a unified government after more than 15 years of clan warfare.
A number of explanations can be offered for the initial collapse and then continual failure to restore a legitimate state to Somalia. Both external and internal reasons have been cited such as criticisms that Somali leaders have been irresponsible, corrupt and unwilling to compromise on power. Others argue that Somali’s are fearful of a re-emergence of an authoritarian corrupt regime that would repress the populous and so scupper efforts for a centralised state. A further explanation is that the traditional clan make-up of Somali society is incoherent with the ideals of a centralised state. Those that argue external factors may be the cause of Somalia’s difficulties blame neighbouring states such as Ethiopia for perpetuating state collapse within Somalia to serve their own interests. While others point the finger at western diplomatic and interventionist policy for being badly managed, ignorant and neglectful of Somalia’s difficulties.
The Barre Regime
During 1991 at Fukuyama’s supposed ‘End of History’ ideological plateau, Somalia was in the midst of large scale clan fighting comparable to civil war that sent Siad Barre’s ruling authoritarian regime fleeing from the capital Mogadishu. Barre’s regime had ruled over Somalia for 21 years following a violent seizure of power in October 1969 after the assassination of democratically elected president Abdirashid Ali Shamarke. Following the seizure of power Barre was appointed chairman and later the presidency of the ruling Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party. However, Somalia proved to be a country difficult to exert political control over, and as Barre’s regime extended it’s control upon Somalia it’s method of rule became increasingly authoritarian.
Siad Barre’s initially socialist regime became increasingly reliant upon methods of survivalist politics in an attempt to exert and extend political power and authority across the whole of Somalia. It denied Somali citizens the right to vote, destroyed any vestige of a legitimate and independent judiciary system and became evermore oppressive towards traditionally democratic institutions such as a free press and free speech. Moreover, Barre concentrated much of his political power and economic reform in and around Mogadishu and fertile southern river valleys, creating vast inequalities and in-balances in economic growth, giving rise to group rivalry for scarce resources outside of the capital. As the regime continued such a hard-line approach to governing Somalia, policy often depended upon creating clan divisions and sometimes inter-clan conflict through a method of divide and rule that led to the creation of evermore powerful enemies and competing factions that would lead Somalia to future collapse.
Cold War Politics
Somalia was a pawn of super power rivalry during the Cold War period. Both the US and the Soviet Union supported Siad Barres regime at one point or another. The two great powers of the day saw Somalia’s strategic location at the entrance of the Red Sea as an important oil route and a means of extending their influence in an unstable region. Having seized control from the democratically elected government and then declaring Somalia a Socialist state Siad Barre’s regime was quick to receive international support from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union helped arm and aid Barre’s regime militarily through the 1970s as Barre sought support from the Soviet military to annex the majority Somali Ogaden region of Ethiopia. However, when the Soviet Union switched it’s support to the new Marxist government in Ethiopia mid-way through the conflict Somalia lost the war. Defeat in the Ogaden war was catastrophic for the Barre regime. It ruined Somalia’s military, forcing Barre to abandon his dreams of a ‘greater Somali nation’ causing an upsurge in discontent within the Barre regime as well as leading to the formation of the first organized opposition group, the ‘Somali Salvation Democratic Front’ (SSDF).
During the 1980s the US, hoping to gain a greater influence in the destabilised region and counter strong Soviet influence in Ethiopia became a donor to the Barre regime. US support for the Barre regime was to last up to its collapse, providing both military and economic aid to fight insurgent warlords. The legacy of the Cold War left a lasting impact upon Somalia, creating a huge weapon surplus in Somali society due to military super-power support during the arms race. Such an arsenal, derived from Cold war patronage was often sold on the shadow economy during and immediately after the collapse of central government authority. This allowed some to accumulate vast amounts of wealth and weaponry while others were forced into circumstances of survival.
After losing patronage from the Soviet Union the Barre regime quickly aligned itself with the US and Italy. Foreign aid generated $2.8 billion for Somalia between 1972 and 1989, more than any other African states’ aid per a capita at that time. However, most of the Somali population benefited very little from state led development as much of the generated wealth was siphoned off by the corrupt regime. An indication of the level of internal difficulty and corruption is that Somalia’s dependence on foreign aid for 90 per cent of its development spending . Moreover, when examined government spending in other areas not related to social development indicates possible reasons for the collapse, break-up and continuous lack of legitimate authority in Somalia after the disposal of the Barre regime.
Following the collapse of the Barre regime in 1991, that brought with it the destruction of any remittance of central authority in Somalia since 1991, the world prepared to intervene. The Cold War had ended, Francis Fukuyama had declared man to have reached the end of his ideological evolution, and the world was to become a safe place full of liberal democratic ideals. The new collective security paradigm following the end of the cold war conceived a new world order asserting greater emphasis upon global governance institutions, democratization and a neo-liberal global economy. The requirement for aid intervention further heightened in the case of Somalia as the collapsed state stood outside the teleological neo-liberal remit of development theory that still placed Somalia on an evolutionary path to fulfil a liberal development paradigm. Therefore, the response conceived by the international community was one of ‘mission creep’, a term coined from the intervention in Somalia in the early 1990s to describe the changing goals of the intervention.
The UN, US and International Financial Institutions (IFI’s) sought to intervene in collapsed Somalia at various times during the 1990s. However, their task was made decidedly difficult without a government to impose their policies or accept their aid efforts whether it was loans or aid. Civil conflict and societal break-up induced a devastating famine for much of 1991 and 1992, causing mass internal displacement and an estimated 300,000 deaths. A UN peacekeeping force was assigned to Somalia in December 1992, but faced greater violent resistance than expected from militias’ armed with it’s Cold War arsenal. Moreover, there was the added difficulty of exercising neutrality in civil conflict.
The United Nations involvement in humanitarian relief within Somalia was radically altered in 1992 due to civil conflict. The Security Council established a UN intervention force UNSOMI to monitor a ceasefire in Mogadishu. Mission aims for UNSOMI was to provide protection and a secure working environment for United Nations “personnel, equipment and supplies at the seaports and airports in Mogadishu and to escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies to distribution centres in and around Mogadishu”.
In August 1993 UNSOMI was enlarged to administer such services throughout all of Somalia. Following little success in the midst of large scale civil conflicts the Security Council authorised the forming of UNITAF (Unified Task Force) to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance while UNSOMII was later established in March 1993 to disarm and reconcile the internal conflicts within Somalia and install law and order back into Somalia. However, there was little success as following the shooting down of two US Black Hawk helicopters and the global media portrayal of the horrific deaths of 18 US soldiers in 1993, US troops were withdrawn. Later the UN also withdrew from operations in Somalia claiming that there was no peace to keep. The poorly planned foreign intervention in Somalia in the early 1990s raised many questions about the developing role of various actors in global governance and humanitarian efforts. It would also have a radical impact upon UN and international interventionist policy in African states, leading to the non-intervention in the Rwandan genocide in 1994.
Since UN and US operations retreated from Somalia, difficulties in Somalia were largely ignored by the international community until the events of September 11th 2001. Prior to September 11th Somalia was portrayed by the world media as a collapsed state torn apart by tribal rivalry and corrupt warlords set on personal gain. Civil conflicts, social strife, and humanitarian atrocities became evidence for corruption and ethnic rivalry to such an extent that foreign powers remained unable to remedy, despite reports suggesting up to a million people had died in the time period.
The emergence of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) in the midst of the US led war on terror, has increased concerns within the West that Somalia was becoming a safe haven for Islamic fundamentalism ruled by a regime similar to that of the Taliban prior to intervention in Afghanistan. The US has acted on such fears, worried that Somalia will become a safe haven for terrorists intent on launching attacks upon the West as the “events of September 11th have elevated the relevance of collapsed states into a central question for international security.” In May 2006 the Washington Post claimed that the US was secretly supporting warlords fighting against Islamic groups linked to the UIC in and around the capital Mogadishu. However, African researchers criticised the Bush administration claiming that, “little was being done to support economic development initiatives that would provide alternative livelihoods to picking up a gun or following extremist ideologies.”
Attempts for the Restoration of Somalia
Since the turn of the century there has been a renewed attempt from the international community to restore order within Somalia. This has primarily been done through support for the establishment of a new Somali transitional government. In October 2000 newly appointed Prime Minister Ali Khalif Gelayashi announced his transitional government which was the first in Somalia since 1991. However, within months of the establishment of the government Somali rebels, with backing from Ethiopia had seized the Southern town of Garbaharey. Further damage was then done to the transitional government’s authority in April 2001 when a number of Somali warlords announced their intentions to form their own national government in opposition to the transitional government. A year later warlords based in South West Somalia attempted to follow their counterparts in Somaliland and Puntland by declaring six regions to be autonomous from the transitional government and formed a ‘South-Western Regional Government.’ After the failure of the previous transitional government a new transitional government was formed in 2004, headed by Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Ghedi, who was elected to the precarious task of restoring order and legitimate authority within Somalia. However, due to the volatile situation in Mogadishu and throughout much of Somalia it was not until June 2005 that the transitional government was able to return from exile in Kenya. Moreover, it was still unable to establish a parliament in Mogadishu due to warlord fighting, so after much dispute it set-up parliament miles north of the capital in the town of Baidoa.
A further threat to Ghedi’s transitional government’s authority was seen by the rise of Islamic warlords mainly in South and central Somalia. Islamist warlords compromised government authority by gaining control of vast regions in the South including Mogadishu. The Islamic advance in Southern Somalia was only halted and forced to retreat due to the UN Security Council resolution 1725 outlining an endorsement of peace keeping strategy to prop up the transitional government in December 2006. Then later intervention by Ethiopia and the US, fearful of the formation of a radical Islamic state, forced the Islamist warlords to abandon Mogadishu and concede their strongholds in southern Somalia.
A recent BBC report from January 1st 2007 declared, “It is unlikely that the transitional government would be able to fulfil that vacuum without the help of powerful clan leaders.” Underlining that since 1991 there has been 14 failed attempts to establish a central government in Somalia without key infrastructure such as government buildings or civil service. The last 15 years of warlord fighting has taken it’s toll on Somalia, destroying conventional differences between government and the populous, causing a radical transformation within Somali society. Such intra-state conflict has caused the breakdown of Somalia’s modern structures of power within political and civil society, which have since been replaced by distorted traditional structures of kinship and regional elites. This has been enveloped within much conflict intervention and rhetoric worldwide that views intra-state conflict and importantly traditional civil authority to contradict liberal development moralities.
Written by Liam Taylor
International Crisis Group – Collection of artilces from this NGO regarding Somalia
Net Nomad – “Famine Threat Drives Thousands of Somalis From Homes”
Somaliland Forum – Site serving the widespread Somali Diaspora
The Somaliland Times – “Patronage Politics, Foreign Aid, and the Start of State Collapse”
